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U.S. President Barack Obama arrived in Moscow on Monday on his first official visit to Russia. But despite his determination to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations, Obama will likely fail in the attempt, leaving supporters of both the “realistic” and the “values-based” camps without any cause for celebration.
Obama will not agree to a tacit arrangement in which Washington and Moscow divide their respective “spheres of influence” among the former Soviet republics, giving Moscow the final word on the fate of those peoples. Deep in their hearts, Russia’s current leaders continue to dream of re-establishing the Russian or Soviet empire. Their main yardstick for success remains territorial expansion rather than economic prosperity. The Kremlin places the former Soviet republics in four categories: “enemies” that are hopelessly lost (the Baltic states); “adversaries” that it tries to destabilize and control by installing regimes that are friendly to Moscow (Georgia and Ukraine); “vacillating countries” that need to be pulled more tightly into Russia’s orbit (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova); and firm “allies” that should eventually become part of the Russian Federation (Belarus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
Obama will never agree to give Moscow a free hand to annex new territories. What’s more, he will almost certainly warn Moscow of the serious consequences that would follow any Russian military aggression in the region, primarily in Georgia. Because the two countries have different understandings about the sovereignty of the new Eurasian states, Obama will similarly refrain from promising Moscow a halt to NATO’s eastward expansion and will not completely reject plans to deploy elements of U.S. missile defense batteries in Poland and the Czech Republic. If either of those programs is canceled, it will not be from a change in U.S. policy but more because Washington has run out of money during the economic crisis.
Similarly, Obama will reject Russia’s preconditions for signing a new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons reductions that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin put forward during a recent visit to Japan. (The Constitution, by the way, does not give the prime minister authority to make pronouncements on strategic foreign policy.) The United States also has no interest in pursuing President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal for a pan-European security pact that incorporates the same ideas about Moscow divvying up spheres of influence with the West.
Both sides have an interest in reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons reductions: Each side’s nuclear arsenals are much larger than are needed in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, they are expensive to maintain. But because modern U.S. conventional forces have such a strong advantage over Russia’s, negotiations on the reduction of nuclear arms are filled with a deep sense of distrust that makes the process painfully complex. The leaders of both countries will have to personally push an agreement through in order to sign a new treaty before the current one expires at the end of this year.
Whereas Moscow’s interests are limited to re-establishing greater influence over the former Soviet republics and profiting from monopolistic oil and gas exports, the United States has far different foreign policy priorities. Washington is striving to finally stabilize Iraq and begin a phased withdrawal of its troops, cope with the rapidly worsening situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, contain the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea and make progress toward achieving a durable solution to Arab-Israeli relations. In all of these issues, Moscow has scant interest and little to offer in the form of assistance. The fact that the U.S. military base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, which Moscow tried to shut down, continues to serve NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan is a perfect illustration of this.
The approach of the “realists” is doomed to fail because Obama will not agree to Moscow’s three main terms: giving Russia a free hand in the former Soviet republics, allowing far-reaching protectionist measures and turning a blind eye to the reality of Russian authoritarianism in domestic affairs.
Obama is even more resolute than his predecessor about demonstrating how important democratic values are for him and his administration. There is no doubt that his Moscow speech will include strong statements on democracy and human rights. Obama has long emphasized his intention to meet with Russian opposition politicians, human rights advocates, youth groups, businesspeople and to give an interview to the opposition Novaya Gazeta newspaper. That is a clear signal that the White House sees not only the Russian government as partners, but also the wider civil society as well. The Kremlin could not be very happy about it, as it tries to dictate its will not only to its neighbors but within the country as well.
Therefore, we can expect neither a “reset” nor an “overload” from this summit. The hopes of “resetting” U.S.-Russian relations will be shattered by the two sides’ fundamental disagreements on a whole range of issues. At the same time, no “overload” or worsening of relations will take place either, because it would not serve the interests of either side. Serious difficulties lie ahead for signing an agreement to replace the current START I treaty, as well as in formulating declarations of cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, terrorism, the climate and the global economic crisis.
A permanent bilateral commission headed by the two presidents will probably be created. But considering the deep mistrust that spoils relations between the countries, that commission will most likely lack consensus and substance — just like Russia’s ongoing dialogue with the European Union within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been over the last two to three years.
Obama, who must deal with an unprecedented number of difficult domestic and foreign policy challenges, could quickly lose interest in Russia. He could instead choose to focus on working with partners who have a clearer understanding of the overall challenges facing the largest superpower both during and after a global financial crisis. China might fill that role, having openly declared its desire to cooperate more closely with the United States on a wide array of problems from the global crisis to the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
If that happens, an offended Russia will continue to accuse the “U.S. imperialists” of every possible sin, while at the same time expanding as much as it can the boundaries of its oil-based authoritarianism.
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy radio.