A New Foreign Policy?

The strong showing by ultranationalists and neo-Communists in the recent parliamentary elections raises an extremely important question: What kind of foreign policy will Russia pursue when the new parliament convenes?


Both optimists and pessimists are trying to answer this question.


The optimists believe that Russia's foreign policy will not undergo major changes for at least two years; that is, not before presidential elections scheduled for 1996. These people refer to firm, clear-cut statements by President Boris Yeltsin and other high-ranking officials. During U.S. Vice President Al Gore's visit to Moscow in December, Yeltsin told him that the main lines of Russian foreign policy -- and the Russian government's respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors -- would continue unchanged. Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's top diplomat, echoed Yeltsin's words in a recent interview. "The source and the mandate of Russian foreign policy are to remain unchanged," he said.


Proponents of this view of Moscow's constancy in foreign policy point out that the newly approved Basic Law of the Federation, which officially came into force on Dec. 25, guarantees such firmness. They contend that the Constitution may well serve as a strong judicial counterweight to attempts to make "corrections" in Russia's foreign policy line.


First, they say, Russia's foreign policy will be fully centralized because its activity in the international arena, its attitude towards bilateral and multilateral agreements, and issues of war and peace are issues decided by the state as a whole, rather than by its constituent republics. Second, its foreign policy course will be exclusively presidential because the president, under Article 80 of the Constitution, has the power to determine the basic foreign policy guidelines of the nation. Thirdly, the Basic Law requires consideration by parliament's upper house of important foreign policy issues. Fourth, both chambers of the parliament can influence foreign policy through Russia's diplomatic mission heads, whom parliamentarians endorse and dismiss after consultations with their own relevant committees and commissions.


However, despite some optimistic assurances that the recent election success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, will have at most a very limited impact on Russia's foreign policy, a large number of political observers believe Russia's foreign policy image inevitably will change.Some think Moscow's external policy line already has changed, and that the shift took place before the Dec. 12 elections. These analysts are of the opinion that since July 1993 Russia's foreign policy has become much more hardline, especially in such areas as the strength of Russian armed forces, the use of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations within newly independent states, the final withdrawal of the Russian military from the Baltics, protection of Russian-speaking minorities in some ex-Soviet republics, expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.


Pessimists also find increased zigzagging in Russian foreign policy on issues such as the Kuril Islands dilemma, the No First Use concept for nuclear weapons, naval arms control in particular and arms control in general, admission of new members into NATO, etc.


New faces in the parliament from a number of opposition parties and electoral blocs may well attempt to move foreign policy toward a harder line.


The most ambitious efforts in this direction are being made by the Liberal Democratic Party, whose leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, in his brochure, "Last Push to the South," "a new geopolitical formula for the development of the Russian state"


Besides using the podium in parliament to satisfy their foreign policy ambitions, the five newly elected blocs that have indicated they favor a tougher line in foreign policy will try to place their proteges in the government. These hardliners will also try to get their people into Russian diplomatic missions abroad. The opposition will surely try to put pressure upon Yeltsin to change foreign policy. This could lead to the appearance of imperialistic and nationalistic ambitions to a greater extent in 1994-96.


In a truly negative scenario Moscow might well wish to reconsider some of its international obligations, in the area of arms control in particular and on the issue of Russia's borders with CIS and non-CIS member states. The Foreign Ministry's home office and diplomatic missions abroad might well be considerably reshuffled if Yeltsin were to yield to the new hardliners. Russia's foreign policy plans could become unpredictable and unstable. Such negative tendencies might sharpen after 1996, the year of the next presidential election, if a very different person, with extreme nationalist and conservative views, were to appear on the scene.


It is in the interest of Russia, and other nations that want to secure the former Soviet republic's peace-loving and nonaggressive status, to make sure that it treats its neighbors with dignity and respect. The chances of a "Cold-War-2" -- which could emerge in the event of an adverse change in Russia's foreign policy in mid-1990s -- should prompt us to try by democratic and civilized means to avoid the ghost of confrontation.


A social safety net is needed for Russia, and, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently observed, to make "shock therapy" for the Russian people "less shock and more therapy." It would also be expedient to give some friendly advice to Moscow to deal with the opposition in a businesslike manner and to maintain close and constructive bonds between the parliament and government.





Vladimir Kozin is a Moscow-based commentator on foreign policy issues. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.