Army Discontent Brewing

If anyone still had any doubts, the war in Chechnya has certainly shown the low levels of military preparedness and morale of the Russian Army. Many commentators expected the army would roll into Chechnya and quickly take Grozny. But nothing of the sort has happened.


Officially, the Defense Ministry is forbidden from issuing information of any sort to journalists about the operation in Chechnya. Unofficially, at the beginning of the week one of Russia's highest military chiefs, although he asked that he not be identified, told me he was not satisfied with the way things were unfolding there. "The operation is moving sluggishly," he said.


Of course the military is primarily blaming the fog and the low cloud cover, as well as the short days that are typical of winter in the North Caucasus. Under such circumstances close air support can be provided for only a few hours a day, at best. Many days, it is impossible altogether.


Sources in the general staff say that from the very beginning of the Chechen operation soldiers were not given strict time frames for achieving their objectives, but instead were told "to proceed according to the circumstances." However, military authorities are obviously not pleased with the way the attempt to blockade Grozny has developed. The so-called blockade remains riddled with holes. Even in the north, where the Russian troops have made their closest advance on Grozny, there is no continuous front, despite statements all week from highly placed military officers that the circle will be closed "either today or, at the latest, tomorrow."


The Chechen formations have operated even more poorly than the Russians. Dudayev's supporters did nothing to use the Russian Army's indecision to their advantage. The best prepared elements of the pro-Dudayev force -- Dudayev's personal guard, the Chechen Republican Guard and a battalion of veterans from Abkhazia -- spent the entire week in Grozny awaiting an attack that never came.


Instead, Russian forces were opposed primarily by various types of irregular fighters. In Chechnya, every clan and every village has its own armed formation, which has no other loyalties. Chechen units attempted to organize nighttime "partisan" raids, but Russian military experts say these attacks were very poorly planned, and the Russian soldiers were easily able to fend them off.


Now the campaign is entering its most critical phase. The motley Chechen units, which do not have any knowledge of modern warfare, and the Russian Army, which does not really want to fight, have come together over the battle for Grozny, and no one can tell what will come of it. After a long sequence of defeats and humiliations, beginning in Afghanistan, the Russian Army has reached a point where it might simply refuse to obey orders.


Although he is losing on the battlefield, Dudayev has been waging an effective propaganda campaign in the Russian mass media. From the point of view of Russian public relations, the entire Chechen operation has been a disaster. Russian government officials and the president's aides understand they do not have a single respected spokesperson who is capable of explaining the government's policy.


Any withdrawal from Chechnya that leaves Dudayev in power in Grozny will appear as a shameful defeat in the eyes of the Russian media and society.


If the soldiers are left to spend the winter in trenches outside Grozny under constant enemy fire, their morale will continue to erode. On the other hand, if the Russian Army is ordered to take the city, no one can be 100 percent confident it will obey. The uncertainty is even greater because the Russian force near Grozny consists of combined task forces hastily pulled together from scattered army, airborne and Interior Ministry units whose officers and soldiers do not know each other well and have never before fought together.


Many people in the army are also afraid that once again -- as happened in the past in Vilnius, Tbilisi, and Baku -- the politicians will heap the blame for their own mistakes on the military. And the media will write about the army as the murderers of innocent people, when in fact it is attempting to put down an armed secessionist movement.


The dissatisfaction that has long been accumulating silently may burst forth at any time. If the army comes under any more pressure, we will have an armed-forces rebellion on top of a secessionist movement.





Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security editor for Segodnya.