In the midst of the constitutional crisis that is threatening Crimea's already shaky political system, the Nov. 1 deadline that the Ukrainian parliament has imposed on the Crimean legislature represents another spark capable of igniting conflict in this region, which -- according to many analysts -- trails only the former Yugoslavia as a major global hot spot.
The deadline, issued Sept. 22, requires the Crimean parliament to bring its constitution into line with Ukrainian law and follows almost two months of attempts by the Crimea's executive and legislative branches to dissolve each other's political authority.
The explosive tit-for-tat has so far resulted in the dissolution of Crimean President Yury Meshkov's government and the reduction of Meshkov himself to figurehead status. After stripping Meshkov of his authority, the parliament amended eight articles of Crimea's constitution, empowering itself to create a new office of prime minister and to elect future heads of government. Former Crimean State Enterprise Management Minister Anatoly Franchuk was quickly confirmed in the post and has already chosen seven new ministers and 14 state committee chairs. Parliament confirmed the new government without debate on Oct. 13.
However, the assertion of a parliamentary republic in Crimea has by no means stabilized the crisis. New developments have combined with old problems to further undermine the autonomous republic's political legitimacy, threatening the parliament's already questionable hold on the loose ends of Crimean politics.
One such development is allegations that a shadow government is operating on the peninsula. These rumors began to fly after Meshkov opted to retain his former government as "presidential advisers." Although he has denied the charges, the continued presence of the former ministers is causing observers to question which government is really in charge.
Equally disconcerting are hints that other countries' foreign intelligence services may be acting to further disrupt the Crimean crisis. Ukraine's internal security service is said to hold evidence to this effect, but has not commented publicly.
A third destabilizing factor is the Crimean parliament's unwillingness to cooperate with the Nov. 1 ultimatum. In an obvious snub to Kiev, it has scheduled its review of the Crimean constitution for Nov. 2. In addition, Speaker Sergei Tsekov has taken his own inflammatory stand against Kiev, pushing for the creation of an independent Crimean internal affairs minister and Crimean security chief.
Tsekov has stated that Ukraine and Crimea are past the point of making headway on the basis of mutual agreements. Kiev may interpret this more forcefully than Tsekov would like as it ponders what action to take if the deadline is ignored.
Beginning with the peninsular parliament's declaration on Sept. 4, 1991, of the sovereignty of Crimea as a "constituent part of Ukraine," Crimean popular support for autonomy peaked with the onset of the economic decline in Ukraine in 1992-93. Crimeans generally felt that the peninsula could do better economically on its own, rather than tied to what they viewed as a sinking ship. But now signs indicate that this popular consensus is breaking up.
The 80 percent vote registered by Crimeans in favor of Meshkov's March 27 referendum on Crimean independence should not be taken as a show of support for Meshkov or the parliament. The criticism expressed by Ukrainians and Tatars at the time of the referendum has spread to the rest of the population thanks to the economic decline since Meshkov took office. One Crimean official recently observed that people are less active politically now than they were during the huge riots and demonstrations of January and July 1993.
On top of its economic morass, Crimea is coping with an acute identity crisis. The most painful recent example of this was the heated executive-legislative conflict, with each branch seeking to define Crimea with itself on top, either as a presidential or a parliamentary republic. But the parliament's recent actions to assert its vision of the republic at Meshkov's expense have not smoothed out Crimea's political landscape. The region remains torn between Ukrainian and Russian interests and divided by the conflicting views of Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars.
Crimea's path toward separatism is by no means set in stone. Ethnically Ukrainian Crimeans and returning Crimean Tatars alone make up nearly half of the peninsula's 2.5 million inhabitants. Both groups are strong potential pockets of resistance to an independent Crimea, as many of their political statements have indicated. Nor should it be forgotten that only half of the Crimean Tatars have returned from Central Asia so far.
The Tatars continue to be extremely active politically. They have fought vigorously for political recognition for the outspoken Medzhilis, the Tatars' own legislative assembly. Judging by the statements of the outspoken Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, if Kiev does intervene in Crimea, it will not encounter resistance from this ethnic group.
Additional delay on the development of the autonomous government in Crimea is likely to further harm the effort to define Crimean identity and to slow Crimea's run for independence. Popular resentment against the constitutional quagmire, combined with the Crimean ethnic boiling pot and a collapsing economy, seems to be working in Kiev's favor. It is a mistake to think that there exists a clear consensus in Crimea in favor of a break with Ukraine. As the Nov. 1 deadline approaches, it is becoming clear that many people there are losing faith that Meshkov or the Crimean parliament can provide the best solution to Crimea's problems.
