To some extent, the Federation Council is the tyomnaya loshadka -- or dark horse -- of Russian politics. Granted, the parliament's upper house carries less weight than the State Duma, the lower chamber. But its significance is often lost even on seasoned Russia watchers. Most understated of all aspects of the Federation Council's activity is its effect on economic policy.
Russia's last Federation Council was elected with the Duma in December 1993. In a separate ballot, 178 upper house members were chosen -- two from each oblast. As such, the Federation Council is made up of local political "heavies," and usually reflects regional interests.
The upper house cannot, in general, initiate the lawmaking process; it can only agree or disagree with the Duma. This is important because in order to make law, the Duma must secure an ally from Russia's legislative triangle -- soliciting either the president's signature, or a two-thirds majority in the Federation Council. Tight presidential control of the council, in other words, scuppers the lawmaking power of the Duma.
It is difficult enough to gauge the composition of the Duma, given that deputies regularly switch party affiliations. But monitoring the Federation Council is even harder. Voting records show that about 45 percent of the last Federation Council were reformist. Another 30 percent gave mixed signals.
The executive branch of government often found an ally in that Federation Council. A case in point was last autumn's budget debate. In October 1995, the Duma bitterly disputed the government's low-inflation 1996 budget. When a reconciliation committee was formed among the government, Duma and Federation Council, it was a swing by the upper house participants which ensured that Russia's tight budget became law.
The Federation Council's crucial role in reining in a disobedient Duma may be one reason Yeltsin effectively canceled the last Federation Council elections. The fact that he did so barely made the headlines. In November 1995, new Federation Council selection procedures were established. Every oblast, the bill implied, would be represented by its current governor and local Duma speaker.
The spirit of the bill, initiated by the president's administration, was that Russian democracy was broadening. About one-third of the new Federation Council would be local governors and legislative chiefs who owed their appointment to local elections anyway. Moreover, new council members who had not been elected would, the bill promised, face a local ballot before the end of 1996.
The Yeltsin camp was keen on the new bill. Most incumbent governors and legislative heads were Yeltsin appointees: The Federation Council's pro-reform bent could only increase. Indeed, most commentators agree that nearly two-thirds of the current Federation Council are Yeltsin placemen. In this sense, the new Federation Council selection procedures were a convenient pro-reform move.
Rather less convenient for the reformers are the impending local elections. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the 1995 Duma elections was the Communist party's strong showing in the constituency ballot. Regional bosses were expected to deliver constituency votes to the pro-government party -- Our Home Is Russia -- just as they did for Russia's Choice in December 1993. But this time around, Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov's men took 58 seats in the constituencies. Our Home managed just 10 constituency seats.
One reading of this outcome is that Russia's generally opportunistic regional bosses have sensed the political mood and are threatening to switch allegiance. If this happens, the president might try to offer regional bosses protection by delaying elections in return for continued support. Indeed, the Yeltsin camp now argues that local elections should be postponed to December 1997, giving local legislatures "time to prepare." Even Nikolai Ryabov, the unpredictable head of the Central Election Committee, is supporting Yeltsin on this one.
Conservative lobbies in the Duma, meanwhile, are baying for blood. They contend, with some justification, that regional legislatures are violating the constitution.
So far, the new Federation Council has at least partly cramped the current Duma's economic policy style. For instance, the Duma's 20 percent minimum pension and minimum wage hike in February was handily blocked by the upper house.
But the Federation Council can only do so much. The Duma overturned the Council's minimum wage veto with a two-thirds majority. The Duma's action places the president firmly in the spotlight, pen poised, stooped over an ultrasensitive piece of legislation.
Russia's last Federation Council was elected with the Duma in December 1993. In a separate ballot, 178 upper house members were chosen -- two from each oblast. As such, the Federation Council is made up of local political "heavies," and usually reflects regional interests.
The upper house cannot, in general, initiate the lawmaking process; it can only agree or disagree with the Duma. This is important because in order to make law, the Duma must secure an ally from Russia's legislative triangle -- soliciting either the president's signature, or a two-thirds majority in the Federation Council. Tight presidential control of the council, in other words, scuppers the lawmaking power of the Duma.
It is difficult enough to gauge the composition of the Duma, given that deputies regularly switch party affiliations. But monitoring the Federation Council is even harder. Voting records show that about 45 percent of the last Federation Council were reformist. Another 30 percent gave mixed signals.
The executive branch of government often found an ally in that Federation Council. A case in point was last autumn's budget debate. In October 1995, the Duma bitterly disputed the government's low-inflation 1996 budget. When a reconciliation committee was formed among the government, Duma and Federation Council, it was a swing by the upper house participants which ensured that Russia's tight budget became law.
The Federation Council's crucial role in reining in a disobedient Duma may be one reason Yeltsin effectively canceled the last Federation Council elections. The fact that he did so barely made the headlines. In November 1995, new Federation Council selection procedures were established. Every oblast, the bill implied, would be represented by its current governor and local Duma speaker.
The spirit of the bill, initiated by the president's administration, was that Russian democracy was broadening. About one-third of the new Federation Council would be local governors and legislative chiefs who owed their appointment to local elections anyway. Moreover, new council members who had not been elected would, the bill promised, face a local ballot before the end of 1996.
The Yeltsin camp was keen on the new bill. Most incumbent governors and legislative heads were Yeltsin appointees: The Federation Council's pro-reform bent could only increase. Indeed, most commentators agree that nearly two-thirds of the current Federation Council are Yeltsin placemen. In this sense, the new Federation Council selection procedures were a convenient pro-reform move.
Rather less convenient for the reformers are the impending local elections. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the 1995 Duma elections was the Communist party's strong showing in the constituency ballot. Regional bosses were expected to deliver constituency votes to the pro-government party -- Our Home Is Russia -- just as they did for Russia's Choice in December 1993. But this time around, Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov's men took 58 seats in the constituencies. Our Home managed just 10 constituency seats.
One reading of this outcome is that Russia's generally opportunistic regional bosses have sensed the political mood and are threatening to switch allegiance. If this happens, the president might try to offer regional bosses protection by delaying elections in return for continued support. Indeed, the Yeltsin camp now argues that local elections should be postponed to December 1997, giving local legislatures "time to prepare." Even Nikolai Ryabov, the unpredictable head of the Central Election Committee, is supporting Yeltsin on this one.
Conservative lobbies in the Duma, meanwhile, are baying for blood. They contend, with some justification, that regional legislatures are violating the constitution.
So far, the new Federation Council has at least partly cramped the current Duma's economic policy style. For instance, the Duma's 20 percent minimum pension and minimum wage hike in February was handily blocked by the upper house.
But the Federation Council can only do so much. The Duma overturned the Council's minimum wage veto with a two-thirds majority. The Duma's action places the president firmly in the spotlight, pen poised, stooped over an ultrasensitive piece of legislation.
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