Goskomstat -- the state's statistical oracle -- was once a powerful ministry that played an important role in drawing up the sacred plan of the Soviet Union's command economy. Yet, starved of funding, Goskomstat has lost its political clout. It can no longer force workers and bosses to complete its questionnaires accurately.
Coupled with this trend, the twin threat of the mafia and taxman mean Russian firms are loath to reveal what they are doing. The result for Russia watchers: a tangle of economic statistics that are an unreliable guide to what is really happening. In such a situation, short of inspired guess-work, the best bet for Russophiles is to seek out surveys of public opinion.
Such surveys can be split into two types. The first are opinion polls reporting political tastes. Russian political opinion polls are generally conducted fairly. Of those frequently reported, Vsyerossiisky Tsentr Izucheniya Obshchestvyennogo Mneniya (the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion), or VTsIOM, perhaps has a Yabloko bias, whereas Vox Populi, or VP, and Obshchestvyennoe Mneniye (Public Opinion), or OM, sometimes err toward the government.
But the real problem with pre-election opinion polls is that the voters change their minds. The straw vote predicted that Dewey would win the 1948 U.S. presidential race; Truman eventually defeated him. Similarly, the Congress of Russian Communities was supposed to swing the 1995 State Duma ballot; in the end, it was nowhere.
The second type of opinion polls asks citizens broader questions about issues that the economic statistics spectacularly fail to detect: What do you buy each month? Do you own a refrigerator? Is life today better or worse than under Brezhnev? When surveyed about their consumption habits and outlook on life, Russians are quite likely to report accurately and honestly -- more so than when Goskomstat probes about incomes or when quizzed on the relative merits of Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Gennady Zyuganov.
In this field, VTsIOM's New Russia Barometer, or NRB, survey -- carried out annually since 1992 -- is a much-neglected source of wisdom for marketing types, academics and hacks at the mercy of official Russian statistics. The NRB's strength is that it gets quite literally right into the living room of provincial Russia. Only 9 percent of the 3,000 NRB interviews are in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In fact, 72 percent of the 1995 interviews took place in cities or towns of less than 500,000 people.
Reams have been written on Russia's privatization, yet very little is known about what it has meant inside firms. Here the NRB helps. First, some two-thirds of private sector workers surveyed are employed in privatized enterprises -- that is, firms formerly in the state sector; only a third work in de novo firms -- those that started from scratch. In ex-state privatized enterprises, more than 60 percent of the workers say they "often have little to do," yet less than 30 percent of de novo workers say the same. Moreover, two-thirds of the workers in privatized enterprises say their firm is "in trouble," while three-fifths of the de novo workers say their firm "is improving."
There are further distinctions. In the "old" private sector, only 24 percent of employees own a car, compared with 43 percent in the "new" private sector. In addition, 60 percent of ex-state workers say their life will get worse over the next five years; 61 percent of de novo workers feel life will improve.
Despite the much-publicized efforts of local authorities to relieve firms of social obligations, the NRB suggests 11 percent of workers still live in free or heavily subsidized firm-owned housing, and 47 percent use firm-based, subsidized medical facilities. In addition, 36 percent use their firm's gratis kindergartens, and 35 percent use company holiday facilities.
The NRB also conveys important marketing information. In 1995, 74 percent of Russian households had a color television, and 87 percent owned a washing machine of sorts. And it is perhaps surprising that only 38 percent had a telephone, but as many as 39 percent owned a dacha.
Folklore about Russian attitudes to trade unions is confirmed by the NRB. Although 65 percent of Russian workers are unionized, two-thirds of them don't trust the local union boss to "further their interests," and more than three-quarters are "highly skeptical" of national union bosses.
The NRB also suggests modern Russians are deeply dissatisfied with state bureaucracy and authority, while being rather impressed by market-driven services. Some 70 percent "can expect to be treated fairly" at banks and 55 percent at the local grocery store, many of which are privately run. At the same time, only 30 percent expect fair treatment by the municipal government. And a dismal 29 percent "expect justice" at the hands of the police.
But Russians are, apparently, deeply unimpressed by democracy. The NRB shows 44 percent of Russians think "democracy is not right for Russia," or "Russia is not ready for democracy." This view is difficult to reconcile with the recent Duma elections, in which 65 percent of the electorate cast their votes; U.S. congressional races, in contrast, attract turnouts below 40 percent.
Brussels bureaucrats who lose sleep about Russia in the European Union can take comfort that 60 percent of Russians "never think of themselves as European." Similarly, NATO expansionists should note that only 7 percent of Russians want "closer ties with the West."
English speakers who want to explore VTsIOM's surveys further should contact a leading Western expert on Russian opinion polls, Professor Richard Rose at the University of Strathclyde in Scotland. Since Goskomstat itself estimates Russia's unrecorded "shadow" economy at 45 percent of national income, business strategists have lots to learn by examining broad opinion polls.
Russian presidential hopefuls, also, should look further than their position in VTsIOM's pecking order. The polls report half of the country lists "more law and order" among its election priorities, and more than 60 percent of the populace want an immediate end to the Chechen war. And in light of recent rhetoric, it is surprising that only 26 percent prioritize "an increased economic role for the state," and just 13 percent want "the restoration of the Soviet Union."
