A couple of weeks ago in Budapest, Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that if NATO attempted to expand into Central Europe at the invitation of countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Russia would instigate a new "cold peace" -- read, cold war -- in Europe.


The Russian government's demands have cast a shadow over the peaceful development of Europe and threaten to erect a de facto iron curtain between Russia and Central Europe, with some unfortunate countries, such as Belarus, the Baltic States and Ukraine getting caught up in Russia's sphere of interest.


Yeltsin's cold-peace speech is a sign that Russia is intent on challenging, rather than working with, Western power. The rear guard action to stop NATO expansion has been a key Soviet and Russian policy since 1990.


Why does Russia insist on fighting NATO's expansion? Because Russia is fundamentally different from Western nations: Its glory was never based on a political settlement, but on rights of conquest. To be great means, in the terms of Russian political history, to dominate others by force, not by example.


Even while offering continued lip service to Western, liberal values during 1991, Russia had already taken the decision to claw back as much of its old empire as it could. Evidence continues to mount that much of the chaos and warfare in several former Soviet republics, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Tajikistan, were caused by Russia's presence, not absence. Now we are seeing the fruits of Russian meddling in Chechnya, and the Russian government's kneejerk reaction there.


In the western part of its former empire, however, Russia has trodden more carefully. It knows that Western public opinion cares about the Baltic States and that the American government sees an independent Ukraine as a strategic kingpin in Eastern Europe. Acts to undermine these countries -- overtly at least -- would have threatened economic aid, Western investment and international respect.


The Russian government has a two-pronged policy for undermining NATO. First, it argues that NATO should be brought under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a nebulous organization whose members range from mighty Iceland in the north to that bastion of democracy, Uzbekistan, in the south. Russia's idea is to make NATO toothless by taking it out of the hands of the Western powers and putting it into the hands of such august luminaries.


Its second trick is to demand that Russia be granted what would amount to a sphere of influence -- manorial rights -- over its neighbors: a policy that would allow Russia to eventually recolonize its former empire. It is not to the European Union's or the United States' credit that they have already glossed over Russia's dismemberment of several former republics. We should not make it worse by giving them a green light to carve up the rest.


Despite Russian hostility to NATO's eastward movement, the Kremlin's threats are nothing more than a well-calculated act of huffing and puffing to slow the advance of the inevitable. For some countries, however, Russia's threats are more than just bluff. If NATO does go forward, the Russians are likely to use the occasion as a green light to impose a smaller version of the Warsaw Pact on their immediate neighbors.


Their instrument for doing this will be the Commonwealth of Independent States, the organization established in 1991 to provide the ex-Soviet states with a talking shop. It has since evolved into a vehicle for Russia to dominate its neighbors. Several countries who refused to consent to Russian hegemony were coerced into joining. The Russians have never understood the difference between force and free association.


Most at risk is Ukraine, which has historically supplied Russia half its food supplies and possesses a third of its population; Belarus, which doesn't really want to be independent anyway; and the Baltic States, which definitely do. NATO's reaction to Russian recolonization, should it take place, will be the key decision determining NATO's relationship with Russia for the first few decades of the next century.


Should Western countries accede to Russian demands now, however, you can bet that in two months time -- or two years time -- they will come back for more. The more the West gives, the more Russia will ask for. History, again, explains why: Russia has no borders. It has, throughout the centuries, grabbed what it could of other people's lands whenever it could. The more land it grabbed, the more worried its generals became about its borders, and the more it demanded more land to ensure the previous borders.


On display at the CSCE conference in Budapest were Russia's new hunger pangs, and the Russian generals' "defense" concerns, such as the view held by some that Estonia somehow presents a threat to the security of Russia. Therefore, they argued, Russia should be allowed military bases in Estonia, to be followed no doubt by special privileges for Russian speakers there, membership of the CIS and, as a coup de grace, a coup d'?tat.


The most telling reason for NATO to allow entry to Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic (also known as the Visegrad group) must be Russia's reaction. If the Russians had not objected, it would be proof that they harbor no proprietary intentions towards Central Europe. That the Russians don't want the Visegrad group in NATO is the strongest reason why those countries should be admitted.


It is a cliche, but it is worth repeating: The Russians understand strength. NATO, for the good of North America and Western Europe, must be nurtured to provide a framework for Western civilization's security into the 21st century. The alternative is leaving European security in the hands of Iceland, Uzbekistan -- or the unstable Kremlin.





Robert Seely is a research fellow at Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Center. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.