Coping With Chechnya

A fox runs into a rabbit in the forest and makes some sort of mark on a list he is carrying. "Show up at Bear's house. You're expected for dinner." "No way," answers the rabbit. "Then I guess we'll have to cross you off the menu," the fox observes sadly.


The relations between Moscow and Dzhokhar Dudayev's regime in the three years since Russia became an independent state and the breakaway Chechnya region declared its own independence have been amazingly like this simple joke. At least three times during that period, Moscow has announced its intention to restore law and order in this region. And in each case, even though there was no direct threat to resort to force, it was certainly implied. But each time, after threatening loudly, the Russian government backed away at the crucial moment.


I think that something of this sort will most likely happen this time as well, despite all the uproar, troop movements and operations which can only be called "secret" in quotation marks. These operations have only managed to clearly demonstrate the incompetence and irresponsibility of Russia's "power" ministries.


Today it seems clear enough that the current stalemate is not just a product of the tragic history of the Chechen people (many of whose misfortunes truly have stemmed from Russia) or of some particular qualities of the local mind-set. Part of the problem stems from the fact that for too long Russia conducted a vague and half-hearted policy toward this region. When Russia declared in 1991 that it would not interfere in the region, this was a sensible policy. In the general atmosphere of instability and uncertainty, a number of regions were toying with crazy notions of complete independence. A certain time was necessary to prove both to politicians and to average citizens that if we want to survive, we are going to have to live together in a united Russia. This process did indeed take place everywhere -- except Chechnya.


However, even after the process of disintegration in Russia was halted, Moscow failed to work out a clear, integrated Chechen policy. And while Moscow was inactive, Chechnya grew accustomed to its new position.


Chechnya's situation was partially determined by its unique economic position. Even in Soviet times, Chechnya was one of the country's least developed regions. As a result, it's economy was not intensely interconnected with the country's centralized economic system. At the same time, the region's oil reserves enabled local authorities to create the myth of a "second Kuwait."


Another particular feature of this region is its overabundance of labor. Back in Soviet days, when every construction site was looking for workers, brigades of Chechens had no trouble finding jobs throughout the country. Later, however, it became difficult to find work, and as the power vacuum formed in Russia, crime developed into an industry of its own. In recent years Chechnya has become an enormous center for contraband. Unable to find legal work, the population has taken up the task of smuggling goods duty-free into Russia and the countries of the CIS. Moreover, thanks to its energy resources, Dudayev's regime has been able to create conditions under which it can continue to exist, despite the strict blockade that Russia has imposed on the region since the middle of the year.


Only the fact that Russia does not want to get too deeply involved in Chechnya can explain why it has placed all its hopes on those who call themselves "the opposition." Morality aside, these people have already plainly demonstrated that they do not have the necessary influence to present themselves as a credible alternative to Dudayev. They have shown that they have no organizational ability and their military talents would be comical if not for the lives being lost.


Lately many analysts have been trying to forecast how events in the region will unfold. They have been evaluating the military capabilities of both sides and speculating on Dudayev's ability to wage a guerrilla war. It seems to me, though, that this is not the main issue. The recent fighting has shown how poorly prepared and equipped Dudayev's forces are. If one considers that, unlike the situation the Soviets faced in Afghanistan, it is possible to effectively cut off all channels by which arms are smuggled into Chechnya, then it seems that settling the problem militarily might not be as difficult as many are claiming.


However, the Chechen problem is not just a matter of defeating an enemy. This problem will not be solved until law and order is restored in this Russian region. The main question today -- a question to which I do not have an answer -- is: Has a significant portion of the population of Chechnya grown sick of the bloodshed and the criminal gangs? If the answer is "yes," then they can be enticed to welcome the restoration of legality. If "no," then Russia will have to continue to rely on political and economic pressure.


In the meantime, the Russian government should not be working out a program to overthrow Dudayev, but to socially rehabilitate the region and return it to normal life. Some extremely difficult socio-economic problems must be solved, and this will be done not with bayonets, but with teachers and doctors. And it is going to be expensive.


Force is only capable of stopping the criminal terror and defending those who are trying to rebuild the region for a short time. Russia should not be thinking about whether it is getting itself involved in a "second Caucasian war." It should be settling the questions of where it will get the resources and the determination to "recivilize" Chechnya and how it can truly help the people who live there.





Alexander Golz is a political analyst for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.