The Kremlin's mini-summit on the crisis in former Yugoslavia Thursday was inevitably something of an anti-climax.


With President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia turning down the invitation to join the meeting, there was very little that presidents Boris Yeltsin and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia could achieve on their own, other than to call for yet another summit -- only next time with somebody to talk to.


Yeltsin also threatened unilaterally to lift economic sanctions against Serbia, a position which if not new in substance, was at least new in tone.


But many Moscow- and Western-based analysts were left somewhat baffled as to why the meeting went ahead at all.


Yeltsin and Milosevic marked their first meeting with a warm handclasp for the cameras and exchanged pleasantries about the Russian president's cardiac health and the war in Chechnya.


There was some bitterness expressed on Yeltsin's part that a certain "power" -- read the United States -- had spoiled his potential diplomatic coup by persuading Tudjman not to come to Moscow. And there were the usual homilies about the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict.


But after that, there seemed very little left to talk about.


"The real discussions this week are those of Anthony Lake, the U.S. National Security Advisor, and not the discussions taking place in Moscow," said Jonathan Eyal, director of studies at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based political research center.


U.S. President Bill Clinton has dispatched Lake to London, Paris and Bonn Hoping to revive the Balkan peace process, a task that promises to be an uphill battle. Leaks suggested Thursday that the U.S. plan involved a revised proposal for dividing up Bosnia.


So what was Yeltsin's plan?


An indication of what he was preparing to put to Milosevic came in the text of an interview with the Japanese newspaper Nihon Keizai, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta on Thursday morning. It sounded a familiar theme.


"First of all, the warring sides should conclude a truce and stop hostilities against each other. It is also very important to strengthen other confidence-building measures which could create a favorable climate for the continuation of the search for solutions and the resolution of the existing disagreements," Yeltsin said.


"The basis for the talks between Bosnian Serbs, on the one hand, and Moslems and Croats, on the other," Yeltsin continued, "should be the Contact Group's plan."


Hearing Yeltsin call for an end to fighting, for confidence building and for a reliance on the Contact Group would hardly seem worth a trip to Moscow.


In fact, according to Eyal, there is a belief in the West, in Croatia and among Bosnian Moslems that Moscow at this point can only harm the peace process.


"They could make life more complicated, but cannot positively induce a settlement," Eyal said. "I think as far as the Croats and the Moslems are concerned, they know the real decisions will be taken by the United States."


Thursday's summit probably allowed Yeltsin to solidify his relationship with the Serbian president, but it was a public relations disappointment for the Kremlin. Tudjman should have been there, establishing Russia as a mediator of substance in the conflict.


Tudjman rejected Yeltsin's invitation at the last minute, claiming that the meeting was ill-prepared and should have included Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, who was not invited. That left Moscow with nothing to do but tar Tudjman with his absence and accuse him of warmongering.


But Tudjman's criticisms are hard to fault, and Yeltsin has emerged from the affair tarnished.


Izetbegovic should have been invited to scotch rampant speculation that Serbia and Croatia hope to carve up Bosnia between them. By inviting the Moslem leader to a future summit, Yeltsin appeared to acknowledge his mistake.


Thursday's summit was indeed poorly organized. Both Milosevic and Tudjman first had to ask publicly for details when the proposal was sprung upon them. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev had to interrupt his vacation to attend.