The surprising landslide victory by the Republican party in U.S. midterm elections Nov. 8 will certainly lead to a shift not only in America's domestic policies, but its foreign policies as well. The internal changes that the United States has been undergoing in recent decades were never truly revolutionary. A network of well-established political lobbying and special interest groups has created a system of effective counterweights. As a result, any reform gradually comes to take on the features of a bipartisan compromise intended first and foremost to maintain social stability. Responsible politicians quickly stow away any threatening, radical slogans until the next election campaign.


In contrast, though, U.S. foreign policy is easily changeable and sometimes even neurotic. This has been especially true since the changes in Russia destroyed the stable and predictable character of the old bipolar world order. In America, most voters are not interested in foreign policy; therefore, even a small group of ambitious politicians can undertake radical foreign-policy initiatives in the name of the indifferent nation.


Therefore, it is precisely the area of foreign policy that the right-wingers now in control of the U.S. Congress will find most fruitful and least dangerous -- from their political point of view -- for demonstrations of their radicalism. Tough times are ahead. The disorganized and unpredictable, but generally well-disposed foreign policy of the Clinton administration may well be transformed into an unpredictable and irresponsible policy that is hostile to the outside world, in general, and to Russia, in particular.


Moscow today has no idea what to expect, and therefore people here are just timidly waiting for the changes to come. In Washington, foreign-policy officials have a better idea of the chilly times that lie ahead.


Last week, a highly placed American official involved in coordinating U.S. policy with the countries of the CIS told me that "1995 will be a difficult year." Increasing American support for the Moslem government in Bosnia and the coming eastward expansion of NATO will, of course, provoke negative reactions in Moscow. On the other hand, Moscow's actions to ensure stability within Russia and within the countries of "the near abroad," which this American official described as "completely natural," are not going to make Washington very happy.


On top of this, 1995 is the year when the flank quotas of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) come into effect. Many highly placed Russian generals and politicians, including President Boris Yeltsin, have already stated that the current quotas are unacceptable. However, consultations on the issue, which have been going on for over a year, remain deadlocked. The flank-zone countries of Europe -- Turkey and the Scandinavian countries -- are dead set against renegotiating the quotas. So Russia is on a collision course with virtually all the CFE-signatory countries in 1995.


It seems likely that the new U.S. Congress will find a number of reasons in the coming year to accuse Russia of perfidy and cut off aid to Moscow. The American public in general -- and its representatives in Congress -- doesn't much like foreign aid and is always looking for an excuse to cut back. Even though real American aid to Russia in recent years has been insignificant, a cutoff would have an important psychological effect. Such actions give ammunition to the nationalist and pro-communist movements in Moscow, as well as to right-wing radicals in Washington. Both groups clearly thrive on the presence of an external enemy.


Many American specialists on Russia believe that the real danger is not a Russia that is too strong, but one that is too weak. But no one seems to be listening to them these days.


Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security editor of Segodnya.