Where Did Boris Yeltsin Go Wrong?

Constitutional anarchy has broken into the open in Russia, and at this critical juncture it must be asked how President Boris Yeltsin allowed things to go so badly wrong. Only a year ago, Yeltsin enjoyed the support of a solid majority of the population. He had won a sweeping presidential election victory in June 1991; in August he became the popular champion of the coup, the man who defied the tanks to protect a nascent democracy. Although the West never understood it, Yeltsin's gruff, earthy directness held far more appeal for the people of Russia than the suave demeanor of Mikhail Gorbachev. He was in touch with the pulse of a nation that appeared prepared to break with centuries of autocratic rule and seek its place in the community of democratic states.


Perhaps the weight of those centuries, their heavy heritage, could not be shed so easily. Perhaps, too, the suspicions of the West, its reluctance to endorse Yeltsin and provide badly needed financial support, helped create the current morass.


But there were moments when Yeltsin, despite all this, could have seized the initiative to prevent the development of the present intolerable situation: a vice president who openly disavows the president with whom he was elected to serve; a prime minister, disavowed by the legislature, who insists he will keep on working; a week of debates on amendments to the constitution of a country (the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) that no longer exists; a president so weak that he feels compelled to appeal to the people to choose between the Congress and himself.


Yeltsin is now reaping the consequences of his failure to dissolve the Congress and hold a constituent assembly when this was still an option. He could have done so after the coup last year on the grounds that the new situation demanded new elections and a new constitution. But instead, at the Fifth Congress in November, he made a deal under which the deputies granted him the special powers they are now taking away.


Again last spring, Yeltsin could have dissolved the Congress. At that stage, four months into the Gaidar "shock therapy" program, Yeltsin still had the support of 60 percent of the population. The Congress wanted Yeltsin to ease up on reform. But instead of forcing the issue, he made backroom deals on personnel changes.


In his dramatic speech at the Congress on Thursday, Yeltsin said he blamed himself "for repeatedly making unjustified concessions for the sake of achieving political consent". Due to his failure to act earlier, his future now hangs in the balance -- as does Russia's and, therefore, the world's.