Yeltsin Is the Problem

The Kremlin spinmeisters will follow Boris Yeltsin's lead and portray the Russian president's firing of his prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, as the consequence of profound policy disagreements between the two: Primakov was taking no aggressive steps to turn the economy around; he was too cozy with the Communists and other retrograde forces; his recent suggestion that governors ought to be appointed instead of elected revealed his anti-democratic leanings.


But as usual in Kremlin politics, the real problem was power, not policy. Yeltsin is extremely jealous of his prerogatives, and he is at his best when struggling for power and political survival. And Primakov was a threat. He is the most popular politician in Russia today, enjoys solid elite support and is respected within the military and security forces. Most important, he managed to do what no other prime minister had under Yeltsin, and that is to establish himself as an independent source of political power and authority. Yeltsin simply could not tolerate this situation of dual power.


The full consequences of Yeltsin's decision will unfold over the next few weeks. But amid the present uncertainty, some things are clear.


First, the governmental crisis will not be quickly resolved, and it could deepen. Yeltsin's actions increase the chances that the Duma will impeach him later this week. Under the constitution, that step would deprive Yeltsin of the prerogative to dissolve the Duma should it reject his choice to replace Primakov, as it almost surely will.


But the constitution also states that should the Duma reject the president's candidate for prime minister three times, the president has to disband it and call early elections. The inherent contradictions and omissions in the constitution increase the risk that this conflict will move along extraconstitutional paths, with all the negative ramifications that will have for building democracy in Russia.


Second, the crisis will drastically reduce Moscow's ability to play a constructive role on Kosovo, in part by increasing the chances that Kosovo will become a pawn in domestic politics, where being seen as serving American interests is a distinct minus. It is not accidental that Yeltsin, on the same day he fired Primakov, warned that Moscow would pull out of the negotiations if its interests were not taken into account.


Third, the International Monetary Fund agreement with Russia is dead. The Duma will hardly pass the legislation the IMF is demanding as a condition for disbursing the loan; getting that legislation was going to be a tough fight even with Primakov at the helm of the government. This will only delay any hopes of rebuilding the Russian economy. It could hasten economic decline.


Fourth, the big winner in this crisis is not going to be Yeltsin or the Communist opposition but rather the regional elites. As they have in the past, they will now undoubtedly exploit disarray in Moscow to consolidate their hold on their respective regions. Depending on how the crisis unfolds, they might even muster enough unity to seek to dictate a resolution to the warring parties in Moscow.


This could turn out to be the one positive outcome of the crisis, because it would increase the likelihood of Russia's building a genuine federation, something that is critical to the fate of Russian democracy over the long run.


Overall, this crisis demonstrates what has been clear for some, but what the Clinton administration has steadfastly refused to recognize because of its own close association with Yeltsin: Yeltsin is the problem. He has lost whatever ability he might once have had to play a constructive role in Russian domestic politics. With his frail health, erratic behavior, lack of vision and deep unpopularity (his approval rating hovers around 2 percent), he cannot forge the coalition needed to design and implement a program that addresses Russia's pressing needs.


Moreover, his jealous protection of his own power prerogatives and his entourage's general disregard for the country's welfare retard the formation of such a coalition. While hardly any guarantee, the transfer of power from Yeltsin to a successor is a condition for Russia's recovery. And the sooner that happens, the better for Russia and the world.


Thomas Graham, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was a U.S. diplomat in Moscow from 1994 to 1998. He contributed this comment to The Washington Post.