Russian politicians have certainly noticed that, especially since the middle of last year, the West has been pursuing an active policy with regard to the newly emerged countries of the former Soviet Union. There has been a broadening of political and military contacts, and a number of major commercial agreements concerning oil, natural gas, gold and other natural resources have been concluded with countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Western countries, on both official and unofficial levels, have begun more and more to speak out in support of the independence and territorial integrity of these nations.


Moreover, it is not simply a matter of the policies of separate countries. We must also consider the work of various Western and international organizations, including the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, and the International Monetary Fund. In Ukraine, for example, as President Leonid Kuchma's recent visit to the United States demonstrated, Western policy is becoming an independent factor that influences the development of its relations with the Russian government.


It would be an exaggeration to say there is some sort of long-term Western strategy with regard to Russia and the post-Soviet states. The West is not a monolith, and there are especially pronounced differences in the approaches of the United States and the nations of Western Europe. The United States has been relatively active throughout the former Soviet Union, seeking in part to play a mediating role between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the Baltic states. Western European countries, and those of Scandinavia and central Europe, have been more interested in the small states on Russia's western border.


Further, within each Western country there are a number of different political orientations vying for prominence. Some Western politicians believe Russia must not become any more influential than it already is, but neither should it be further weakened or fragmented. Others favor additional support for the ongoing political and economic reforms in Russia; still others want to pursue a new policy of containment by expanding NATO and strengthening Russia's neighbors. As a result, the actual policies of the Western countries are something of a compromise between these different forces during this transition period.


At present, and for the immediate future, a number of geopolitical, military/strategic and economic ideas are going to guide Western policy. The most important of these is the desire not to allow Russia to dominate its "near abroad," and to preserve the colossal gains the West has made since the end of the Cold War, including the unification of Germany, the independence of the Baltic States and the liberation of central Europe. Western policymakers have distinct misgivings concerning the emergence of a new state structure comprising the old Soviet Union, and they see Russia as the main force behind such a movement, even though many far-reaching initiatives for reintegrating the region have come from other CIS states. The most important of these is the Eurasian Union proposed by the president of Kazakhstan.


Ukraine occupies a unique position in the West's thinking. It is seen as a potential buffer zone between Russia and central Europe that could be used to minimize any "neo-imperialist" ambitions on Russia's part. This benefit of Ukraine's geopolitical situation is extremely important for the West as it moves to incorporate the countries of central and eastern Europe into Western institutions, such as the European Union and NATO.


At present, Ukraine's main vulnerability is the disastrous state of its economy, which is leading to a sharp reduction in the standard of living. Kuchma recently acknowledged that the buying power of the average Russian is more than twice as great as that of the average Ukrainian. In response to this situation, Western policy has tried to push Ukraine's leadership, in part through offers of economic aid, into carrying out complex economic reforms. The IMF has already approved a credit of $370 million, and the United States has pledged $200 million to develop Ukraine's energy sector. These amounts, it is true, are small in comparison to what Ukraine has requested -- $6 billion in aid for 1995 alone -- and in light of the fact that the IMF recently pledged a loan of $201 million to Lithuania, whose problems seem minor in comparison to Ukraine's.


Western policy is also determined to a large extent by a desire to counteract the growing strength of China in central Asia and of Iran in the Caucasus. Naturally, Western countries are also interested in profiting as much as possible from the exploitation of natural resources in these regions.


In addition, the West continues to pursue a policy of furthering nuclear disarmament in the region, and preventing proliferation. On Monday, Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows the START-1 Treaty to come into force and marks an important step on the road to overall nuclear disarmament.


In conclusion, it must be stated that the gradual penetration of the West into the post-Soviet space is already fact, and Russia is not in a position to do much about it. However, the West's policy cannot always and everywhere be automatically interpreted as anti-Russian. But it does mean that the Russian government must carefully think through its policies in this most crucial region. There are areas where Russia and the West share common interests and can cooperate. However there are also spheres in which cooperation will be impossible. Foresight is needed now to prevent serious tensions and conflicts -- which will benefit neither Russia nor the West.





Pavel Podlesny is a senior analyst at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.