Warming Up to Saddam

It was exactly five years ago, at the beginning of August 1990, that Iraq invaded Kuwait. At that time, Moscow -- in the context of Russia's projected partnership with the West -- approved United Nations Security Council sanctions against the aggressor. Now, however, just five years have passed, but the new, "democratic" Russia is moving ever further away from that partnership and toward closer relations with Iraq. Moreover, Russia is becoming the main lobbyist in the UN for Saddam Hussein's regime. As Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated just a few days ago, "International sanctions must not become a tool for changing regimes." He clearly had Iraq in mind.


This strange concern for a regime that just about three years ago Kozyrev described as "criminal" (perhaps because of Saddam's open support for Moscow's 1991 coup plotters) has been developing steadily over the last couple of years. The road toward cooperation with Baghdad was already open in October 1994 when Kozyrev made his "surprise visit" to Iraq while Saddam was busy with his latest military provocation of his neighbors. At that time, Kozyrev shook Saddam's hand and called him "a wise politician." The wheel had come full circle: In just over two years, the Iraqi leader had transformed himself in Moscow's view from a criminal into a wise leader.


But had Saddam really changed in the interval? Not much, although he may have added a few benevolent platitudes to his normally militant rhetorical arsenal. Obviously, it is the view from Moscow that has really changed, a change that has proceeded directly from a realignment of forces in President Boris Yeltsin's entourage. Since the summer of 1994, supporters of the military-industrial complex and other powerful sectors of the economy have gained considerable control over Russia's foreign policy, and naturally they have attempted to combine their own interests with the country's national interests.


As a result, the Foreign Ministry has swung toward restoring and strengthening ties with "traditional partners of the Soviet Union," including Serbia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and others. This anti-Western trend within the Kremlin has already achieved noticeable results.


Former Yugoslavia was the first major example of how Moscow's policies of coordination with the West began to turn into a policy of confrontation. Already in the early spring of 1994, a clear pro-Serbian sympathy could be observed in the Foreign Ministry's line. Also among examples of how the "national-particular" interests of the military-industrial and energy complexes are shaping policy, we should mention the widely condemned war in Chechnya and the nuclear-reactor deal with Iran.


Now we can see the concrete results of this reinterpretation of Russia's national interests from the perspective of the military-industrial complex and Gazprom. Russia's pro-Serbian line in the former Yugoslavia has produced a sharp confrontation between Moscow and virtually everyone else involved. Together with the war in Chechnya, this position has alienated Russia from the Islamic world, with the exception of Iraq and Iran who are overlooking these factors for their own ends.


Russia's pro-Iraq policies have chilled relations with the majority of Arabic countries in the Persian Gulf region, and this has produced a number of negative consequences for Russia in the spheres of trade and finance. In sum, the "triad" of Russian foreign-policy achievements -- Belgrade, Baghdad and Grozny -- has undermined Russia's relations with the very group of advanced nations among whom, according to official pronouncements, Russia seeks to be counted.


And what about the arguments of our national-patriots that the direct material benefits of this new line outweigh any losses that will be incurred? What would Russia stand to gain if sanctions were lifted from Iraq? Not much, I think. For one thing, the sanctions have already been weakened and Baghdad has been allowed to export a limited amount of oil to pay for imports of food and medicine. Iraq, however, has refused to take advantage of this, calling for a total lifting of sanctions.


Second, there is little reason to think that even if Iraq did re-enter the world market, its money would start flowing into Russia. For the last few years, officials in Baghdad have been strengthening contacts with private companies in England, France, Germany and even the United States. Experts estimate that Russia's share of potential orders from Iraq would be minuscule compared to agreements already reached and sealed with Western companies.


Such an attitude is perfectly logical from Iraq's point of view. In order to undermine future efforts by the West to isolate Iraq, it makes sense to deeply engage the West's business interests. These interests, after all, carry considerable weight in the decision-making processes concerning the imposition, maintenance and lifting of UN sanctions. Baghdad simply views Russia as the weak link in the chain of states aligned against it.


Third, we should not forget that there have already been a number of attempts to remove Saddam from power in Iraq. If one of these attempts were to succeed and the opposition Iraqi National Congress were to come to power in Baghdad, they would no doubt not look kindly upon Moscow's friendship with Saddam.


It would seem that taking the desirable for the real in international relations and basing one's policy on this has again become the fashion in Moscow. But we must ask: In whose interests are such policies? Are they in the interests of Russia, its democratic forces and the goals of its nascent democracy? Or are they in the interests of Gazprom and the military-industrial complex -- interests that are better represented by opposition figures like Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov and ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky?





Alexander Shumilin is Middle East bureau chief for Moskovskiye Novosti. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.