Russia has yet to make a fundamental decision concerning its attitude toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Eventually, Moscow will have to choose either cooperation or competition, and its choice will tell us much about Russia's eventual role in international politics.


Thus far Russia has reacted ambivalently to the new post-Cold War NATO. At one point, it accepted in principle NATO's invitation to join the Partnership for Peace. However, at other times, Russia has seemed to question NATO's very existence and, of course, it very recently pulled back from signing the partnership in protest over NATO's decision to consider how former Warsaw Pact nations might be admitted to full membership. However, Russia should overcome its reservations about NATO. Indeed, a strong and active NATO is actually in the interests of a democratic Russia in several important ways.


In the post-Cold War world, NATO serves as a source of stability throughout the European region. Given Russia's internal problems and the instability to its east and south, Russia should welcome the presence of a stable area to its west. One aspect of this stability is the German role in Europe. NATO has enveloped Germany in a web of security arrangements which (along with the European economic and political integration process) have made a resurgence of German expansionist nationalism almost unthinkable.


Related to Germany's place in Europe is the challenge of stability in Central and Eastern Europe. History shows that Germany and Russia are both under constant temptation to meddle in this region. If this area were to be left out of broader European security arrangements such as NATO, tensions between the nations of the region and Russia could arise, or a new power rivalry between Russia and Germany could emerge.


In its early years, NATO offered a security blanket for the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe, thus helping them to maintain democratic political systems and to develop economically. Similarly, by bringing the nations of central and eastern Europe closer to it, NATO can also provide a framework for the consolidation of democracy and market economies, and the development of a common European democratic security culture.


In turn, Russia should feel more secure if the nations to its immediate west are fundamentally democratic. Historical evidence shows clearly that democratic nations prefer peaceful commerce, and are very unlikely to harbor expansionist aims or be aggressive.


NATO is also the institutional mechanism for U.S. involvement in European security affairs. A democratic Russia should see its own strong interest in retaining a U.S. presence in the councils of European security. As a geographically distant nation without any vested interest in past European power rivalries and conquests, the United States can act as an honest broker on many issues, including the Russian role in European security matters.


On occasion, the Russian government has seemed to be interested in having the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) supplant NATO as the primary organization for European security. But the CSCE has no military forces and is composed of members with a wide variety of political systems. It cannot facilitate the integration of emerging democracies into the West.


Russia, of course, is an important part of the overall European security equation and can, to the extent it wishes, be brought into the broader European security framework which includes NATO. Indeed, it is possible for Russia and NATO to have a positive relationship which can, over time, be made formal.


A starting point for the Russia-NATO relationship is the reality that Russia will not become a member of NATO anytime in the near future. Russia itself is not really interested in taking such a step anytime soon, and it will be some time before NATO is ready to offer such membership.


Nonetheless, Russia and NATO can become more closely involved in mutually beneficial ways in the short term. First, Moscow should join the partnership for peace. By joining, Russia will make it more likely that it will be consulted by NATO on security issues, increasing its direct role in European affairs.


Second, Russia can actively participate in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, an organization created by NATO as a framework for political-military relations with all of the former Warsaw Pact nations and former Soviet republics. Through programs developed by the partnership and the Council, Russia can begin the long process of bringing its national security establishment into a common European framework.


The choice for Russia is simple. If it really wants to become part of the community of democratic nations, then Moscow should see NATO as an important mechanism for achieving that result. Democratic forces in Russia should particularly welcome the existence of a strong and effective NATO.


Russia's attitude toward the new NATO will tell us much about how Russia perceives its place in the post-Cold War world. If Russia chooses to react negatively to NATO and to view it as harmful to Russian interests, this will be a clear signal that Russia has defined its future as outside the West, and in possible opposition to it. If, on the other hand, Russia deals with NATO positively and becomes involved in its institutional framework, this will signal that Russia has chosen to move toward the West. The key to Russia's relationship with the West is Russia itself. The West will not isolate Russia -- but Russia may isolate itself. Ultimately, Russia will have to decide whether it wishes to join the West and, if so, it must work constructively with NATO.





W. Bruce Weinrod is counsel to the law firm of Allen & Harold. He was deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy from 1989 until early 1993. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.