The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Over three decades ago Richard Nixon pioneered a "triangular diplomacy" by forming two separate alliances with China and the Soviet Union, which had adversarial relations with each other in the early 1970s. Nixon's diplomacy allowed the United States to drive the wedge through the heart of the Second World, making each of the two communist countries cautious of the other alliance, which in the end has significantly enhanced U.S. bargaining power. In our time, triangular diplomacy is very much alive, but the country effectively pursuing it is no longer the United States but Russia.

During the eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, Russia adopted this type of diplomacy by creating several mini-triangles. Within each triangle, two of the three sides belonged to Russia and the United States. The third country differed each time, although the main criterion always remained the same: That country had to lack diplomatic contacts with the United States and reside on the enemy list of U.S. President George W. Bush.

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Russia thus chose to form strategic alliances with Iran, North Korea, pre-2003 Iraq, Syria, Venezuela and even Hamas. Some came in the form of semitransparent arms deals, as in the cases of Iran and Syria. Some led to greater energy ties, like with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela. Paralleling those partnerships, Russia maintained an ostensibly stable relationship with the United States, which is a necessary precondition for successful triangular diplomacy.

The U.S. buildup of similar diplomatic triangles against Russia has been less prominent. The Bush administration forged alliances with Georgia and Ukraine, aiming to diminish Russia's influence on its former republics. This approach, however, has been largely ineffective since both countries, and especially Ukraine, have a substantial economic dependency on their larger neighbor. The U.S. push for their membership in NATO has fallen on the deaf ears of West European colleagues, who fear alienating Russia over two states that do not add much strategic value.

Meanwhile, Putin's alliances carry far greater weight. They are vital to several major conflicts on the U.S. diplomatic front, in which Russia maintains relative neutrality.

The prospect of expelling Russia from the Group of Eight, raised by U.S. politicians on both sides of the aisle, could tilt Russian neutrality toward its partnerships with "rogue states." Russia would not tolerate humiliation. While no longer a superpower, it seeks to be a major political and economic player in the world arena. As Dmitry Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center analyst, said: "What Russia craves is respect. It does not want to be a junior partner -- it wants to be an equal." The Putin administration was successful in restoring Russia's image that was severely weakened in the 1990s. The triangular diplomacy comes as an inevitable result on the political front, while the rising price of oil strengthens Russia on the economic front.

The G8 expulsion could once again divide the world order into pro-U.S. and pro-Russian domains. The world's rogue states would eagerly join a pro-Moscow bloc, and this would make it difficult for the United States to fulfill its key foreign policy objectives. At a time when Washington intends to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, secure loose nuclear materials, stabilize Iraq and achieve resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it cannot afford to instigate a Cold Peace in U.S.-Russian relations.

Instead, the United States should turn a disadvantage into an advantage. Specifically, Washington could leverage Moscow's alliances to conduct diplomacy with the rogue states, when necessary. The recent presence of William Burns, former U.S. ambassador to Russia and current U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, during nuclear discussions with Iran indicates that a dialogue is at times inevitable. Since direct and immediate talks with a country such as Iran or Syria may be politically damaging for the U.S. side, Russia could become a safe conduit for breaking the ice. Its role could be that of an honest broker, ranging from a dialogue's facilitator to that of a third-party host to bilateral negotiations. As the ice breaks, so will some of Moscow's triangles. Triangular diplomacy is incapable of sustaining itself when two former foes commence a dialogue. Meanwhile, Russia would get the respect that it seeks.

The proponents of Russia's expulsion from the G8 would argue that Putin's nondemocratic policies should not be encouraged, but punished. But what political purpose would the proposed punishment serve for the United States? Few question Russia's rise of authoritarianism in the post-Yeltsin years. Yet the country is still far more liberal than it was in 1972, when Nixon made his historic visit to the Soviet Union and launched detente. Nixon was no lover of communism, but he chose to close his eyes on some aspects of Soviet domestic politics when it served U.S. foreign policy interests. The next president of the United States should choose to do the same.

Alexander Veytsman is a senior manager for international markets at American Express in New York.