Russia's Place in Europe

Every once in a while, you see an article about how, according to the observations of scientists, one of the continents has moved a few centimeters in some direction. You see the same sort of articles written by those of us who study political geography. And the general conclusion has been that since 1991 the continent of Europe has been expanding, as former Soviet republics located in Asia have been accepted into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE.


These moves were intended to help integrate these countries into European security structures as a way of preventing the development of local conflicts. As time has shown, however, this goal has been only partially met. In reality, the OSCE has turned out to be a fairly ineffective instrument for regulating such conflicts.


In recent months, however, we have observed a completely opposite tendency. Now, those who are planning the construction of the new Europe clearly envision it at about half the size that geography would seem to demand. In planning the integration processes of the European Union and the expansion of NATO, Euroarchitects are emphatic that both the EU and NATO will not extend into the Commonwealth of Independent States. While no one is openly saying that there is no place for the CIS countries in the new Europe, no one is offering them a role.


At the same time, on the official level, the West emphasizes that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has nothing to do with any suspicions of Russia's intentions. In his recent, much-cited article in Foreign Affairs, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski firmly emphasized that the expansion of NATO must not be accompanied by anti-Russian hysteria. Otherwise, the old threats will certainly return.


It remains unclear how other, more realistic threats -- such as local ethnic conflicts, ecological catastrophes, floods of refugees, etc. -- can be resolved through the highly selective expansion of this military-political bloc. So far at least, NATO has not provided any examples of effective response to these new threats: On the contrary, the former Yugoslavia would seem to speak volumes against NATO's effectiveness.


The ostensible reason for NATO expansion is the fear that an aggressive totalitarian government will again take control of Russia. Clearly, the conflict in Chechnya has cast a shadow over Europe, which is once again talking about a threat to Central Europe from the East. Of course, when a country or bloc is planning its own defense arrangements, it must take into consideration all -- even the most unlikely -- possible scenarios. But wasn't the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe designed specifically to prevent any country or group of countries from implementing any aggressive plans on the European continent? In addition, not a single NATO military expert has said that they consider a direct military threat from Russia to be a serious possibility.


Meanwhile, the expansion of NATO up to Russia's western border cannot help but create the most profound misgivings in Moscow. A number of new suspicions have arisen and the question now is how to overcome them. Personally, I don't put much stock in the oft-repeated statements of our diplomats that "we will not put up with the accelerated expansion of NATO." Unfortunately, the expansion question has already been settled.


It is the pace of the expansion process that must now concern Moscow. At the same time, concrete negotiations must get underway concerning the exact nature of the "partnership" relationship between Russia and NATO.


Russia must, however, determine exactly what its security concerns are with regard to NATO expansion. In my view, the problem is that the expansion of NATO threatens to alter the essence of the alliance. It is no secret that the countries of Central Europe view NATO as an exclusive club of Western states. The so-called "threat from the East" is just an excuse for them to get into this club.


However, it seems likely that once they get in, the Central European nations will find that they are still not getting as much attention as they desire, and they will continue to loudly trumpet the same theme -- the military threat from Russia. History shows that, when the diplomatic need for a conflict arises, the conflict itself is rarely far behind. This fact, coupled with NATO security guarantees for the new members, is a recipe for disaster.


Moreover, Russia would remain outside of Europe's most important security structure at a time when it is making decisions that directly affect Russia's national interests. We have already had an example of this last year during the discussion of NATO bombing of Serb positions in Bosnia.


In the short term, a NATO-Russian agreement must include security guarantees and an established mechanism for permanent political consultations. As for security guarantees, there is already an excellent example to be followed. Throughout the Cold War, Norway formed a direct border between NATO and the Soviet Union, but it was never considered to be a point of conflict. Why? Simply because Norway refused to allow the deployment of NATO military forces or nuclear weapons on its territory and strictly limited the zones where NATO could conduct manuevers within the country. Such an arrangement could be formalized and implemented as NATO expands eastward.


If an arrangement could be institutionalized (rather than merely remaining on the rhetorical level) which would confirm Russia as a key player in Europe before NATO expansion actually takes place, it would make expansion much easier to swallow in Moscow. However, such talks are only in the preliminary stages, and the danger is great that bellicose pronouncements could bring them to a halt.





Alexander Golz is a commentator for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.