Risk of New Arms Race

After several months of relative silence, Russia has once again raised the possibility of drawing up contingency plans to redeploy its forces, including nuclear ones, and return to a basically offensive strategic posture. A high-ranking official from the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry announced on Feb. 19 that if NATO were to expand further east and deploy its nuclear weapons on the territory of the new alliance members, Russia would respond with "adequate measures." Among such measures, he specified that Russia would retarget its nuclear missiles at any countries seeking admission into the post-Cold War's most powerful military organization that would be willing to allow NATO nuclear bases on their soil.


Such warnings recall official statements that were leaked to the Russian national newspapers, Komsomolskaya Pravda and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, last September and October. The papers revealed the schemes of the Russian General Staff to strengthen, in the light of inevitable NATO eastward expansion, not only conventional, but nuclear forces as well. The reports said that Moscow would redeploy its tactical nuclear missiles in the western part of the country and even on warships sailing in the already denuclearized Baltic Sea. The newspapers also said at the time that Russian nuclear warheads would once again be aimed at potential primary targets inside Central European countries in the expanded NATO area, if they agree to station the alliance's nuclear weapons.


The possibility that NATO will offer nuclear guarantees to the former Warsaw Pact countries that join it, in the form of long- and short-range nuclear missiles and duel-capable aircraft -- which are equipped to carry nuclear free-fall bombs as well as conventional ones -- is not just the fantasy of some alarmist military analysts. The prospect for such strategic plans is real.


It is real, because it can be implemented, both in tactical and strategic terms. The relevant provisions have already been made public last September in the NATO document "Study on NATO Enlargement." It clearly stipulates both possibilities: the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons inside the Eastern European NATO zone and guarantees of a strategic nuclear umbrella, using strategic offensive arms, with a firing range of 5,500 kilometers and beyond, from outside the expanded NATO area.


True, the document has a provision, in Paragraph 58, saying that NATO has no a priori requirement for stationing nuclear weapons on the territory of new members of the alliance. But it also states that the coverage provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on collective defense -- "one for all, all for one" -- including its nuclear component, will also apply to new members. Moreover, like current NATO members, newcomers will be expected to contribute to the development and implementation of NATO's nuclear strategy. They will also be eligible to join the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies and take part in nuclear consultations during exercises and crises.


But more alarming is item "d" of Paragraph 45 of the study. It says that the ultimate guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the "strategic nuclear forces" of the alliance. Security will thus be backed by the most powerful strategic arsenals of two or three of the Western nuclear powers, which include the traditional triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.


It is rather strange that these provisions appeared at a time when the world has witnessed many positive steps aimed at putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle. It is very difficult to understand the reasons behind incorporating such nuclear weapons clauses into a major enlargement study, when, in 1991, the NATO document "Strategic Concept" stated that "the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed."


The provisions in the study for nuclear weapons run counter to the many recent, substantial efforts on the part of the declared nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race. These include the SALT negotiations, the agreement on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, the START I and START II treaties, the 1994 agreements on de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles, which were signed by Russia, the United States, Britain and the People's Republic of China, on a bilateral basis, the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the adherence of Russia, the United States, Britain and France to a nuclear test moratorium, unilateral measures by several states to curtail production of fissionable material and the elaboration of several nuclear-free-zone draft treaties.


It would be counterproductive, pointless and dangerous for the alliance to expand its nuclear capabilities farther east. The worst-case scenario would be if NATO were to go ahead with nuclear defense provisions in its expansion into East Europe and Russia were to give an approximate or similar nuclear response.


In light of the many positive achievements in the search for nuclear disarmament, it would, of course, be much better not to revive nuclear competition between former nuclear adversaries.What, then, should the nuclear powers do to prevent another arms race from occurring? As the American columnist Flora Lewis recently argued in the International Herald Tribune, it is essential that the proposed security pact between Russia and NATO include a strong commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any states seeking NATO membership.


And, I would add, a commitment not to offer any strategic nuclear umbrellas to them.


That would be the best answer to the nuclear questions NATO will be raising as it moves ahead with enlargement to the east.





Vladimir Kozin is a senior counselor at the Arms Control Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. He contributed this comment, which reflects his own personal views, to The Moscow Times.