Moscow's Hardline Shift

Moscow's foreign policy is undergoing a noticeable change. But to fully understand this shift, one has to take a look at the origins of this policy back in 1991. The democratic forces that came to power at that time were eager to build a free and prosperous Russia, and all their hopes rested on the West. At the same time, they were determined to reject the legacy of the Soviet Union -- to get rid of communist partners and Third World clients.


Many facets of this original strategy remain in effect today, but an accelerating change has become evident in recent months. The widely perceived failure of "shock therapy" has delivered a powerful blow to the camp of radical reformers. The opposition in Russia has become so strong that it can now exert influence on the conduct of diplomacy. Generally speaking, challenges to President Boris Yeltsin's foreign policy are concentrated on two crucial points. First, opponents reject the premise that the West and Russia can really be friends. Second, anti-reformers attack Yeltsin for allowing the collapse of the Russian empire.


The Kremlin now takes this powerful domestic criticism into account, especially because the Russian government itself has changed. The radical democrats have largely been replaced by representatives of the old Soviet bureaucracy, most of whom secretly -- and increasingly openly -- endorse the discontent over the 1991 foreign-policy line.


Russia's all-embracing domestic crisis is also having an effect on the country's foreign policy. The government is preoccupied with domestic problems, and it simply does not have time to adequately plan its strategies in the international arena. The absence of an effective mechanism to executing foreign-policy decisions makes things even worse.


Among external factors influencing Russian foreign policy are disappointment with the results of cooperation with the West and disillusion with the behavior of the former Soviet republics and other neighbors, from Afghanistan to Japan.


As a result of all these factors, the motives of Russian foreign policy are being re-examined. Security concerns are beginning to move back to the forefront. There is growing apprehension that the West -- if not checked -- may come to dominate Russia economically, may exclude it from participating in European affairs and may cut Russia off from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. In short, many fear a "new containment." Even much more obvious are security concerns that have arisen regarding Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Caucasus region and elsewhere.


Nationalism is increasingly prominent feature of Moscow's international posture. The government has at last identified the protection of the Russian-speaking population outside Russia's borders as a priority. To placate Russian national feelings, the authorities once again praise the military deeds of former generations and defend Moscow's foreign policy, even the one pursued in the Soviet period.


As for the opposition, it openly presents nationalism as a proper basis for Russia's international strategy. Vladimir Zhirinovsky echoes Hitler's ideas on the struggle of nations for survival, and even theoretically internationalist Communists criticize Yeltsin for not wrestling huge debts from "anti-imperialist" Iraq, Libya and North Korea.


This nationalism is closely connected with Russia's great-power ambitions. The urge to return to the traditional spheres of influence also has a strategic rationale. Balancing the Western connection with cooperation in the east and in the south, the Kremlin hopes to act more independently in the international arena. The economic factor pushes Russia to develop closer ties with virtually all states. On the other hand, the Kremlin believes it has to prevent the flight of valuable resources from Russia.


The Kremlin has finally realized that the "near abroad" is Russia's top priority. The two distinct features of Moscow's current policies vis-?-vis its former subjects are the defense of Russia's national interests and the gradual reintegration of the newly independent states. Yeltsin's government pays close attention to the problems of the Russian diaspora, safeguarding its economic interests. Although it has been generally restrained, many in Moscow consider substantial portions of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to be Russian lands, arbitrarily given away by communist leaders. The desire for reintegration continues to grow.


Nostalgia for lost ground in the Third World has also engulfed not only the opposition, but the Russian government as well. Moscow has become disillusioned with the effectiveness and correctness of its former policy of repentance. Rather than appreciation, Russia's Western partners have shown disdain and continue to emphasize the crimes of previous Kremlin leaders.


These changes in Russia's foreign policy create fears that Russia will sooner or later resume its imperialist practices, especially if democracy at home fails. Such a scenario may indeed develop, but not for a long time, if at all. Russia does not possess the military strength to engage in a general confrontation with the major world powers. It is also obvious that, in order to survive economically, Russia will have to keep its doors to the world open for some time to come.


There is also simply no major ideological issue which could separate Russia (under any leader) from the world's developed countries. The Russian Federation has no choice but to continue to strive to build a modern society along the lines of Western Europe or the United States. Also, the Russian people are fed up with "great leaders," their grand ideas, plans and promises. Most people would reject any new "hero" right from the start, and others would abandon him as soon as he began calling for new sacrifices.





Yevgeny Bazhanov is the director of the Institute for Contemporary International Problems at the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy. He contributed this comment, which expresses only his own opinions, to The Moscow Times.