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Will Russia continue to progress toward the rule of law? How transparent and predictable will the actions of Russia's leaders be? Will the courts become more independent? Will a line be drawn under the results of privatization? As the state's influence on the economy grows, how aggressively will administrative reform be pursued? Will small- and medium-size businesses finally be freed from the yoke of corrupt bureaucracy? Will the ruling elite grasp that for Russia to thrive it must become fully integrated into the global community, and that this can happen only after internal transformations at home? Finally, will Putin's second term be marked by more rapid modernization or progressive stagnation? These and other questions remain to be answered.
A number of influential leaders in the United States have already drawn their conclusions, however. Republican Senator John McCain summed up their position in a speech on Nov. 4. McCain described Russia as a country with a despotic regime that has trampled the fragile shoots of democracy and civil liberties at home, while pursuing a neo-imperial policy in relation to the former Soviet states. He ruled out the possibility of normal U.S.-Russian relations and proposed excluding Russia from the G-8 and other elite Western institutions. McCain called for a top-to-bottom review of Washington's Russia policy since 1991, and to all intents and purposes labeled Russia an enemy of the United States.
Nor is McCain alone in this assessment. For the first time since the spring of 1999, when the Clinton administration's Russia policy came in for withering criticism, pessimism regarding the prospects for U.S.-Russian relations has begun to spread through U.S. foreign policy circles among Republicans and Democrats alike. The White House, which officially regards Russia as a strategic partner, thus finds itself under fire from all sides. If the pessimists win out, the United States could adopt a more hard-line stance in its relations with Russia. How justified would such a shift be?
The picture painted by the hard-liners in Washington is fairly accurate. Russia today is a semi-authoritarian country whose political system borrows much from the Soviet as well as the imperial past. While a plurality of interests does exist, the regime is in the hands of bureaucratic clans that have merged with big business. The press enjoys only limited freedom, but the arbitrary actions of law enforcement know no limits. Politics remain the domain of the elite. Elections are held regularly, but most Russians are utterly apathetic. Russia's "democratic future" cannot be guaranteed, not because too little time has passed for democratic institutions to take hold, but because there is no broad consensus on the necessity of democracy itself.
The main question today is not what form democracy will take, but rather what form the new capitalism will take; or rather, what role the state will play in the economy. Recent events suggest the economy will remain largely in private hands, but that state control of these "hands" will tighten.
In foreign policy, Russia is putting its friendly relations with the developed (Western) countries to use to promote modernization while pursuing economic expansion throughout the former Soviet Union, potentially increasing its political influence in the "new" independent states. At the same time, Russia will remain outside the integrated political, economic and military structures of NATO and the European Union, while striving to preserve its freedom of maneuver in other areas (China, India, the Middle East and Central Asia). In other words, Russia will remain outside the Western community for the foreseeable future.
Russia's partners should bear in mind that the country is not likely to change drastically in the near future, and that domestic capital, not political forces, will be the driving force behind the limited change that does occur. In the current climate of openness, external factors play a significant role in internal processes, but opportunities for direct political intervention in these processes from without are extremely limited, and such intervention would almost certainly prove counterproductive.
Putin clearly values Russia's membership in the G-8, but for him political power is inestimably more important. By his own admission, Putin is a "European." But even if the question of Russia's exclusion from the Council of Europe were raised again he would not withdraw federal troops from Chechnya. The United States has very few levers to pull where Russia is concerned. U.S. aid is basically limited to financing nuclear disarmament. Russian access to cutting-edge American technology remains limited. The Jackson-Vanik amendment has lost all practical meaning, and the level of private investment depends far more on Russian law than on guarantees from the U.S. government. Even the IMF and the issue of Russia's foreign debt no longer provides much leverage because Russia is focused on paying back existing debt, not on borrowing more.
The main thing to keep in mind is that Russia's "democracy deficit" has been created less by the elites than by the "masses," who have yet to become a "demos." It goes without saying that a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States would have serious and unpleasant consequences for Russia across the board. But this fact only complicates matters for the United States. The following points should be borne in mind:
• Kicking Russia out of the G-8 and closing the NATO-Russia Council would add another item to the already long list of fundamental differences between the United States and Europe.
• Refusing to cooperate with Russia in the war on terrorism (in Afghanistan, for example) would compromise U.S. national security.
• A public rift between the United States and Russia on the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would only play into the hands of those responsible for this proliferation.
• Any attempt by Washington to push Russia out of CIS countries would place a further strain on U.S. forces and draw them more deeply into regions where the United States has no vital national interest.
• Any attempt to pressure Moscow into signing off on energy deals or to alter its stance on the price of oil is fraught with negative consequences for the world energy market.
As the 21st century opens, the United States has achieved the pinnacle of power and influence in the world. Yet America's ability to maintain its position depends largely on its ability to create a system for managing global processes founded on the consensus of the world's leading nations -- not only the EU and Japan, but also China, India and Russia. In its long-term strategy, the United States would do well to take into account the consequences of the likely increase in economic and political power of the leading Asian countries, the deepening integration of Europe and Russia's possible emergence as a significant economic power.
At this juncture, Washington and Moscow must candidly exchange views on issues capable of influencing bilateral relations, including Russia's policy at home and U.S. foreign and military policy. And this exchange must be predicated on a firm grasp of each country's interests and ambitions. This is not the place for philanthropy or altruism. The Russian leadership must have a clear idea of what the country stands to gain from its relationship with the United States, and in the national interest it must remain committed to partnership. To this point, the Bush administration has proceeded in precisely this manner, but should it attempt to make the U.S. relationship with Russia part of its "global democracy project," it would seriously damage U.S. national interests.
Dmitry Trenin is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment and director of studies at the Carnegie Moscow Center. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
