There have been relatively few serious political conflicts in Russia since the beginning of this year. Contrary to panicky predictions after the December 1993 elections, the new Russian parliament has turned out to be a relatively civilized forum for political debate. Against the background of Russia's constant political crises between August 1991 and the shelling of the White House in October 1993, the country appears much more stable now than might have been expected.


Unfortunately, this picture of tranquility is treacherous. The unpleasant truth is that Russia remains an inherently unstable country, primarily because it continues to depend on a politics of personalities rather than one of institutions.


The division of power between the federal and regional governments is hazy at best. Although the fear for Russia's territorial integrity has subsided, key problems remain unsolved. Many prospering or reform-minded regions are reluctant to subsidize the economies of poorer or reform-averse regions by means of federal tax redistributions. Oil-rich Tyumen, to give one example, is presently drafting a new regional charter that claims more economic and political autonomy than provided for in the federal legislation.


To the extent that the central government intends to continue a relatively tight monetary policy, the pressure for increased tax revenues from the regions will increase. Added to the ongoing controversies over the budget, export licenses and state property, this may trigger a new round of stand-offs between the regions and Moscow.


In most regions, the relationship between a presidentially appointed governor and a locally elected legislature is largely determined by personal and political chemistry. Existing legislation does not define a workable division of power. The voluntary agreement in 1992 between Governor Boris Nemtsov and the regional parliament to create a Coordinating Council to bridge the gap between the two branches of regional government, was instrumental in turning Nizhny Novgorod into Russia's most successful example of reform to date.


Significantly the Federal Treaty, signed in 1992 to regulate the relationships between Moscow and the country's regions, was not included in Russia's new constitution. No mechanism other than silent tolerance has yet been found to resolve the numerous contradictions between the federal constitution and the many regional charters. The uneasy treaties Russia signed with the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan earlier this year, not to mention the Chechen Republic's refusal to accept federal law, conspicuously demonstrate the frailty of the current federative arrangements.


Moreover, the division of power between the executive and legislative branches on the federal level still lacks an effective balancing force. Russia's first experiment with a Constitutional Court, created in the heyday of Russia's young democracy, went badly wrong. Although initially the court avoided being drawn into the conflicts between the main political opponents, subsequent events exposed the court's inability to act as constitutional arbiter.


The Constitutional Court has had no real means to effect its own decisions. Apparently as a result of the political activities of the court's previous chairman, Valery Zorkin, which did much to discredit the institution as a whole, neither the new constitution nor the new law on the Constitutional Court grants the court real administrative clout. Worse, by denying any lower-ranking judicial body the right to review constitutional questions, the new legislation guarantees that the court will be immobilized by a deluge of appeals.


In addition, the temptation to raise political conflicts to a constitutional level is as great as ever. This will further dent the image of the court which already enjoys little to no public respect: In a society in which the most successful live by to their own rules, public confidence in any sort of referee is naturally low. The reality is that the revision of political rules and the delineation of administrative competence are still left to the political players themselves.


Lastly, there is the question of the constitution's legitimacy. In July, Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an analysis by Alexander Sobyanin who had been asked by Yeltsin to review the adoption of the current constitution. Sobyanin's findings indicated that the constitution had in fact failed to gather the number of votes necessary for passage in the December 1993 referendum. Subsequently Sobyanin was removed from his position and his report was, officially and publicly, treated with stony silence.


This is no surprise: For more than two years the constitutional division of powers has been the root cause of the country's political crises. Acknowledging doubts about the legitimacy of Russia's new constitution, which had been proposed by the president and which forms the basis for the current parliament's existence, would have produced a complete vacuum of political authority.


Also, the initial concerns about the new constitution -- that it provides for a strong presidency and a weak parliament with little say in the formation of the government -- seem to have been forgotten. Yeltsin is still seen by many as the symbol of democracy and reform. But the troubling question remains of who will succeed Yeltsin and inherit his far-reaching constitutional power.


Much of Russia's current tranquility is a function of a battle-weary president and a parliament too splintered to provide real opposition. And much of the credit goes to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who has masterfully consolidated his position while simultaneously implementing the basic principles of Yegor Gaidar's reform program. The "Chernomyrdin phenomenon," though, is really just another example of Russia's problem: Stability still depends too much on individual personalities and personal relationships. Lasting stability is yet to be institutionalized in Russia.





Richard Burger is the director of the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow center. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.