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The ratification of the START II weapons agreement and the 1997 package of anti-ballistic missile agreements by both houses of the Russian parliament, followed by the passage Friday of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the lower house, clearly signal the course of action that, in Moscow's opinion, should be pursued in the complicated world situation that is emerging.


Strategic offensive arms have always occupied a special place in the range of disarmament treaties created over recent decades; and they play an important role in Russian-American relations and are, of course, directly linked to Russia's security.


The Russian leadership, military and diplomatic experts and members of parliament have studied these issues for almost four years because they have no right to make a mistake on such matters. And if START II was not ratified earlier, the reasons are known: It was put aside by parliament in connection with the bombings in Iraq in late 1998 and then again because of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military action against Yugoslavia last year.


Having ratified the package of START II and the anti-ballistic missile agreements, Russia has done its part. The ball is now in the court of the United States. An exchange of ratification documents for these agreements would make it possible to put them into effect and continue the process of reducing strategic arms. And there is another important issue: the close connection between START II and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans the signatories from deploying national anti-ballistic missile systems. The United States is considering the creation of such a system, which would be an open violation of the treaty.


Everyone should be aware that the collapse of the ABM treaty would have a destructive domino effect for the existing system of disarmament agreements. The terms on which START I and II were agreed would change. Even from theformal point of view, if the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty, Russia would not be bound by its strategic arms-reduction obligations. The further question of the fate of agreements on medium- and shorter-range missiles would arise. Finally, the development of START III would be disrupted. We would be back in an era of suspicion and confrontation. I am sure this is not a prospect to be relished by anyone, especially in Russia or the United States.


At the same time, Russians are closely following the debate in the United States on the dangers from missiles and possible countermeasures. The view that prevails here - and is reflected in the decision of Russian lawmakers - is that this threat (which our specialists think is at least exaggerated) should not be counteracted in a destructive way. There are other ways that would be far more effective in terms of international stability. For instance, the start of direct dialogue between America and North Korea has brought a very positive reaction in the world because it may help clarify many of the issues, including those connected with missile challenges.


Russia proposes to the United States that we jointly develop a program that would prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies or remove incentives for acquiring them. Another path is to continue efforts to strengthen the control of rocket technology and to create a global control system to prevent proliferation of missiles and missile technology. In March, Moscow hosted an international meeting of experts on such a system, at which representatives of 50 countries exchanged ideas on practical steps.


Russia is prepared to cooperate with the United States and other countries in creating systems of nonstrategic antimissile defense that are not banned under the ABM treaty. The basis for this is provided by the Russian-U.S. agreements on the delimitation of strategic and nonstrategic ABM systems of 1997, awaiting ratification by the U.S. Congress.


And finally, further cuts of strategic weapons - and Russia is ready to bring the total ceiling of nuclear warheads to 1,500 under START III, reciprocally with the United States - provide an additional stimulus for the strengthening of the regimes of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery.


In short, the Russian side offers a constructive alternative to the disruption of strategic stability. And we are also open to positive ideas of the American side aimed at further cooperation in the disarmament field. The decision of the parliament on the START-ABM package is, in effect, our invitation.


Igor Ivanov is foreign minister of Russia. He contributed this comment to The New York Times.

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