Reading China's Future

The day is fast approaching when Deng Xiaoping, the patriarch of China's economic reforms, will quit the political stage. Naturally, analysts in Russia are wondering what influence Deng's exit will have on the situation in China and on Beijing's foreign policy. There are three likely scenarios for China in the post-Deng period, each of which could have different consequences for Russia.


The most likely turn of events would be that Deng's successors will be able to maintain the current course of reform. China's political hierarchy should be able to avoid serious convulsions. The drawn-out transition period has meant that the current leadership has been able to secure a fairly tight grip on the reins of government. It has amassed considerable experience and has shown that it can manage effectively.


Under this scenario, there will not be a collision between the old communist ideology and system and the emerging forces of the market. The communist apparatus has been able to maintain its controlling function and is seen as the guarantor of reform. Fed by foreign investment, the Chinese economy should continue to grow. Meanwhile, inefficient state enterprises, although a burden to the central budget, will nonetheless help hold down unemployment and possible social tensions.


In foreign affairs, Beijing will continue to come under pressure from the West both in the ideological and economic spheres. Also, certain territorial conflicts with China's southern neighbors will continue to be a problem. China's relative weakness and isolation will naturally push Beijing to seek out strategic partners, the most logical of which is Russia. A rapprochement has already begun and will likely intensify as both countries find themselves at a geopolitical disadvantage vis ? vis Washington.


However, there will not be a new alliance between Russia and China. For one thing, China is intensely interested in developing economic cooperation with the West and is unlikely to jeopardize that for closer ties to Russia. Also, as in the past, Sino-Russian border disputes and trade and resettlement issues will continue to be a source of mistrust and will undermine complete cooperation.


The second scenario is less likely, but also possible. If China's economic, technological and military reforms are accelerated and crowned with success, the country could well turn into a "large Asian dragon" in the near future. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Chinese ?migr? communities will bolster the strength of the dragon. Spurred by economic needs, security concerns, nationalism and its own great-power ambitions, China could undertake a more determined and even aggressive foreign policy.


The first to feel the teeth of this dragon would be the nations of South-east Asia. China could settle its territorial disputes with these countries militarily, while cheap Chinese goods would form an economic assault on local producers. Sooner or later, Beijing would step on Washington's toes and the chronic tensions between the two countries would become acute. Also, Beijing would likely oppose Japanese efforts to expand its political role and beef up its military potential. The two countries would quickly come into economic competition in the markets of Southeast Asia.


In such a scenario, China would no doubt take a hardline against its weakened neighbor to the north. Even now, enormous numbers of Chinese settlers are yearning toward the depopulated regions of Siberia and the Far East. The Chinese recall that these lands were "illegally annexed" by Russia in the 19th century and would like to raise the question of their return. The Russian economy has already begun to feel the double squeeze of an overflow of cheap Chinese imports and China's wholesale purchase of Russian raw materials at bargain-basement prices. China will take steps to muscle Russia out of its traditional spheres of influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.


In the event of such a scenario, Washington, Moscow and Tokyo would find themselves brought together by a common interest to restrain Chinese hegemony. However, this commonality could never produce a true alliance because of the complexity of the relationships involved, including U.S.-Japanese trade tensions, Japanese-Russian territorial disputes and U.S.-Russian conflicts concerning security in Europe, etc.


The third scenario is the least likely, but cannot be excluded altogether. It is still possible that Deng's death could provoke a succession crisis which could, in turn, end China's economic reforms. The ruling class would become fragmented, forming conflicting groups along clan and regional lines. The old communist elite could find itself challenged by the emerging capitalists. Ethnic uprisings will undermine stability in the border areas, while economic difficulties -- especially in the agricultural sector -- will provoke social disturbances elsewhere. As a result, an overall political crisis may erupt.


In short, it would be a return to the 1920s-1940s for China, taking the form of either an all-consuming civil war or a number of isolated local conflicts. In such a case, one side or another would inevitably turn to Russia and, for its part, Russia would most likely respond positively as it has in the past. The other side would naturally seek support from the United States or its surrogate, Taiwan, providing yet another arena for conflict between Moscow and Washington.


Having laid out these scenarios for China's future, I do not want to end on an alarmist note. As I said above, the first scenario is far the most likely. Moreover, for both Russia and the West, it is by far the most preferable. A progressively evolving China, even though it will sometimes come into conflict with other powers, is fundamental to stability and growth throughout the Asian-Pacific region.





Yevgeny Bazhanov is a professor of history and author of many books and articles on Asian-Pacific issues. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.