She was well liked, highly respected and supported by all factions in the Duma. There were no other candidates and no one disputed that she was the best person for the job. The questions held no hidden traps, her answers were forthright and authoritative. So it was not unreasonable for Tatyana Paramonova to assume that the Duma would approve her appointment as chief of the Central Bank.


Then they voted her down. She did not even come close. In fact, Paramonova had not stood a chance from the outset. From the moment she was named by President Boris Yeltsin as successor to the wily Viktor Gerashchenko, she became another pawn in the long drawn-out game of power politics between the president and his legislature.


For as everyone,with the possible exception of Paramonova herself, was aware, the vote had nothing to do with her own qualifications or desirability for the post. The Duma was simply telling Yeltsin that he could not ride roughshod over its rights and the country's constitution. The fact that he can, and often does, was neither here nor there. They were making a point.


It is hard to blame the Duma. The dismissal of Gerashchenko without reference to the legislature usurped one of the few powers it enjoys under a constitution drafted by none other than Yeltsin. For the deputies to display a certain amount of pique is in the circumstances understandable.


But to hold up a crucial appointment -- especially of such an eminently qualified candidate for the post -- is regrettable, a sign that the country is still some way from escaping the power struggle that so paralysed its development for the first two years of Russia's independent existence.


Though Paramonova will continue working at her desk in an acting capacity, the uncertainty over her future will weaken her position and obstruct her ability to plan at a time when Russia needs a strong and creative hand at the Central Bank. By all accounts, Paramonova will provide that if her future at the bank has not been fatally wounded in the cross fire between president and parliament.


Fortunately, the most likely outcome is that Paramonova's name will be put forward again and that the Duma, having made its point, will approve her in the post. If this happens, well and good. But there is always a cost to the pursuit of rivalry for its own sake in Moscow that inevitably is paid by the country at large, rather than just Yeltsin and the deputies of the State Duma. No matter who emerges the winner in this skirmish over power, the losers will without question be stability and the continuation of the reform process.