The unfolding events in Chechnya, which began -- seemingly by chance -- during a regularly scheduled break in the current session of parliament, seem to have pushed the question of the present state of relations between the president and the legislature onto the back burner. However, those relations are certainly capable of affecting the future of Russia at least as much as the potentially explosive situation on the southern frontier.


President Boris Yeltsin has lost no time in giving the deputies something to think about as the crucial debate on next year's budget unfolds. In recent weeks, both Sergei Shakhrai and Yegor Gaidar have brought forward the unambiguous threat that Yeltsin will disband the State Duma if it fails to pass the austerity budget that the government has presented. The fact that Shakhrai and Gaidar were chosen to deliver this message to the deputies seems to indicate that these leaders and their political factions have once again moved closer to the president. It may be one last attempt by Russia's most prominent democrats to rally around Yeltsin.


The threat to disband the Duma seems to be a tactical move to pressure the deputies rather than a firm intention. The point of the move is that, even if opposition leaders such as Gennady Zyuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky are ready (and even eager) for elections as soon as possible -- as their successes in local elections in Stavropol and Krasnodar clearly illustrate -- the average deputy in their parties is not. On the contrary, the average deputy is quite happy enjoying the advantages of being a member of the Duma and is uncertain whether he or she will make it onto the party list for the next election or not. The president's team has clearly read the situation well.


On the other hand, Yeltsin may not have much choice. Russia's internal political situation seems to be entering another crisis phase: Either Yeltsin will succeed in pushing his austerity budget through the Duma over the opposition of various industrial lobbies or there will be a repeat of last spring's situation, which will lead to the complete collapse of the current budget.


This could be Yeltsin's last chance to maintain his own power by democratic means. He must relatively quickly produce some positive results from the reforms about which he has been talking so much, and he must settle the question of whether he has the will and the political strength to do battle with Russia's special interests, especially the industrial and military-industrial lobbies.


The recent "economic meeting" between Yeltsin and Russia's leading policymakers is another important factor in the fate of the budget debate in the Duma. It has become a habit on Yeltsin's part to hold such elite gatherings whenever political tensions mount. Because of the influence of those who participate, these meetings have proven to be relatively significant in the past.


The simple goal of the latest meeting was to pick up public support -- or create the appearance of public support -- for Yeltsin's policies by going over the heads of its representatives in parliament. However, achieving this goal is more difficult than it used to be: While the old Supreme Soviet, it was thought, did not truly represent society because it was elected in Communist times, the current parliament has a legitimate mandate.


After last October's shelling of the White House, Yeltsin's advisers -- having learned from their bitter experience with dual power -- attempted to concentrate power in the hands of the president alone. In the first months of the new regime, this policy was perfectly justified in the name of stabilizing the country's internal political situation. But then the political pendulum began to swing ever further the other way.


At some point, it would seem, the president's team -- either accidentally or intentionally -- missed the moment when it should have undertaken the reform of the structures of government and the system of checks and balances. Instead, the state machine continued to grow stronger and to become the effective ruling force in Russia. Last spring, Yeltsin promised to use this machine to undertake decisive economic reforms. But the results of this promise are painfully evident today: The bankruptcy mechanism has not been worked out, the problem of inter-enterprise debt is worse than ever and the current budget is bursting at the seams. Is there any reason to believe that the latest -- and, most likely, the last -- attempt at reform will fare any better?


The executive branch, as it has grown stronger, has grown ever more estranged from the public. Once again the agenda for reform is being dictated from above, and the president clearly expects society simply to approve it. However, society has responded to these efforts with growing extremism, which was most clearly demonstrated at the last congress of the opposition Agrarian party. In the next few months we will certainly see a stiffening of the positions of the other opposition organizations. Even worse, many democrats may cease to support Yeltsin. All this means that the results of any early parliamentary election would not be very pleasing to the president.


It seems that Yeltsin has boxed himself into a corner. On one hand, he must have broader public support and, on the other, he can only get it by producing concrete results from his reforms -- results that can only be achieved by further bolstering the state machine. In this situation, it is impossible to move forward with the institutional reform that Russia needs, including local self-government, regulation of the legislative-executive relationship and judicial reform. But without such reform, the machine just keeps getting stronger and one authoritarian decision leads to the next. And the question remains, what will happen when the elections come?





Sergei Chugayev is a political commentator for Izvestia. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.