Getting Along Without the United States

Even if it is too soon to write NATO's obituary, something fundamental is changing in the security arrangements of the Western world. This was demonstrated in stark fashion just after the U.S. midterm Congressional elections, when the Clinton administration decided to stop participating in NATO's naval enforcement of the United Nations Security Council arms embargo on the republics of former Yugoslavia.


This step, though unlikely to affect very much the course of the Bosnian war, was taken despite anguished protests from European states that have peacekeeping troops in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It highlighted a serious split in NATO's ranks and, in years to come, will be remembered as one of the decisive events in the alliance's history.


Not long after the U.S. announcement, French President Fran?ois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister John Major held a summit in Chartres. There they announced four new fields of cooperation between the French and British armed forces: nuclear weapons doctrine, a joint air command, training for peacekeeping operations and the design for a new frigate.


These measures had been planned long before the Clinton administration made public its new policy on the Yugoslav arms embargo. However, in symbolic terms at least, it looked like the dawn of a new age of European defense cooperation.


France, of course, has long maintained that Europe must turn itself into a strong, independent entity in defense matters. In Cold War times, Charles de Gaulle used to pose the question: Would the United States be prepared to sacrifice Chicago if the Soviet Union threatened Paris? He believed the answer was a definite "no." In the 1990s, France has continued to push for closer European defense integration, forming small joint military units with Germany and now linking its forces more closely with those of Britain. The U.S. decision on the arms embargo is, in French eyes, proof of the need to go even further in this direction.


From the British perspective, things look somewhat different. First, the lesson of the 20th century for Britain is that on three occasions -- World War I, World War II and the Cold War -- the preservation of British freedom has required deep American involvement in Europe. Second, the British do not see why closer military ties with European countries should be incompatible with continued close ties with the United States. In short, they would like to have their cake and eat it.


How France and Britain resolve these differences is going to be crucial to the future of Europe's security. The legacy of history is still too great for Germany to play the kind of leading military role in Europe that comes more easily to the French and British. Moreover, although the United States is most unlikely to cut completely its security relationship with Europe, it is already scaling down its military presence and indeed advocating a strong separate European military identity.


Ultimately, the creation of such an identity, backed by a modernized form of alliance with the United States, is the best option for the Europeans.


France and Britain must take the lead in forging closer military integration in Europe, and they must do it quickly. Events are moving fast in Europe these days. This is a time for vision and commitment.