The old metaphor of two dogs fighting under a carpet probably never applied more aptly to any event than to the struggle now underway for President Boris Yeltsin's affections among his aides.


The Russian press has been buzzing with the expectation that a group of Yeltsin's more liberal aides, numbered anywhere between four and seven, are about to lose their jobs after being abruptly left off the list of administration officials who were to accompany Yeltsin to the United States.On Friday, the president returned to Moscow and presumably the fate of liberal aides such as Yeltsin's spokesman, Vyacheslav Kostikov, is about to be decided. The more conservative aides who did accompany Yeltsin, such as his right-hand man Viktor Ilyushin, are looking very comfortable by comparison.


Kostikov, left to lick his wounds in Moscow, has said that this is a fight of real consequence, nothing less than a struggle for Yeltsin's democratic soul. Other reports have said it is more a question of style and that Kostikov's team made the fatal mistake of criticizing Yeltsin for his recent performance in Berlin, where he appeared to have had a few drinks too many.


But the immediate causes of the dispute are probably less important in this case. For well over a year now the president has slowly been transforming the political stamp of people he keeps around him. Viktor Chernomyrdin replaced Yegor Gaidar; Ilyushin replaced Gennady Burbulis; Mikhail Poltoranin, too, was pushed aside; while Yeltsin published in his latest memoirs the fact that Sergei Filatov, Yeltsin's liberal chief of staff, has no power.


In fact, Kostikov is one of the few liberals remaining in the president's entourage from the team he built up nearly three years ago. His words on the struggle for Yeltsin's soul ring true.


Kostikov said his small liberal coterie does not support Yeltsin in power for his personal virtues but for what he can achieve in bringing democracy to Russia. The same might be said for the motives of the entire, and still substantial, democratic movement in Russia, which was largely responsible for bringing Yeltsin to power.


Yeltsin should heed Kostikov's words for his own sake, whether or not he decides to keep his spokesman on. For who will support Yeltsin in the next elections if not the country's democrats? And which international leaders will welcome and support Yeltsin in the future if he is no longer seen as the best realistic hope for democracy in Russia?


Yeltsin should remember that even in Russia leaders have never voluntarily been loved for their personalities alone, or for their bonhomie in singing at state banquets, but rather for the hopes that they embody.