No Interest in Kim Jong-Il

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UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted Saturday, includes serious international sanctions aimed against Pyongyang. At the same time, the original draft resolution as submitted by Japan was softened somewhat to address objections from Moscow and Beijing. But are such attempts at leniency in Russia's strategic interests?

North Korea's nuclear test runs counter to the fundamental interests of the country. This much is obvious to any serious analyst and only the most ardent Russophobe would claim otherwise.

Currently only a few countries have nuclear weapons, and Russia and the United States have many times more than any of the other nuclear states. If the current structure of the United Nations guarantees Russia special status among other countries as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, then the nuclear-weapons non-proliferation regime is at the base of Russia's position as one of the world's two most powerful countries. This means the nuclear weapons proliferation seriously devalues Russia's influence in the world. It is all very simple: the more nuclear states there are, the less Russia's comparative military might become. This is a purely pragmatic consideration, to which can be added a number of other negative consequences from further nuclear proliferation: an increased probability of nuclear conflict, threats to national security in the Far East, and so on.

So when I hear "patriots" like General Leonid Ivashov, former head of the Defense Ministry's department for international cooperation, saying nuclear weapons are the only defense some countries have against possible aggression by the United States, and that Russia should support these countries in this, I feel like accusing them of treason. Yes, Kim Jong Il's regime, like many other anti-U.S. regimes around the world, wants to defend itself using nuclear weapons. Yes, the United States applies double standards and occasionally, under the pretext of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, punishes those it does not like (as was the case with Iraq). In a number of these cases Russian interests diverge from those of the United States. Russia's position with regard to Serbia, for example, was openly treacherous. But Russian-U.S. differences end when it comes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing the United States from battling against the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be shooting ourselves in the foot. That's an act typical not of a patriot, but of someone of a completely different character.

Russia's position on North Korea should also be based on other considerations.

Pyongyang is ruled by an extremely exotic regime that will fall sooner or later, although no precise time frame for this is clear. The result of this will be a united Korea. This is unavoidable, if only because the peoples of both countries are desperate for reunification, something not even Pyongyang denies.

The creation of a united Korea would be good for Russia, both geopolitically and economically. First, a united Korean state -- which would undoubtedly be based on the far more viable South Korea -- will be less dependant on U.S. influence, since its influence on Seoul is largely dependent on the threat from the North. Second, a united Korea's relations with Japan will be tricky due to the historical problems between the countries. It would also look with some trepidation at its huge and booming neighbor, China. For Russia, which also has serious and stubborn difficulties with Japan, and for which a powerful China represents a strategic challenge, a united Korea could become a geopolitical partner in the same mold as, for example, India. In addition, an economically advanced and unified Korea that is still closer to Russia's level of development than that of more advanced Japan could make a significant contribution to the development of the Far East and Siberian regions. The population of these regions traditionally favors collaboration with the Koreans and has fewer reservations about them than it does, for example, about the Chinese.

Thus, the U.S. course to change the political regime in North Korea clearly chimes in with Russia's long-term interests, which here diverge in part from those of Beijing. Of course, it would be good for Russia if the fall of Kim Jong Il's regime and the unification of Korea occurred peacefully, without cataclysms that could lead to a flood of refugees or in any other way exert a baleful influence on territories bordering Russia. In this respect, the United States, which is much further away, can afford to be much less cautious.

Russia should look first to Seoul, where its interests coincide completely and where the position of those in favor of appeasing Pyongyang has weakened noticeably following the nuclear test. At the same time, some parts of Russia's position should also be coordinated with Washington and Beijing.

Based on these considerations, Russia should support harsher sanctions than those outlined in Resolution 1718 and should advise Beijing to do the same, since China, which supplies North Korea with energy, is the only country with serious influence in Pyongyang. This would further strengthen Russia's position -- favoring the most serious sanctions possible, up to and including a blockade and inspections of all incoming goods, but not war.

At the same time, while it is rational to take an anti-war position in Security Council negotiations, it would be better to refrain from them in public statements. The nature of the Pyongyang regime is such that only the real threat of real action that could lead to the destruction of its leaders might push it into real concessions. Economic sanctions here are much less effective, as they hurt the population, about whom the regime doesn't care. By saying publicly that they oppose military action, Moscow and Beijing give Kim Jong Il a false sense of security and freedom to act.

Russian policy in general should move away from its Cold War complex, which says anything that is bad for Washington is good for Moscow. In today's world, Washington and Moscow can have their differences, but there are other questions where their interests may be identical or similar (in addition to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, these include the war on international terrorism, drug trafficking, religious extremism and many others).

There is also the possibility for horse-trading here. For example, Russia stiffens its position on Korea -- which is good for Moscow anyway -- in exchange for a softer U.S. position on Georgia (an operation the Foreign Ministry seems to have carried out successfully). Active defense of Russian interests is not compatible with the primitive anti-Americanism characteristic of pseudo-patriots and some highly placed figures apparently unable to overcome their Soviet special-services training. While possibly taking a more assertive position on some questions, it is essential to work closely with Washington and the West as a whole on others. Genuine patriotism is not made of hysterical anti-Westernism, but of strengthening one's own country. To paraphrase the words of Petr Stolypin, prime minster under Nicholas II, we can say, "They need a weak America, we need a strong Russia." Taking this literally, the Kremlin leadership still occasionally lets itself be influenced by traditional feelings that ultimately boomerang and produce a foreign policy that is ultimately unproductive for Russia.

Alexander Lukin is director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at the Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Relations, or MGIMO.