 | To Our Readers |
Has something you've read here startled you? Are you angry, excited, puzzled or pleased? Do you have ideas to improve our coverage? |
Russia is once more frustrating all attempts at classification. Not so long ago the country was described as a managed, electoral democracy.
Such definitions, based on a distinction between developed and undeveloped democracies, held out hope that with a little hard work the country could become a full-fledged democracy, or at least that it could be regarded as a special model of democracy. But following the collapse of communism and Boris Yeltsin's three "revolutions" -- overturning the state, the political regime and the form of ownership -- Russia is reverting to the tried and true.
Yesterday's optimists now guardedly describe Russia as a hybrid society. This gives rise to three important questions: What sort of hybrid is this? Does Vladimir Putin's hybrid differ from Yeltsin's? And is Putin's hybrid capable of reform?
In the 1990s a unique political structure took shape in Russia. It combined the personification of power that has existed for centuries with the legitimacy afforded by a democratic institution -- elections -- that represents both continuity and a break with the past. The fusion of diametrically opposed principles -- autocracy and elections -- makes this structure inherently unstable. It can only survive by passing from one political regime to the next, altering its rhetoric and its power base.
The Yeltsin years made clear that an underdeveloped democracy cannot be consolidated when it is called upon to form an autocratic regime.
The Putin regime has confirmed the logic of personified power, which inevitably moves to control the electoral process as the only available way to guarantee its longevity. But the more the regime manipulates elections, the more it undermines its own legitimacy. The denizens of the Kremlin may think they are bolstering their hold on power, but in fact they are placing a bomb under the throne.
The threat to the legitimacy of the presidential election caused by the Kremlin's steamrolling of the opposition last fall should serve as a warning to Putin that the electoral component of his regime is on the verge of collapse. Should that happen, to stay in power the president would have little choice but to resort to authoritarian rule. But this would not necessarily restore order to society.
Yeltsin's hybrid differed from Putin's in that it was built on mutual nudge and wink, constant shocks and political bartering -- handing out power in exchange for loyalty. Yeltsin's regime began to bend democratic institutions to the purpose of maintaining its hold on power. This meant strengthening the hand of "The Family" and the oligarchs.
Putin built his regime on subordination and the re-centralization of power. He leads a consolidated bureaucracy, and on his watch, electoral autocracy has given way to bureaucratic authoritarianism. The Kremlin's decimation of the democratic and liberal Duma minority -- and the forceful resolution of its conflict with big business -- testify to the return of a traditional state that imposes its will on society. As left-wing nationalists assume the main opposition role, Russia will be hard pressed to contain this authoritarian impulse.
The fact that Russia is still a long way from becoming a police state offers cold comfort. The current regime does not possess the resources necessary to support a dictatorship, and Putin doesn't act like a dictator. But the erosion of democratic legitimacy will force the regime to clamp down. The weaker it feels, the more it will be tempted to rely on the whip.
The clear definition of power does have its positive aspects. When the cloak of democracy is finally removed, the opposition will be better able to define itself in turn. A regime built on the executive chain of command is stable only when that chain functions flawlessly, and that can be achieved only with fear and violence. Should subordination weaken even slightly, or should fear of the Kremlin disappear, the chain would break. A regime like this inevitably loses touch with reality and becomes incompetent. The fact that the organizing structures of society all hinge on Putin's popularity is a cause of great concern. If his poll numbers plummet, they will drag the entire system down with them.
Is this sort of regime capable of modernizing the country? Yes, if we're talking about industrializing a rural society. But Russia now faces the challenges of the post-industrial world. This requires that the internal sources of growth be freed up, and that is impossible without expanding political freedom. A corrupt and bureaucratic authoritarianism will produce only irresponsibility and decay.
The country's future depends on how quickly society takes control of the power of the state. But systemic reform on that scale has never been achieved during a period of stability, especially when the political class has a stake in maintaining the status quo and society, rocked by years of turmoil, opts for order above all else.
The absence of a democratic, liberal alternative must also be taken into consideration. The current regime, with its fondness for authoritarianism and the market, now faces a rising tide of opposition from the patriotic left. In other words, Russia is torn between two traditional ideologies, right and left.
For now, absolute power is riding on high oil prices and the popular belief in Russia's great-power status. It may well be that Russia will have to follow this road to the end, until the illusions about the potential of modernized authoritarianism are exhausted. Then again, society may soon grow fed up with this transitional phase. Should that happen, much will depend on who -- big business, a faction within the ruling elite or the democratic minority -- steps forward with a viable alternative.
The course of Russian democracy will present a challenge to the West as well, for without the transformation of Russia the community of industrialized nations will never be truly stable or secure.
This comment by Lilia Shevtsova, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, first appeared in Vedomosti.