The axe has finally fallen on two of the top Russian Army generals who had recently been sent into disgrace, Matvei Burlakov and Georgy Kondratyev, but one is left wondering: Why now? And what does it mean?


The alleged misdeeds of the two, after all, were quite disparate. Burlakov, as the commander of the Western Group of Forces, has been accused of presiding over a hugely corrupt arms bazaar in what was once East Germany. Kondratyev spoke out against the conduct of the war in Chechnya.


This may be simple coincidence, but it seems aptly to sum up the lack of a clear policy among Russia's powers-that-be where the army is concerned. If the time has come to restore honor and professionalism in the armed forces, then it would have been logical to dispense with both Burlakov and his long-time friend the defense minister, Pavel Grachev.


And if the purpose is to restore discipline in the ranks, then it would have made sense to sack deputy defense ministers Boris Gromov and Valery Mironov along with Kondratyev, not to mention the maverick General Alexander Lebed, who on Thursday reportedly went still further out on a limb by calling for President Boris Yeltsin to resign over Chechnya.


But it seems that nobody knows exactly what the president plans to do with the army on which he relies so heavily, but which he also fears. Were he not afraid of losing the military's support, Yeltsin would already have ditched Grachev, who has long been a political liability. The trouble is that Grachev's loyalty is so valuable.


In or out of uniform, everybody seems to agree that the Russian Army desperately needs reform. The campaign in Chechnya has shown that it is a fighting force from another era, when infantry was thrown into battle as cannon fodder and then left to improvise. This was the tragic and heroic story of Stalingrad.


What Russia needs, everybody agrees, is a slimmer, professional, better trained and better led military. It also needs a military doctrine that leaves behind anachronistic paradigms of massed battles, and acknowledges that in the future it is more likely to be carrying out peacekeeping or fighting limited conflicts against partisan forces, as in Chechnya.


What nobody seems to be able to provide is a plan on how to reach this goal, mainly because it would be expensive and would make waves in the ranks. But Yeltsin should bite the bullet now and sack Grachev, or nothing will change.


What Yeltsin needs is a defense minister, preferably a civilian, who is not only loyal, but also commands the respect within the army that is so essential for effective reform.