The war in Chechnya is breaking up the Russian Army. Many officers and generals feel that the poorly prepared assault on Grozny was a mistake for which the army will soon have to pay.
The army's situation is made even worse because neither President Boris Yeltsin nor Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is very popular among Russian soldiers and officers. So far, however, this dissatisfaction has not taken the form of open insubordination.
Over the past two years, literally hundreds of thousands of officers have been retired from the Russian Army. Those who remain fervently hope they will be able to serve at least until they are eligible for full pensions. They understand well that any public protest would forever destroy their military careers.
Therefore only one three-star general, Eduard Vorobyov, first deputy commander of the Russian Ground Forces, has so far openly resigned his commission over the war in Chechnya. Even he, though, took this measure only after Grachev gave him a direct order on Dec. 21 to take command of the Chechen operation: Before that, Vorobyov had spent three days at the Russian command center in Mozdok "studying the situation."
Vorobyov told me recently that he has received a number of phone calls of support from leading Russian generals, although many have also called "to express their regret" that he has taken such a foolish step. However, in both cases he declined to name names.
"You were in Mozdok," I asked him. "Is the operation really going as badly as it seems?" "Why are you torturing me with such questions?" Vorobyov replied. "We should have considered everything in advance, instead of first moving in and then figuring out what to do after we were already engaged."
Vorobyov is a cautious military professional. He has refused to speak to journalists to air his side of the story, saying that his fate is not as important as the fate of the country and of the army, which is now being decided in Chechnya.
It is possible that among those who called Vorobyov to express their sympathy were one or more of Russia's deputy defense ministers: Boris Gromov, Valery Mironov and Georgy Kondratyev. In any event, Grachev has decided to dismiss them as well.
Gromov has been fighting openly with Grachev since August, when Gromov was severely reprimanded for taking a trip to Israel without authorization. However, Gromov's real sin was much more serious: In recent months many analysts have been pointing to him as a possible successor to the troubled Grachev, and even as a possible candidate for president in 1996.
Gromov ran for vice president in the 1991 elections on Nikolai Ryzhkov's ticket, which came in second to Yeltsin and Alexander Rutskoi. At the beginning of December he spoke out against the policies of Yeltsin and Grachev and condemned military action in Chechnya. It was obvious that Gromov had decided once again to take up politics.
Unlike Gromov, Mironov never dabbled in politics. In the Defense Ministry he was responsible for education, and Grachev blamed him personally for the low morale in Russia's armed forces. He was never part of Grachev's inner circle, and Grachev has long sought a way to get rid of him.
Kondratyev, on the other hand, has for the past two years been viewed as Grachev's right-hand man, a specialist in the so-called flash point of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, in mid-September Grachev publicly blamed Kondratyev for "carelessness" that nearly provoked an armed conflict between Russia and the Georgian region of Abkhazia. Kondratyev had merely been fulfilling Grachev's order to put additional pressure on the Abkhazians. Since then, relations between the two have been strained.
In carrying out its mission in Chechnya, the Russian Army has appeared clumsy and incompetent. Nonetheless, Grachev's position has strengthened. He is the only one who can guarantee that the army will obey Yeltsin's orders, using both the carrot and the stick on Russia's dissatisfied generals.
In October, after the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov, Grachev's fate was entirely in Yeltsin's hands. Now the president finds himself at least as dependent on Grachev, who has been taking advantage of his growing influence to purge the Defense Ministry of unwanted generals. Other changes may come. We may even see the return of General Matvey Burlakov.
Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security editor for Segodnya.
The army's situation is made even worse because neither President Boris Yeltsin nor Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is very popular among Russian soldiers and officers. So far, however, this dissatisfaction has not taken the form of open insubordination.
Over the past two years, literally hundreds of thousands of officers have been retired from the Russian Army. Those who remain fervently hope they will be able to serve at least until they are eligible for full pensions. They understand well that any public protest would forever destroy their military careers.
Therefore only one three-star general, Eduard Vorobyov, first deputy commander of the Russian Ground Forces, has so far openly resigned his commission over the war in Chechnya. Even he, though, took this measure only after Grachev gave him a direct order on Dec. 21 to take command of the Chechen operation: Before that, Vorobyov had spent three days at the Russian command center in Mozdok "studying the situation."
Vorobyov told me recently that he has received a number of phone calls of support from leading Russian generals, although many have also called "to express their regret" that he has taken such a foolish step. However, in both cases he declined to name names.
"You were in Mozdok," I asked him. "Is the operation really going as badly as it seems?" "Why are you torturing me with such questions?" Vorobyov replied. "We should have considered everything in advance, instead of first moving in and then figuring out what to do after we were already engaged."
Vorobyov is a cautious military professional. He has refused to speak to journalists to air his side of the story, saying that his fate is not as important as the fate of the country and of the army, which is now being decided in Chechnya.
It is possible that among those who called Vorobyov to express their sympathy were one or more of Russia's deputy defense ministers: Boris Gromov, Valery Mironov and Georgy Kondratyev. In any event, Grachev has decided to dismiss them as well.
Gromov has been fighting openly with Grachev since August, when Gromov was severely reprimanded for taking a trip to Israel without authorization. However, Gromov's real sin was much more serious: In recent months many analysts have been pointing to him as a possible successor to the troubled Grachev, and even as a possible candidate for president in 1996.
Gromov ran for vice president in the 1991 elections on Nikolai Ryzhkov's ticket, which came in second to Yeltsin and Alexander Rutskoi. At the beginning of December he spoke out against the policies of Yeltsin and Grachev and condemned military action in Chechnya. It was obvious that Gromov had decided once again to take up politics.
Unlike Gromov, Mironov never dabbled in politics. In the Defense Ministry he was responsible for education, and Grachev blamed him personally for the low morale in Russia's armed forces. He was never part of Grachev's inner circle, and Grachev has long sought a way to get rid of him.
Kondratyev, on the other hand, has for the past two years been viewed as Grachev's right-hand man, a specialist in the so-called flash point of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, in mid-September Grachev publicly blamed Kondratyev for "carelessness" that nearly provoked an armed conflict between Russia and the Georgian region of Abkhazia. Kondratyev had merely been fulfilling Grachev's order to put additional pressure on the Abkhazians. Since then, relations between the two have been strained.
In carrying out its mission in Chechnya, the Russian Army has appeared clumsy and incompetent. Nonetheless, Grachev's position has strengthened. He is the only one who can guarantee that the army will obey Yeltsin's orders, using both the carrot and the stick on Russia's dissatisfied generals.
In October, after the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov, Grachev's fate was entirely in Yeltsin's hands. Now the president finds himself at least as dependent on Grachev, who has been taking advantage of his growing influence to purge the Defense Ministry of unwanted generals. Other changes may come. We may even see the return of General Matvey Burlakov.
Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security editor for Segodnya.