State visits don't usually influence world politics. But the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to Moscow on July 6 to 8 might become an exception. Obama has a unique chance to tell the world what U.S. policy toward Russia will be under his administration.? He could provide an understanding of whether that strategy will be high-priority or pushed to the back burner. He could clear the air about his thinking about Russia's neighbors, the other former Soviet republics that Moscow views as its "areas of privileged interests." He could help Europe define its "Eastern dimension."?
Taken together, Obama's insight on these issues could give us a clue as to what foreign policy his administration will chose -- that of the 20th century or, more likely, what philosopher Francis Fukuyama called "realistic Wilsonianism," a combination of pragmatism and values.? ? ? ?
The outcome of Obama's visit to Moscow will depend on the willingness of the U.S. side to see the differences between the national interests of Russia and the interests of Russia's ruling elite.
The interests of Russian society, which is longing for openness, social welfare and the supremacy of the rule of law, do not contradict the interests of the United States. The problem is in the Russian elite, which would like to integrate into the West but at the same time is trying to close the rest of Russian society from the West and consolidate it through decidedly anti-U.S. rhetoric.
Obama may take the easy route of conducting talks with the Russian elite only. By doing so, he could accomplish his goals of reaching an agreement on a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in December, and setting up a framework for ongoing consultations between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. At the same time, Obama could make progress on trade and security issues, both of which are high on the U.S.-Russian agenda.
Supporters of realpolitik on both sides of the Atlantic -- people who say U.S.-Russian relations need to be developed on a foundation of common interests and not be tied to Russian domestic issues --? are calling on the White House to embrace talks with the Russian elite. Some in this camp find Russia's transformation in the 18 years since the Soviet collapse to be a hopeless endeavor and are urging Obama not to irritate the Kremlin. Others are using realpolitik to promote their own interests and to legitimatize the current Russian system of government.
It is clear that the Russian government would support Obama's embrace of realpolitik. Interestingly, relations between Russia and the United States during the eight years of George W. Bush's presidency were built on a foundation of realpolitik, and their ideologists are the same people who today are giving advice to the White House on how to go about "resetting" ties. But this old foundation for ties failed to avert a crisis in relations that reached post-Cold War lows last year. Who can guarantee that the old prescriptions being offered to Obama will work effectively today?
Obama, however, might offer Russia his own version of pragmatism, showing that his vision of "resetting" ties differs from what is expected in Moscow. During his visit, he could demonstrate to the Kremlin that Russia is not a priority for him and suggest that all cooperation be kept low profile. Such a stance would deal a blow to the hopes of the Kremlin elite who expect a comeback of "special relations" with the United States. The elite would then resort to a well-known mantra of "we are being ignored and humiliated" and again try to prove their importance by "breaking windows" in neighboring countries.
Obama's speech to the Muslim world in Cairo on June 4 gave proof that the U.S. president has embraced a new way of strategic thinking. But could he deliver a speech in Moscow that manages to simultaneously call for a transformation of Russia and take into the account the West's errors in its dealings with Russia in the 1990s? Such a feat seems unlikely. Western "engagement through transformation" politics don't go over well in Russia. Moreover, the U.S. neocons who tried to make the world a better place with their "spreading democracy" campaign have not yet been forgotten.
Therefore, it would be understandable if Obama decided to adopt the simplest approach: downgrading ties with Russia. But the Kremlin could end up offended if Washington decides to attach no special status to the "resetting" of U.S.-Russian ties. Moreover, pro-Western Russians would be disappointed by Obama's unwillingness to take a value-based approach to Russia.
So Moscow might turn into a trap for Obama. The White House has little chance of being able to cooperate with the Kremlin without making some concessions to the Russian elite. However, such cooperation promises to promote the current Russian system, which functions with the "besieged fortress" mentality in which Russia is surrounded by enemies.? If Obama takes a value-based approach, his opportunities on security will be limited.
Nevertheless, Obama might try to pull off something in Moscow that no other U.S. president has succeeded in doing: reaching an agreement with the Kremlin on issues of common interest and at the same time offering a different world vision to Russian society.
The significance of rhetoric and other gestures during state visits should not be exaggerated. But with Obama's visit, the words of a person who is recognized by many as a world leader hold a special value. If Obama mentions key issues like modernization, freedom, contentiousness and respect for neighboring countries' sovereignty, his words will have an impact that goes well beyond the pro-Western Russians waiting for some encouragement from the United States. His words in Moscow could be heard in Kiev, Tbilisi, Warsaw and Berlin. Crucial conclusions could be made in those capitals about Washington's strategic viewpoint -- or its absence.
Obama's choice of words is not the only important part of his visit. With whom he decides to meet will also be essential. It is one thing if he sits down with human rights leaders and the opposition and quite another if he agrees to meet with representatives of the Kremlin-appointed "civil society" and pro-Kremlin political parties.