Coupled with this trend, the twin threat of the mafia and taxman mean Russian firms are loath to reveal what they are doing. The result for Russia watchers: a tangle of economic statistics that are an unreliable guide to what is really happening. In such a situation, short of inspired guess-work, the best bet for Russophiles is to seek out surveys of public opinion.
Such surveys can be split into two types. The first are opinion polls reporting political tastes. Russian political opinion polls are generally conducted fairly. Of those frequently reported, Vsyerossiisky Tsentr Izucheniya Obshchestvyennogo Mneniya (the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion), or VTsIOM, perhaps has a Yabloko bias, whereas Vox Populi, or VP, and Obshchestvyennoe Mneniye (Public Opinion), or OM, sometimes err toward the government.
But the real problem with pre-election opinion polls is that the voters change their minds. The straw vote predicted that Dewey would win the 1948 U.S. presidential race; Truman eventually defeated him. Similarly, the Congress of Russian Communities was supposed to swing the 1995 State Duma ballot; in the end, it was nowhere.
The second type of opinion polls asks citizens broader questions about issues that the economic statistics spectacularly fail to detect: What do you buy each month? Do you own a refrigerator? Is life today better or worse than under Brezhnev? When surveyed about their consumption habits and outlook on life, Russians are quite likely to report accurately and honestly -- more so than when Goskomstat probes about incomes or when quizzed on the relative merits of Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Gennady Zyuganov.
In this field, VTsIOM's New Russia Barometer, or NRB, survey -- carried out annually since 1992 -- is a much-neglected source of wisdom for marketing types, academics and hacks at the mercy of official Russian statistics. The NRB's strength is that it gets quite literally right into the living room of provincial Russia. Only 9 percent of the 3,000 NRB interviews are in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In fact, 72 percent of the 1995 interviews took place in cities or towns of less than 500,000 people.
Reams have been written on Russia's privatization, yet very little is known about what it has meant inside firms. Here the NRB helps. First, some two-thirds of private sector workers surveyed are employed in privatized enterprises -- that is, firms formerly in the state sector; only a third work in de novo firms -- those that started from scratch. In ex-state privatized enterprises, more than 60 percent of the workers say they "often have little to do," yet less than 30 percent of de novo workers say the same. Moreover, two-thirds of the workers in privatized enterprises say their firm is "in trouble," while three-fifths of the de novo workers say their firm "is improving."
There are further distinctions. In the "old" private sector, only 24 percent of employees own a car, compared with 43 percent in the "new" private sector. In addition, 60 percent of ex-state workers say their life will get worse over the next five years; 61 percent of de novo workers feel life will improve.
Despite the much-publicized efforts of local authorities to relieve firms of social obligations, the NRB suggests 11 percent of workers still live in free or heavily subsidized firm-owned housing, and 47 percent use firm-based, subsidized medical facilities. In addition, 36 percent use their firm's gratis kindergartens, and 35 percent use company holiday facilities.
The NRB also conveys important marketing information. In 1995, 74 percent of Russian households had a color television, and 87 percent owned a washing machine of sorts. And it is perhaps surprising that only 38 percent had a telephone, but as many as 39 percent owned a dacha.
Folklore about Russian attitudes to trade unions is confirmed by the NRB. Although 65 percent of Russian workers are unionized, two-thirds of them don't trust the local union boss to "further their interests," and more than three-quarters are "highly skeptical" of national union bosses.
The NRB also suggests modern Russians are deeply dissatisfied with state bureaucracy and authority, while being rather impressed by market-driven services. Some 70 percent "can expect to be treated fairly" at banks and 55 percent at the local grocery store, many of which are privately run. At the same time, only 30 percent expect fair treatment by the municipal government. And a dismal 29 percent "expect justice" at the hands of the police.
But Russians are, apparently, deeply unimpressed by democracy. The NRB shows 44 percent of Russians think "democracy is not right for Russia," or "Russia is not ready for democracy." This view is difficult to reconcile with the recent Duma elections, in which 65 percent of the electorate cast their votes; U.S. congressional races, in contrast, attract turnouts below 40 percent.
Brussels bureaucrats who lose sleep about Russia in the European Union can take comfort that 60 percent of Russians "never think of themselves as European." Similarly, NATO expansionists should note that only 7 percent of Russians want "closer ties with the West."
English speakers who want to explore VTsIOM's surveys further should contact a leading Western expert on Russian opinion polls, Professor Richard Rose at the University of Strathclyde in Scotland. Since Goskomstat itself estimates Russia's unrecorded "shadow" economy at 45 percent of national income, business strategists have lots to learn by examining broad opinion polls.
Russian presidential hopefuls, also, should look further than their position in VTsIOM's pecking order. The polls report half of the country lists "more law and order" among its election priorities, and more than 60 percent of the populace want an immediate end to the Chechen war. And in light of recent rhetoric, it is surprising that only 26 percent prioritize "an increased economic role for the state," and just 13 percent want "the restoration of the Soviet Union."
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