Weapons of Diplomacy

Glafcos Clerides, who was recently re-elected to a second term as president of the Republic of Cyprus, promises to finally solve two fundamental problems of the country in the coming months: overcoming the quarter-century partition of the island into Greek and Turkish parts and introducing Cyprus into the bosom of the European Union. It seems there is a real prospect that he will reach his goals. Clerides has already shown his ability to masterfully use the Russian-Cypriot contract on the Russian S-300 ground-to-air missiles as an instrument of his policies.


"The Russians should pay us for advertising the S-300," a Cypriot official told me recently. But the truth points to the contrary. Whether or not the Russian missiles will be put in Cyprus, the widespread stir surrounding the deal has already accomplished its aims. It has helped push the international community to actively find a settlement to the Cyprus question.


Clerides has called "the growth in international interest in Cyprus' problems" the main political achievement of his first presidential term. Almost within a week of his victory, representatives from international organizations and envoys from influential states were dispatched to the island. Britain's special envoy, Sir David Hannay, and EU commissioner Hans van den Broek are among those who have attempted to break the impasse between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the EU negotiations. Cyprus also expects visits from the UN Cyprus representative Diego Cordobez and the most important of international mediators, Richard Holbrooke, U.S. President Bill Clinton's special envoy, as well as the Russian Foreign Ministry's special envoy, Vladimir Chizhov.


It is now clear that Clerides was able to attract such wide attention to Cyprus' problems thanks to the missile deal with Russia. Turkey, the United States and several European countries protested against the deal, which was reached in January '96 in Nicosia. If the Americans and Europeans are trying to stop the deal from being carried out largely out of concerns for competition, then the Turks saw it as a direct threat to the security of northern Cyprus as well as continental Turkey.


Worried that components of the surface-to-air missile system had already been sent to Cyprus, the Turkish authorities held up for thorough inspection more than 10 foreign ships that were followed from the Black Sea ports of Russia and Ukraine. In a recent interview with the BBC, the Department of State coordinator on Cyprus, Thomas Miller, said the "United States would do everything possible to stop the stationing of Russian missiles on the island." According to the Russian ambassador in Nicosia, Georgy Muradov, this opposition is being carried out in every way. In exchange for turning down the contract, the Americans and British in particular are promising Cyprus that they will cooperate in regulating the dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots and helping the Republic of Cyprus enter the EU.


The United States and Europe have already partly made good on these promises. The European Conference, which is meeting Saturday, has put Cyprus as the main question on the agenda, and March 30 begins the process of negotiations for entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU with relatively relaxed requirements. (The earlier stipulation that the division of the island be overcome is now omitted.) Holbrooke will soon renew his mediatory mission, which (most likely in exchange for Nicosia canceling the S-300 contract) on one hand, will restart negotiations between the two Cypriot communities and, on the other, put pressure on Ankara not to create military tensions in the region and not obstruct the process of Cyprus' entr y into the EU.


For Russia, the contract to deliver the S-300 missile system to Cyprus has from the start had particular significance not only because it involves millions of dollars but because it is seen as a breakthrough of its high-tech products onto the Western market. By last summer, however, Moscow understood that the international problems that the contract provoked could prevent it from being carried out.


Following Nicosia's example, it also attempted to draw some dividends, both political and economic, from the deal. It is easy to suppose that the agreement that was reached last December by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on delivering Russian gas to Turkey (which will cover two-thirds of the Turkish market's needs) would hardly have been possible without the promise of certain concessions from Russia on delivering the S-300 to Cyprus.


Moreover, already last autumn, Moscow and Nicosia, which had come up against stiff opposition to the contract from Turkey and the United States, put forward a scheme for backpedaling out of the deal. This is how the scheme sounds: "The Republic of Cyprus and the Russian Federation could give up placing the S-300 complex in the context of demilitarizing Cyprus." In this way they let it be known that canceling the contract was entirely possible, but under certain conditions.


It is clear that the contract on the surface-to-air missiles, regardless of whether it is carried through or not, has turned out to be an effective political weapon above all for Cyprus in solving vital problems of the country. If Moscow and Nicosia suddenly decide to annul the contract, then the Russian side can at least be satisfied with its gas deal with Turkey and the notable increase of its political weight in the Mediterranean region on the whole.


Alexander Shumilin is a staff writer for Kommersant Daily. He contributed this piece to The Moscow Times.