The Election Question

Everything is temporary in Russia, even the constitution. As the State Duma prepares for its Oct. 5 opening session, many deputies have already begun warming up for the coming battles. By all accounts, the start of the session could be accompanied by major upheaval: The factions on the left are threatening an attack on the government, and the question of the prime minister's resignation or that of the cabinet might well be raised. In this situation, one of the crucial issues is the problem of postponing parliamentary and presidential elections (or conducting them early). In this regard, Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin's recent proposal that simultaneous elections for president and parliament be held in the summer of 1996 is especially interesting, as was the reaction of Russia's leading politicians.


According to the transitional statutes of the constitution, the Duma deputies' mandate will expire in December 1995, and President Boris Yeltsin's in June 1996. During last year's constitutional convention, which was held during the heat of the conflict between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet, several proposals were presented concerning the expediency of holding both elections simultaneously. The opposition insisted that holding them together was the only possible peaceful escape from the crisis, while supporters of the president were equally adamant that the elections should be staggered. They argued that changing both branches of government at once would not facilitate stability.


From the political point of view, parliamentary elections were to be taken as a sort of dress rehearsal for the presidential elections, a process that would help each bloc choose its candidate for the presidency. In the end, this argument proved convincing and was enshrined in the transitional statutes of the current constitution.


However, soon after last December's parliamentary elections it became obvious that far from all the deputies were happy with the idea of facing new elections after only two years. Likewise, the prospect that Yeltsin might not be re-elected in 1996 is, of course, a threat both to him and to the members of his team, who -- in the wake of last October's events -- have only just begun to enjoy the fruits of their power.


In June, then, the chair of the Federation Council, Vladimir Shumeiko, proposed that both elections be postponed for two years, since the deputies were just beginning to get used to their responsibilities and an election campaign would only interfere with the legislative process. This proposal met with little reaction: Only the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov came out categorically against it. Everyone else was silent. However, as time goes by, this will be harder and harder to do, so Rybkin apparently decided to be among the first to take a stand.


Just a few weeks ago he appeared on Moscow television and, citing the opinion of the "exhausted electorate," he called for joint elections to be held on June 12, 1996. His main argument was that holding the elections together would save the state several billion rubles.


Rybkin's idea resonated positively within the administration: Presidential aide Georgy Satarov and chief of staff Sergei Filatov immediately came out in support. The Kremlin seems to have understood the possibilities: After all, having set aside the provisions of the constitution once, the process can be repeated endlessly. It would be a simple matter to extend Yeltsin's mandate for a year or two.


Postponing the elections as long as possible corresponds completely with Rybkin's interests. In recent months, he has been named several times as a possible candidate for president. However, it is clear that anyone daring to challenge Yeltsin now would immediately come under fire from the powerful administration. In two or three years, however, Rybkin hopes to be in a good position.


Zyuganov has been calling for a referendum of no confidence in the administration and the holding of presidential elections next spring. Rybkin, however, has already said there is no constitutional basis for such a referendum and that Zyuganov's drive to gather a million signatures in support of the idea will have no legal force, since the constitution says only the president can call a referendum.


Despite growing support for the idea of postponing the elections, it will be difficult for Rybkin to reach a general consensus. Rybkin's own deputy, Mikhail Mityukov of Russia's Choice, opposes the move. Mityukov is considered one of the most qualified jurists in the Duma and he insists that the constitution be strictly observed. He argues that since the constitution and the transitional statutes were ratified by a national referendum, the only way changes can be introduced would be by conducting another national referendum. This, of course, would nullify Rybkin's argument about saving election costs.


It is clear that the president's team expected such an argument. They have spoken little about the economics of the problem, and instead argue that the presidential election would take place after "the electorate had been exhausted" by the parliamentary elections.


It is difficult to judge what the true goals of this political game might be. It is possible that it was initiated by the president's team not so much to distract attention from the opposition's noisy campaign for a referendum and early elections as to work out a mechanism for altering the constitution, or at least the transitional statutes. If they succeed in the first instance, it will theoretically open up the possibility of postponing presidential elections even further. The final word, of course, will rest with President Yeltsin, who so far has kept quiet about Rybkin's proposal. However, at a recent press conference, his press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, said Yeltsin can be expected to have his say soon after the Duma session opens.





Sergei Tsekhmistrenko is a commentator for Commersant-Daily. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.