The report of a proposed reorganization of Russia's military command in the Transdnestr republic, a breakaway enclave of Russian speakers in Moldova, has provoked a wave of comment and predictions. This would be natural enough considering that the flames of discontent in the region have by no means been put out altogether, but merely subdued in recent months. However, the comments that the report has provoked are only slightly related to the triangle of relations between Moscow, Kiev and Tiraspol, the capital of the Transdnestr republic. What really has everyone concerned is what will become of the commander of the 14th Army, General Alexander Lebed.


Many analysts have been predicting that Lebed will take up a political career and, further, that he could end up playing the role of a Russian Augusto Pinochet, for whom Lebed has unconcealed admiration. What is most surprising of all is that many people who consider themselves democrats and who support the current program of market reforms in Russia seem to be favorably disposed to this possibility.


Lebed undoubtedly has earned the respect that people afford him. His personal courage, obvious military talent and the independence of his judgments, combined with his integrity and his open contempt for political maneuvering, make him a rare figure in Russia today. No matter how his future career develops -- whether he continues with the military or moves into some other field -- there can be no doubt that Lebed is destined to reach the summit of Russia's Olympus. Clearly, Russia today badly needs such people as Alexander Lebed.


But does Russia need a Pinochet? I understand why Lebed thinks so highly of the Chilean general. Like many other Russians during this period of economic instability and criminal terror, Lebed dreams of a "strong hand" that will bring order to the country. The really surprising thing is that many serious analysts also share these views. But it seems to me that these people do not see the fundamental differences between Russia today and Chile in the era of Pinochet.


Pinochet became a myth in Russia not because he executed the representatives of the legally elected government and established a personal dictatorship. The most important fact is that his regime turned out to be highly effective in the sphere of economics. Pinochet was smart enough to undertake reforms that were primarily aimed at freeing market forces. So, if one wants to find people in Russia today with the economic views to lay a claim to the role of the "Russian Pinochet," one had best turn to Yegor Gaidar rather than to any of our own generals. The point of the totalitarian regime in Chile, with its strong reliance on the military, was to suppress all social protest. As is always the case, the beginning of reform in Chile was accompanied by a sharp impoverishment of the population and a considerable increase in unemployment.


More than a few figures in Russia's democratic camp seem to be dreaming of just such a regime. They have grown tired of endless discussions with their loud and not always fair opponents in the communist and nationalist camps.


The only thing that is unclear is why these democrats are so convinced that a Russian Pinochet will be such a dedicated supporter of market reforms. We must not forget that in Chile the generals came to power at a moment of economic collapse when the population had been irritated by the results of the failed economic programs of the socialists. The Chilean generals simply proposed the exact opposite model, market reform, which seemed to be more liveable.


But in Russia, the alternative to the market system is a repetition of the old model that has already proven its ineffectiveness both in the Soviet Union and in Chile. The majority of those who are waiting for a strong hand in Russia are also awaiting that notorious socialist justice, the same justice against which the Chilean Pinochet so successful fought.


One of the main factors behind Russia's current tension is the difficulty inherent in reforming the army and in converting the military-industrial complex. It is hard to imagine that anyone seriously thinks that if Lebed came to power in this country he would undertake the military reductions that Russia needs right now.


And would the army be able to protect the regime from outbreaks of discontent within the military itself? The one thing that is certain is that a rejection of democratic means necessarily entails a rejection of economic reform.


In general, the dream of a benevolent dictator who will help the country through the present difficult transition period and then return the citizenry's "temporarily suspended" democratic freedoms is far from the experience of Russian history. After all, on every street corner these days we have Bolsheviks with experience at "temporarily" suspending liberties in the name of "revolutionary expediency." However, authoritarianism in Russia always evolves toward unlimited dictatorship. By the way, among the first victims of such a dictatorship are always those who advocated the "temporary" suspension of democracy.


Of course Russian democracy, to put it mildly, is a queer thing. And our market economy is also queer. But those who are tired of arguing policies with political opponents in the chambers of parliament and who are now counting on the appearance of a Russian Pinochet stand a good chance of finding themselves conducting those same arguments on plank bunks in the Gulag.





Alexander Golz is a political observer for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.