Inevitable as it was, Leonid Kuchma deserves applause for making it happen. While Ukraine has never had a real option to keep its status as a nuclear power, it was nonetheless a significant achievement to persuade parliament that this was the case and to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Only three months after taking office, Kuchma has succeeded where his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, failed in 2 1/2 years as president of Ukraine.


As a former missile-factory director, Kuchma had a certain authority on the subject that Kravchuk perhaps lacked. So when Kuchma told the assembly that there was little purpose in Ukraine hanging on to nearly 200 missiles and about 2,000 warheads it had no capability of launching, they listened. And when he reminded them that just keeping these weapons would cost the beleaguered Ukrainian economy up to $30 billion a year, they got the point. The motion was carried by 301 votes to 8 against.


That it is a good thing that one country fewer will be a nuclear power goes without saying. The more countries that sign and adhere to the treaty, the safer the world becomes.


But Ukraine also deserves credit for opting to sign the treaty now, rather than continuing to dangle the prospect before the West in the hope of gaining further financial inducements. Cash played a significant role in the deal as it is, with Kuchma standing to gain some hefty loans, credits and aid when he visits Washington next week. The vote was well timed in this respect.


There is also the point that when the treaty comes up for renegotiation in the near future, Ukraine's signature will play a role. Any further stalling on Ukraine's part would have added weight to the already growing body of opinion in the developing countries that the treaty is simply a means to exclude them from a predominantly American and European nuclear club.


There were a few nationalist diehards in the Ukrainian Rada who opposed the notion of Ukraine giving up its nuclear deterrent to the bitter end, arguing that such a move would involve a loss of status.


This simply does not hold water. Ukraine was never a nuclear power in its own right. The missiles on its soil were never part of a Ukrainian defense program, but a legacy of Soviet power. And Ukraine still has no power to launch or maintain its arsenal. In other words, this was no deterrent, it was a nuclear liability.


By deciding, of its own volition, to give them up, Ukraine may have lost its status as a nuclear wild card, but it has greatly enhanced its image as a responsible nation that can be dealt with rationally and should be helped.