Dagestan No Chechnya

You can't say the situation that is now unfolding in the very fragile North Caucasus republic of Dagestan is simple. It is enough to recall the seizure last week of the main government building in the capital city of Makhachkala last week. The Khachilayev brothers who organized the action -- Nadir, who heads the influential Union of Moslems of Russia and Magomed, the leader of the political movement Kazi-Kumukh -- demanded the dismissal of the government, changes in the rules of the presidential election and in general the establishment of order in the republic.


Now several politicians, including some in the Kremlin, consider it appropriate to frighten the public and the Russian president with the prospects of a war in Dagestan along the lines of Chechnya.


Is such a scenario possible in Dagestan?


In all likelihood, no. Why?


First of all, because the idea of independence that united Chechen society during the conflict there has no parallel in Dagestan, and it is unlikely that one will arise. Dagestan does not have an authoritative leader who is capable of rallying all of the republic's 70 various peoples.


Second, the situation in Dagestan depends on interethnic relations that, if circumstances grew more tense, could easily turn into ethnopolitical conflict with unpredictable consequences, including the collapse of the territory into tiny ethnic enclaves.


I am not a believer in what is widely called the "wisdom of the people," which supposedly guarantees stability and calm. But every nation has a sense of self-preservation. In the end, the Dagestani people are capable of preventing large-scale civil strife.


This sense keeps them from wanting independence from Russia. An independent Dagestan would be a hopeless endeavor. An independent government with so many ethnic groups would be doomed to constant internal conflict. Unlike the almost mono-ethnic Chechnya, Dagestan has always needed an outside arbiter, whose role, for better or worse, Russia still fills.


It should be added that a sovereign Dagestan would have to solve the most complicated of international problems, particularly those connected with the Lezghin ethnic group. Half of this ethnic group, with its nearly 500,000 members, lives in Dagestan and the other half in Azerbaijan.


Even Chechen radicals do not believe that an independent Dagestani government can be created. They are counting on including Dagestan in their fight to expand the border in opposition to Russia.


When they speak of union with Dagestan, politicians in Grozny want to strengthen their own influence throughout the region. Furthermore, Chechnya would receive access to the Caspian Sea through Dagestan, which would help turn the second-rate mountain enclave into an almost respectable state.


But Dagestanis such as Magomed Khachilayev, to cite just one example, are enterprising people, and they can figure out what to do with Caspian riches without Chechen advisers.


The Dagestanis' attitude toward Chechen independence is rather contradictory. On the one hand, there is talk of solidarity with their brothers in faith. On the other, some are dissatisfied that Chechnya has stirred up the situation in the North Caucasus and that Chechen politicians make claims to leadership in the region. Many are disturbed by the behavior of Chechens on Dagestani territory: their refusal to submit to local authorities, attacks on police posts and robberies. This has forced Dagestanis to organize something like a local system of self-defense.


The failure of Grozny's attempt to create a Congress of Peoples of the Republic of Ichkeria and Dagestan, the founding session of which no authoritative Dagestani politician of the first order attended, only aggravated the already complicated relations between Dagestan and Chechnya.


Some analysts have said the Wahhabites have been heating up the situation in Dagestan. But this is also hard to believe. The ideas behind Wahhabism -- spreading Islamic values, strict observance of moral norms and emphasis on social justice -- are nothing out of the ordinary. Moreover, Islam's appeal is a natural reaction to the economic and social crisis and the penetration of cultural and behavioral norms into the North Caucasus that are not traditional for the region. Islam is seen by many as a reasonable alternative to the current situation.


As for the organized armed Wahhabite groups, their numbers are not very high. Estimates run from 700 men to 4,000 men. Informed sources put their number at between 1,500 and 1,700. It should be noted that they did not take part in the seizure of the government building. Furthermore, the Wahhabites have not succeeded in gaining the sympathy of the majority of the population, which tends to adhere to traditional forms of Sufism in the Caucasus.


Tensions in Dagestan are likely to remain high, and it cannot be ruled out that separate outbreaks of conflict, including armed conflict, will occur. But it is unlikely that these conflicts will turn into a general war, however much this may be desired by certain journalists, experts and even politicians who have staked their careers on peacekeeping activities that, as everyone knows, have not once resolved definitively any of the conflicts in the region.


Dagestan, like the entire North Caucasus, will have to resolve its problems by itself.


One more thing: I would hope that there has finally appeared in the Kremlin professionals with a grasp of politics in the Caucasus who will not begin sending troops to Makhachkala in order to establish constitutional order.


Alexei Malashenko is a scholar-in-residence at the Moscow Carnegie Center. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.