Skewed NATO Debate

As the debate on NATO expansion moves to the more public and open setting of U.S. Senate hearings this month, we will begin to hear the true motivations behind those for and against extending the alliance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. From the right, senators will declare that they favor enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a hedge against a possible Russian threat to Europe in the future. From the left, senators will argue that they oppose NATO expansion because the move eastward will help nationalist forces within Russia and thereby damage U.S.-Russian relations.


Both of these arguments will do more damage than good to U.S. interests in Europe. Both overestimate the positive and negative effects of NATO expansion. By focusing exclusively on one component of U.S. policy in the region, both arguments also de-emphasize other more central aspects of our relations with postcommunist Europe. Ironically, at a time when we have the unprecedented possibility to engage with the former Warsaw Pact countries in nonmilitary arenas, the NATO expansion debate has recast U.S. policy in the region in military terms.


Traditional conservatives generally see NATO expansion as an insurance policy against a possible return of a military threat emanating from Russia. The history of war in the region and the shadow of guilt from World War II (when the West left allies like Poland to be colonized by the Soviet Union) provide strong motivations for this kind of argument. The probability of a Russian invasion of Europe is remote. But from a moral or ethical point of view, it is hard to make the case that Poland or Hungary do not have the right to become NATO members.


Yet, NATO today has the potential to be more than just a military alliance. As an institution, NATO has acted a stabilizing force between member states in the past and can play a similar role in central Europe. More importantly, NATO already has expanded its scope of activities by establishing cooperative relations with non-NATO members through the Partnership for Peace program and the Founding Act signed between Russia and NATO. By engaging non-NATO members into cooperative relationships, these new NATO institutions can serve to obviate the threat from the East and thereby decrease the likelihood of U.S. soldiers actually having to go to battle to secure Poland's borders.


Traditional liberals generally see no need for NATO expansion. If Russia is no longer our enemy, why do we need to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to prepare for a war that will never occur? Moreover, liberal leaders have pointed out that NATO expansion helps our nationalist and communist enemies within Russia. Though currently out of power, these forces might win the next presidential election in Russia precisely because of foreign policy issues like NATO expansion.


Like the stark arguments provided for NATO expansion, the logic driving this stance against NATO expansion also places the focus of U.S. policy in the wrong place. While overly concerned about how NATO expansion might help nationalists and communists in Russia, these opponents of NATO expansion have not devoted a commensurate level of attention to thinking about how the United States should and can assist Russian democrats.


While Russia passed a major milestone by holding elections for parliament, president and regional leaders in the last two years, the Russian political system is still far from a liberal democracy. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government is still skewed, political parties are weak, civil society is disbanded, the rule of law does not exist, and the media are becoming less independent, not more. More generally, Russia has few institutions that propagate democratic values. Russia boasts dozens of new business schools, but not one public-policy school. While my department of political science offers roughly 20 courses a year on issues of democracy, Moscow State University has one. Likewise, there is no standard civics course taught in Russian secondary schools, and no textbook on post-communist Russian government. The recent passage of law restricting religious freedoms demonstrates that Russian democrats are still engaged in a protracted battle to consolidate democracy in Russia.


The United States can do a lot to assist in all of the areas. As senators prepare to approve spending millions to expand NATO, they should devote similar funds to promoting democracy in Russia.


After all, let us not lose sight of the critical factor that made this debate about NATO expansion possible. While NATO has proved to be an extremely successful institution over the last half century, NATO ultimately did not end the Cold War; the collapse of communism and the emergence of democracy in Russia did. Europe will be divided again if and only if democracy fails in Russia and communist or nationalist forces assume power there.


Consequently, Europe's best guarantee for unity and peace is the consolidation of Russian democracy. Alliances did not save Poland in 1939 from the ambitions of authoritarian dictators. While we should do all that we can to deter a future threat to our new European allies, military defense is only half of an effective game plan. A political offense in support of Russian democratic institutions and Russian democrats also must be part of the strategy.





Michael McFaul is a Hoover fellow and assistant professor at Stanford University and a senior associate at the Moscow Carnegie Center. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times