Last week, UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Gali completed a tour of the three nations of the Caucasus. He promised Azerbaijan and Georgia cooperation in restoring their territorial integrity. Georgia and Armenia got assurances of assistance in coping with their economic crises. In short, it was the usual stuff of such tours and Boutros-Gali's visit did not make any lasting impression in Baku, Tbilisi or Yerevan.


However, shortly before Boutros-Gali's tour, Vladimir Shumeiko, chairperson of the Federation Council, also visited the Caucasus. Even though he only stopped in Yerevan, the trip raised a furor throughout the region. Russia had never before made such a clear demonstration of its loyalties: Official Moscow has sent a clear signal, letting both Georgia and Azerbaijan know what country is the most important in the area.


Shumeiko stated that relations between Russia and Armenia "are of the first priority among Russia's dealings with the post-Soviet states." He also noted that Moscow and Yerevan agree on virtually every important issue. At the end of the visit, Armenia received a truly royal gift: a pledge of 110 billion rubles in assistance.


Relations with Russia have always been a keen issue among the nations of this region. When Azeri President Heydar Aliyev returned to power he reproached journalists at his first press conference: "Why hasn't anyone asked me about relations with Russia? Well, I'll tell you anyway. We regard this issue as one of paramount importance. We cannot forget about our many centuries of contact, about the fact that thousands of our compatriots live in Russia, and about many other issues."


Likewise, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze recently stated that it was time to do away with old pipedreams about a quick integration into the world community and to focus on improving relations with Russia.


Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan has always pursued a Russia-oriented policy. He, obviously, had no choice: Two wars in Georgia cut off his republic's road to the north, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh closed off the east, and Armenia's centuries-old enmity with Turkey completed the circle of isolation.


Under these conditions, Russia chose Armenia as the region's "policeman." It was Armenia that drew Georgia and Azerbaijan into the CIS. Also, Armenian military units, occupying one village after another, have kept Baku's domestic and foreign policies on a short leash. "If Moscow gave the word," one military leader in Karabakh said recently, "we could easily take Gyandzha. With a little effort, we could even march on Baku."


The situation in the region changed radically on Sept. 20 with the signing of an oil deal which will involve major firms from the United States, Great Britain and Turkey in developing Azerbaijan's oil reserves. Military units in Karabakh will now be tempted to strike against the oil pipeline leading from Baku to the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti. Such an action, however, could well lead to the introduction of "third-country" troops. No one has forgotten how the United States defended its oil interests in Kuwait.


"We have carefully studied the films of the oil-deal signing," an expert at the Institute of World Politics said recently. "We were amazed at Aliyev's professionalism. He really put Russia in its place." The 10 percent of the oil that is slated to go to the Russian oil concern LUKoil does not count for anything. It is small change. Baku has now thrown in its lot with some major powers who are capable of defending their property.


Perhaps it was just a coincidence, but at the beginning of October, 100 kilometers from London, there was a UN military exercise to work out a coordinated plan of action to land forces "in one of the Caucasian countries." In addition to troops from Western countries, forces from Japan, Ghana and Bangladesh took part. Given the current situation, there can be little doubt that "one of the Caucasian countries" means Azerbaijan.


The oil deal may also prove a boon for Georgia. Official estimates say that nearly one-fifth of the country's population has either died or emigrated since independence. Winter is coming on and, according to Shevardnaze, many may not survive it. This situation has compelled the government to redouble its efforts to find outside support.


Russia, though, continues to place all its hopes on Armenia. Russia's leaders have already forced Georgia to its knees, and they continue to apply pressure. "If Russia wants a nation of slaves, its policy is right on course," said David Paichadze, a respected member of Georgia's parliament. "But this isn't the way friends deal with one another."


At the same time, Azerbaijan agreed to ship all the Caspian oil through Turkey, in exchange for Turkish pledges to defend Azeri territorial integrity. However, since Azerbaijan and Turkey do not share a border, and since Armenia is unlikely make a deal, Georgia is in a strong position. It already has a working pipeline, an excellent oil refinery in Batumi and a high-capacity port facility at Poti, as well as a border with Turkey.


If the Tbilisi-Baku connection pans out, Russia will lose its influence in the region once and for all. This is especially true since Russian troops have already left Azerbaijan and an agreement to permantently base Russian troops in Georgia remains unratified.


This situation opens up a wealth of possibilities for interested outsiders, especially since Russia continues to show its indifference. All the signals say: Take what you want. It's a beautiful area -- oil, fertile land, an enviable geo-political situation. And just a couple weeks ago, speaking at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, stated baldly, "Russia's interests must not extend beyond its borders."


Sergei Chyornykh is a reporter for Komsomolskaya Pravda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.