Daniel Connelly is research fellow for International Security Programs at the Council of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
The deadline, issued Sept. 22, requires the Crimean parliament to bring its constitution into line with Ukrainian law and follows almost two months of attempts by the Crimea's executive and legislative branches to dissolve each other's political authority.
The explosive tit-for-tat has so far resulted in the dissolution of Crimean President Yury Meshkov's government and the reduction of Meshkov himself to figurehead status. After stripping Meshkov of his authority, the parliament amended eight articles of Crimea's constitution, empowering itself to create a new office of prime minister and to elect future heads of government. Former Crimean State Enterprise Management Minister Anatoly Franchuk was quickly confirmed in the post and has already chosen seven new ministers and 14 state committee chairs. Parliament confirmed the new government without debate on Oct. 13.
However, the assertion of a parliamentary republic in Crimea has by no means stabilized the crisis. New developments have combined with old problems to further undermine the autonomous republic's political legitimacy, threatening the parliament's already questionable hold on the loose ends of Crimean politics.
One such development is allegations that a shadow government is operating on the peninsula. These rumors began to fly after Meshkov opted to retain his former government as "presidential advisers." Although he has denied the charges, the continued presence of the former ministers is causing observers to question which government is really in charge.
Equally disconcerting are hints that other countries' foreign intelligence services may be acting to further disrupt the Crimean crisis. Ukraine's internal security service is said to hold evidence to this effect, but has not commented publicly.
A third destabilizing factor is the Crimean parliament's unwillingness to cooperate with the Nov. 1 ultimatum. In an obvious snub to Kiev, it has scheduled its review of the Crimean constitution for Nov. 2. In addition, Speaker Sergei Tsekov has taken his own inflammatory stand against Kiev, pushing for the creation of an independent Crimean internal affairs minister and Crimean security chief.
Tsekov has stated that Ukraine and Crimea are past the point of making headway on the basis of mutual agreements. Kiev may interpret this more forcefully than Tsekov would like as it ponders what action to take if the deadline is ignored.
Beginning with the peninsular parliament's declaration on Sept. 4, 1991, of the sovereignty of Crimea as a "constituent part of Ukraine," Crimean popular support for autonomy peaked with the onset of the economic decline in Ukraine in 1992-93. Crimeans generally felt that the peninsula could do better economically on its own, rather than tied to what they viewed as a sinking ship. But now signs indicate that this popular consensus is breaking up.
The 80 percent vote registered by Crimeans in favor of Meshkov's March 27 referendum on Crimean independence should not be taken as a show of support for Meshkov or the parliament. The criticism expressed by Ukrainians and Tatars at the time of the referendum has spread to the rest of the population thanks to the economic decline since Meshkov took office. One Crimean official recently observed that people are less active politically now than they were during the huge riots and demonstrations of January and July 1993.
On top of its economic morass, Crimea is coping with an acute identity crisis. The most painful recent example of this was the heated executive-legislative conflict, with each branch seeking to define Crimea with itself on top, either as a presidential or a parliamentary republic. But the parliament's recent actions to assert its vision of the republic at Meshkov's expense have not smoothed out Crimea's political landscape. The region remains torn between Ukrainian and Russian interests and divided by the conflicting views of Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars.
Crimea's path toward separatism is by no means set in stone. Ethnically Ukrainian Crimeans and returning Crimean Tatars alone make up nearly half of the peninsula's 2.5 million inhabitants. Both groups are strong potential pockets of resistance to an independent Crimea, as many of their political statements have indicated. Nor should it be forgotten that only half of the Crimean Tatars have returned from Central Asia so far.
The Tatars continue to be extremely active politically. They have fought vigorously for political recognition for the outspoken Medzhilis, the Tatars' own legislative assembly. Judging by the statements of the outspoken Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev, if Kiev does intervene in Crimea, it will not encounter resistance from this ethnic group.
Additional delay on the development of the autonomous government in Crimea is likely to further harm the effort to define Crimean identity and to slow Crimea's run for independence. Popular resentment against the constitutional quagmire, combined with the Crimean ethnic boiling pot and a collapsing economy, seems to be working in Kiev's favor. It is a mistake to think that there exists a clear consensus in Crimea in favor of a break with Ukraine. As the Nov. 1 deadline approaches, it is becoming clear that many people there are losing faith that Meshkov or the Crimean parliament can provide the best solution to Crimea's problems.
Daniel Connelly is research fellow for International Security Programs at the Council of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
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