Today, out of 22 states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there are only five -- Albania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia -- in which former Communists do not hold power or significantly share in governance. Yet the startling political comeback of ex- and neo-Communists excites little concern in the United States and Western Europe. Many of the new ex-Communists are viewed as pragmatic, go-slow reformers committed to playing by the rules of the market and of democracy -- a characterization that is more apt in some cases than in others. Democratic activists in the region do not share the West's lack of concern. Those in Ukraine, for example, report a palpable shift in the attitudes of the media and among academics since the takeover by socialists and neo-Communists of the country's newly elected parliament. "We are beginning to see a hardening of positions among many Communists who were lying low over the last two years," observes Ilko Kueheriv, director of the Democratic Initiatives polling center. "Now they feel much more self-assured; they are on the offensive." And that is legitimate cause for alarm, since there is no denying that many of these self-styled reformers were cogs in a system that for decades proscribed human rights, suppressed religious liberties and crushed opposition. Even more worrying is that many of the millions who voted for them did so out of a nostalgic hope for a return of social and economic security, even if that meant a return to authoritarian order. To be sure, the difficult transition from statist economies to a market system could have been expected to push millions of disgruntled industrial workers and pensioners to the left. What surprises is that they turned to the old, ex-Communist left and not to the new social-democratic parties. How did this come about? First, the West vastly underestimated the psychological damage inflicted by decades of statism. Communist rule destroys the ideas of voluntarism, self-help and cooperation, and with them any sense of authentic community. It is also now clear that the old Communist nomenklatura never really relinquished influence over politics and economics, especially in the former Soviet Union. And in Central Europe, where privatization has made remarkable progress, much of the power of the ex-Communists was retained through a tightly controlled process of privatization that, accompanied by rampant corruption, seemed to discredit capitalism and economic reform. The West further underestimated the solidarity of ex-Communists who had worked in the upper and middle reaches of the Communist Party and in women's, youth and trade union organizations. Those potent networks remained intact despite confiscation of much party property. Central Europe's economic difficulties were also greatly aggravated by the selfishness of the European Community, which denied Eastern-bloc nations what they really wanted: market access. The EC covered its protectionism with bogus explanations: One sick sheep from Poland was cited as justification for prohibitive quotas on all sheep from anywhere. Not surprisingly, Poland and her neighbors responded with duties of their own, hurting the economics of both areas and plunging Central Europe into political turmoil as well. Above all, the ex-Communists clawed their way back to power because anti-Communists lost their moral voice. When the genuine leaders of democratic movements, steeped in the values of human rights and moral courage, were replaced on the airwaves by cold-blooded economic surgeons, the public was encouraged to think about reform exclusively in material terms. Detached, pragmatic Eurocrats and American consultants recoiled at such unifying forces as nationalism and religious revival, which are central to the fragile rebirth of civil society. Instead, nationalism was equated with xenophobia and ethnic hatred -- a dangerous threat to stability that is often cynically mobilized by ex-Communists. Richard Rose, of the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, has found that citizens appreciate the improvements in political rights and civil liberties, the fact that they can now worship in the church and vote for the party of their choice, speak their minds freely and choose television shows and newspapers that are more truthful and open. Yet the democratic revolutionaries who led the movement to secure these new rights failed to remind the public of these tangible gains. Had they done so, they might have withstood the populist and materialist onslaught of the ex-Communists and bought more time for the economic transition. The ex-Communists who have staged their remarkable comeback are aware that if they return to their old ways, they can again be swept from power. There are economic constraints, as well -- among them, the emergence of a middle class and increased trade with the industrial democracies. Yet the worrying signals from the post-Communist world suggest that aid programs should be redirected away from their nearly exclusive focus on market mechanisms and local administration. Aid programs should aim at the strengthening of independent media, democratic education of the young and the dissemination of books and journals that promote respect for political freedoms. Help should also be targeted to independent trade unions that give voice to the interests of ordinary working people and so stem the rise of pro-Communist and pro-fascist sentiments among those who have borne the brunt of the harsh economic transitions. Adrian Karatnycky is executive director of Freedom House. He contributed this comment to The Washington Post.