The 'Kozyrev Doctrine'

If there is a deity of diplomatic protocol, then he or she has punished Andrei Kozyrev for the "joke" he played on his fellow ministers last year in Stockholm. At that time he sent shock waves radiating through the world diplomatic corps by parodying the foreign policy views of the Russian opposition.


Now, after having caused even greater alarm with his quite serious speech at the conference of the ambassadors of Russia and the near abroad, he has had to prove that Tass, the official news agency, distorted his views.


But I do not think that the main issue is whether or not Kozyrev was speaking about maintaining a Russian military presence in the Baltics. The fact is, he was the first to state plainly that the chief threats to Russia's security come from former Soviet territory, which was highly unpopular both in the Baltics and in Washington. Some analysts have hastened to explain this transformation of Kozyrev the "dove" into Kozyrev the "hawk" by saying that this is his attempt to pull the rug out from under ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Others talk with fear of the rebirth of Russian imperialism.


In my opinion, the significance of Kozyrev's remarks lies elsewhere -- in the real life situation that exists, through no fault of Andrei Kozyrev's, on Russia's borders today.


Unfortunately, the state of affairs in these regions is quite far from the "good neighbor area" that Kozyrev dreamed of a year ago. In the west, in Estonia and Latvia, a policy of open discrimination against the Russian population is being pursued, aimed at encouraging the Russians to leave. It is a sure bet that those who are forced out of the Baltics, like the French who left Algeria, will become fertile ground for reactionary movements. Is this not a threat?


But Russia is not likely to be able to counter this very real threat to its security with a military presence, which cannot be said of the zones of local conflict that have literally engulfed Russia's southern flanks. And I think that it was these conflicts that Kozyrev had in mind when he said that the complete withdrawal of troops from Commonwealth of Independent States countries would be "an approach almost as extreme, if not extremist, as the idea of sending tanks into some of these republics."


These conflicts are, in fact, a major danger for Russia. Due to the practical absence of borders, Russia cannot defend itself from the traffic in arms and drugs through those regions, along with a rising tide of refugees. All of this seriously threatens to overwhelm the country. Meanwhile, Russian troops in a number of regions are a stabilizing force, they prevent bloodshed. It is enough to remember the civil war in Georgia, the conflicts in the trans-Dnestr republic, South Ossetia, Tajikistan.


So an announcement that the CIS countries are a zone of vital interest to Russia is hardly a bid for a renewed empire. It is just a statement of the real, and very complicated, state of affairs. But to proclaim what some have already dubbed "the Kozyrev doctrine" does not mean that Russia is able to use its military might effectively to preserve peace and stability. The suspicion that Russian troops will use their presence to recreate the Soviet Union will follow them like a shadow. The experience of troops on foreign territory shows that at the moment of crisis these troops are an excellent bogeyman, and also a good target for all manner of extremists.


In addition to this, Western governments, in spite of "mature cooperation with Russia," are reacting very cautiously to its peacekeeping efforts in the ex-Soviet territories. I would like to point out that the West's position is a bit cynical, since it is prepared to sit by forever and watch blood being spilt, without attempting to do anything about it. But Russia has not been able to get an international mandate for its peacekeeping missions in conflict zones.


However, the main difficulties with the implementation of "the Kozyrev doctrine" lie in its internal contradictions. It is no secret that those who are talking about peacekeeping efforts in zones of conflict sometimes have quite a different goal in mind. Namely -- to force the warring sides to make peace with the aid of a third, Russian, force.


But attempts to establish peace by force, when the adversaries are trying to accomplish their goals on the battlefield, with no thought to negotiations, are obviously doomed to failure. Peacekeeping forces very quickly become occupation forces in such a situation.


So the military presence demands not a weakening but an intensifying of diplomatic and political efforts, which Russia has been slow to provide, trusting in its military threat.


This is all the more important because some local leaders fall prey to the very great temptation to hide from their own problems behind Russian swords.


It is not out of the question that Moscow could become the support of an unpopular regime, and gradually be drawn into a civil war, in much the same way as America did in Vietnam. The consequences would be similar.


The only possibility of implementing this doctrine and avoiding the dangers associated with it is to strengthen the real importance of the CIS. All of the states in the Commonwealth must understand the real security priorities involved. They must realize that only the full cooperation of the Commonwealth countries on security matters can make it possible to regulate local conflicts.





Alexander Golz is a political observer for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.