In December, I predicted that there would be huge shakeup in the Kremlin and White House at some point in 2009. It looks like I will be wrong on this one.
The reason I was so bold in my forecast was that over the last 100 years of Russian history, there has never been a drastic drop in manufacturing during peacetime like the one we experienced during the 2008-09 crisis without it resulting in major changes in the country’s leadership. I envisioned two possible scenarios. In the first, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would be sacked in a bloodless internal Kremlin coup, a la former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s forced retirement. Many people — both inside and outside the Kremlin — believe that despite Putin’s numerous attributes and achievements, his prolonged hold on power is only making a bad crisis worse. In the second scenario, Putin could have tried to avert the first scenario by “retiring” President Dmitry Medvedev.
So far, neither scenario has played out, and the existing power structure has remained surprisingly stable. But that stability has come at a high price. It is impossible to make even the slightest change to the top positions in government. Even the smallest change in the political status quo could upset the precarious balance.
But it appears that a change is brewing, and we are seeing the first signs of it in the strong attacks against Mayor Yury Luzhkov. In the past, the mayor did an excellent job of coping with Kremlin pressure and allegations that Luzhkov helped his wife become the richest woman in Russia through various corrupt, inside business deals. The formula for his popularity in the capital had been simple: Despite the high corruption and monopolization of the economy, revenues flowed to Muscovites in one form or another. This helped residents tolerate the disproportionately high prices that resulted from runaway corruption and high monopolization.
But this tolerance is running very thin now. The income that used to trickle down to Muscovites has sharply decreased, and this has left residents upset with the Moscow leadership. It is clear that Luzhkov is concerned that the candidates from his United Russia will do poorly in the Oct. 11 City Duma elections, and this may be one explanation why so many opposition candidates were disqualified from running. But in cases of manipulating elections, a falsified “victory” often ends up as a big loss for the chief manipulator.
If Luzhkov were to be ultimately ousted, who could be appointed in his place? Perhaps Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Sobyanin, former governor of the Tyumen region and former head of the presidential administration. He is being seriously considered to one day replace Luzhkov. That would place Sobyanin in the third — and possibly second — most important political post in Russia. It would also put him in a good position to run for president in the future.
Sobyanin is not the main issue though. The bigger problem is changing the status quo. Putting a strong politician in Luzhkov’s spot could very well tip the balance, giving him too much political strength vis-a-vis the president and prime minister. But appointing a weak politician for the spot would tip the scales the other way, creating a power vacuum that could lead to instability.
Despite these inherent political dangers, I remain firm in my prediction: There will be some big political shakeups in the next few months.
Konstantin Sonin, a professor at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University and the New Economic School/CEFIR, is a columnist for Vedomosti.