Russia and the Caucasus

The Federation Council's unexpected deferment of a decision on introducing Russian peacekeeping forces into the conflict in Abkhazia makes one wonder about the role that Moscow should play in the entire Caucasus region.Only a few weeks ago it seemed that progress on the two major conflicts in the region -- Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh -- was finally being made. Unfortunately, that has not happened. A cease-fire agreement worked out by military leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh is hanging in limbo. In Azerbaijan, the "war party" is not yet ready to give in. It is the same in Georgia, where near-hysterical criticism has been provoked by a proposed cease-fire agreement in Abkhazia. Of course, no regulation of these conflicts can occur until all parties involved feel the need for peace.It is, however, becoming clear that the most responsible players on each side do see that a continuation of the fighting -- regardless of who is winning -- means catastrophe for everyone. Not without difficulty, they have come to see who it is that can become the guarantor of any agreements that might be reached and who will be able to take responsibility for peacekeeping operations: Russia. Therefore, we are on the threshold of a new situation. It seems that our troops will have to return to the very regions from which they were compelled to leave under unpleasant circumstances, experiencing the enmity of many people in the region, some of whom continue to feel the same way.Now, however, it would seem that quite a few people would not like to see Russian peacekeepers in the Caucasus. And it is not simply the nationalist-oriented leaders of the warring states that feel this way. When Defense Minister Pavel Grachev recently presented Russia's military doctrine at NATO headquarters in Brussels, the strongest objections were evoked by his statements concerning the possible conduct of peacekeeping operations in the countries of the CIS.Furthermore, it now seems that various members of Russia's parliament are expressing misgivings. They are concerned primarily with the fear that Russia may be beginning a new period of imperialist policies. And while NATO's analysts and the radical nationalists in the former republics are concerned about the idea of empire itself, in Russia people wonder about the price that would have to be paid for a military return to the Caucasus.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not Russian, but Soviet troops -- having only just barely taken the name "Russian"-- that left the region. This is not merely a word game; there really is an important difference here. In those days, the army was held accountable for mistakes that were not its fault. The Soviet leadership played political games with the brewing crises of the region, trying to suppress them rather than resolve them. The army was sent into such flashpoints as a part of these games, without a clearly defined mission. It was sent simply to represent a desire on the part of the Soviet authorities to regulate these conflicts; in reality, no such desire existed.But this is the main difference in the present situation is that no one is forcing anything on anyone. The warring sides in those same conflicts that destroyed the Soviet Union who, until recently, refused any help from Moscow in regulating the conflicts, are the same people who today see Russia as the only force capable of bringing peace. Whether they like it or not. The reality is that these conflicts are impossible to win while, at the same time, no one has the will to end them since too much blood has already been spilt. So far, the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has come to nothing. Also, hopes that neighboring countries with ethnic or religious ties to the warring sides would be able to play a stabilizing role have not been justified. These countries are plainly more interested in taking control and expanding their own spheres of influence by taking advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbors.As a result, only Russia is a serious force capable of undertaking peacekeeping operations, despite the risks involved. Moscow is ready, though, to take these risks because Russia has its own interests in the Caucasus, and it is these interests that Russian troops would be defending. But the important point is that these interests are not selfish and they do not conflict with the interests of the people of the region. First, Russia seeks to end conflicts that threaten its own security. Second, Russia is concerned about the possibility of millions of refugees flooding across the border. Third, Russia is concerned about the inflow of weapons and narcotics. In short, Moscow's main interest is stability in the region.The fact that the warring sides themselves are voluntarily turning to Russia as a mediator is itself an important moral victory for regulation. This explains the fact that the relatively sharp tone with which Grachev conducted negotiations with military leaders from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh -- which surprised many -- was tolerated. It would seem that this is the only way to shake up people who, after years of war, have come to think only in terms of confrontation.Moscow, which is now patiently waiting for the warring sides to turn to Russia for assistance, clearly does not intend to repeat Soviet mistakes by taking on a police function within the CIS. If troops are sent, it will only happen after all sides have agreed to a complete cessation of military activity. Russian peacekeepers will have a clear mandate and well-defined limits to their functions. Life itself, it would seem, is bringing the old argument about Russia's role in the post-Soviet world to an end. It will not be the role of an imperial power, but that of a stabilizing and consolidating factor.Alexander Golz is a political observer for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.