Craving to Be a Great Power

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In relations between sovereign nations, nothing is more important than understanding the culture of the countries with which one is dealing. Without this understanding, there can be tragic consequences. If the Japanese in 1941 had understood the American psyche, they would never have attacked Pearl Harbor in the vain hope that once a major part of its Pacific Fleet had been destroyed, the United States would sue for peace. Similarly, the Germans would not have attacked the Soviet Union if they had known how the Russians traditionally reacted to invasions by foreign “infidels.”
I have a feeling that Western politicians have made little effort to understand the mentality of the Russian people and leaders. And yet we have a great deal of evidence from public opinion polls and Russian politicians to convey what it is they want and what it is they fear.
For one, Russians crave the status of being a velikaya derzhava (great power). They feel that they are entitled to this status since Russia has the largest landmass in the world, one that covers most of Eurasia and stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific. The other component of Russia’s great power status is the country’s grand accomplishments, such as breaking the back of the German army in World War II and sending the first man into space.
The astonishing popularity of a monster like Josef Stalin is primarily due to the fact that he had made Russia a power that was universally respected because it was feared. This craving assumes obsessive forms, particularly because Russians suspect deep in their hearts that their claim to this status is dubious — that they are not really a great power in economic, political or military terms. This obsession compensates for the inferiority complex that a majority of Russians feel when they compare themselves with genuine great powers, notably the United States.
Precisely because of this inferiority complex, it is important to treat Russians with deference and to consider their opinions. It is also important to understand what is behind their attempt to be a spoiler in global affairs. When the Kremlin says “no” to Western initiatives, Russians feel that they are indeed a world power. Their uncontrollable fury at the West’s behavior in Kosovo, for example, derived from the sense of frustration that their wishes had been ignored.
The other cultural factor to take into consideration when dealing with Russians is their imperial tradition. One prominent peculiarity of Russian historical development was that the growth of its nation state, Muscovy, occurred concurrently with the growth of its empire. When Ivan IV conquered Kazan and Astrakhan in the 16th century, acquiring Muslim subjects and opening the gates to Siberia, the Russian state was just beginning to coalesce. This differed from the situation in Western Europe, where the acquisition of colonies followed rather than accompanied the creation of the state. As a result, Western powers could let go of their empires without suffering a loss of ethnic identify, but the loss of Russia’s colonial possessions in 1991 was a far more traumatic experience. To this day, the end of the Russian/Soviet empire is a tragic historical episode for Russians and it has little to do with communism. Many Russians continue to regard Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia as integral parts of the Russian realm.
What this means is that foreign powers have to be extremely careful in encroaching on these regions. U.S. President Barack Obama was correct in stressing during the summit last week that the former Soviet republics are now sovereign states and hence free to conduct their foreign policy as they see fit. Nonetheless, it is equally true that the United States, which is home to the Monroe Doctrine for the American continent, should respect Russia’s sensitivities in this respect. Opinion polls indicate that a majority of Russians regard NATO as a hostile force. For this reason proposing that former Soviet republics join NATO is dangerous, and this is particularly true for Ukraine. If Kiev were ever to join NATO, it is likely that the Kremlin would seriously consider military intervention as a response.
On the other hand, I do not advise Washington to yield to Moscow on all issues relating to what its leaders call their “privileged zone of influence.” The proposal to install elements of a missile defense system  in Poland and the Czech Republic, for example, is in the interest of U.S. security and should be implemented. A few military officials who do not submissively toe the Kremlin line — for example, General Vladimir Dvorkin — openly admit that 10 interceptors and a radar system in Central Europe do not and cannot threaten Russia’s security.
The United States should not hesitate to condemn Russia’s invasion of Georgia or the spurious “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It should feel free to criticize Russian behavior when it violates the rules of civilized behavior at home or abroad. At the same time, we should be aware of their sensitivities and avoid unnecessarily irritating them in word and deed.   
 
Richard Pipes is professor of history, emeritus at Harvard University and author, most recently, of “Russian Conservatism and Its Critics.”