Whether Obama will let the Kremlin use him in its own games is also of great importance. Obama could unknowingly end up promoting or undermining one of the two players in the ruling tandem -- President Dmitry Medvedev or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Obama is coming to a country mired in an economic crisis. The political system is paralyzed and the leaders are disorientated. He has an opportunity to come to Russia and address Russians as an embodiment of change. But for change to happen, he needs a strategic vision and an understanding that Russia is not just another board piece in a U.S. geopolitical chess game. Russia is a challenge.
Lilia Shevtsova is a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center and chair of the Davos Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Future of Russia.
Taken together, Obama's insight on these issues could give us a clue as to what foreign policy his administration will chose -- that of the 20th century or, more likely, what philosopher Francis Fukuyama called "realistic Wilsonianism," a combination of pragmatism and values.? ? ? ?
The outcome of Obama's visit to Moscow will depend on the willingness of the U.S. side to see the differences between the national interests of Russia and the interests of Russia's ruling elite.
The interests of Russian society, which is longing for openness, social welfare and the supremacy of the rule of law, do not contradict the interests of the United States. The problem is in the Russian elite, which would like to integrate into the West but at the same time is trying to close the rest of Russian society from the West and consolidate it through decidedly anti-U.S. rhetoric.
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Supporters of realpolitik on both sides of the Atlantic -- people who say U.S.-Russian relations need to be developed on a foundation of common interests and not be tied to Russian domestic issues --? are calling on the White House to embrace talks with the Russian elite. Some in this camp find Russia's transformation in the 18 years since the Soviet collapse to be a hopeless endeavor and are urging Obama not to irritate the Kremlin. Others are using realpolitik to promote their own interests and to legitimatize the current Russian system of government.
It is clear that the Russian government would support Obama's embrace of realpolitik. Interestingly, relations between Russia and the United States during the eight years of George W. Bush's presidency were built on a foundation of realpolitik, and their ideologists are the same people who today are giving advice to the White House on how to go about "resetting" ties. But this old foundation for ties failed to avert a crisis in relations that reached post-Cold War lows last year. Who can guarantee that the old prescriptions being offered to Obama will work effectively today?
Obama, however, might offer Russia his own version of pragmatism, showing that his vision of "resetting" ties differs from what is expected in Moscow. During his visit, he could demonstrate to the Kremlin that Russia is not a priority for him and suggest that all cooperation be kept low profile. Such a stance would deal a blow to the hopes of the Kremlin elite who expect a comeback of "special relations" with the United States. The elite would then resort to a well-known mantra of "we are being ignored and humiliated" and again try to prove their importance by "breaking windows" in neighboring countries.
Obama's speech to the Muslim world in Cairo on June 4 gave proof that the U.S. president has embraced a new way of strategic thinking. But could he deliver a speech in Moscow that manages to simultaneously call for a transformation of Russia and take into the account the West's errors in its dealings with Russia in the 1990s? Such a feat seems unlikely. Western "engagement through transformation" politics don't go over well in Russia. Moreover, the U.S. neocons who tried to make the world a better place with their "spreading democracy" campaign have not yet been forgotten.
Therefore, it would be understandable if Obama decided to adopt the simplest approach: downgrading ties with Russia. But the Kremlin could end up offended if Washington decides to attach no special status to the "resetting" of U.S.-Russian ties. Moreover, pro-Western Russians would be disappointed by Obama's unwillingness to take a value-based approach to Russia.
So Moscow might turn into a trap for Obama. The White House has little chance of being able to cooperate with the Kremlin without making some concessions to the Russian elite. However, such cooperation promises to promote the current Russian system, which functions with the "besieged fortress" mentality in which Russia is surrounded by enemies.? If Obama takes a value-based approach, his opportunities on security will be limited.
Nevertheless, Obama might try to pull off something in Moscow that no other U.S. president has succeeded in doing: reaching an agreement with the Kremlin on issues of common interest and at the same time offering a different world vision to Russian society.
The significance of rhetoric and other gestures during state visits should not be exaggerated. But with Obama's visit, the words of a person who is recognized by many as a world leader hold a special value. If Obama mentions key issues like modernization, freedom, contentiousness and respect for neighboring countries' sovereignty, his words will have an impact that goes well beyond the pro-Western Russians waiting for some encouragement from the United States. His words in Moscow could be heard in Kiev, Tbilisi, Warsaw and Berlin. Crucial conclusions could be made in those capitals about Washington's strategic viewpoint -- or its absence.
Obama's choice of words is not the only important part of his visit. With whom he decides to meet will also be essential. It is one thing if he sits down with human rights leaders and the opposition and quite another if he agrees to meet with representatives of the Kremlin-appointed "civil society" and pro-Kremlin political parties.
Whether Obama will let the Kremlin use him in its own games is also of great importance. Obama could unknowingly end up promoting or undermining one of the two players in the ruling tandem -- President Dmitry Medvedev or Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Obama is coming to a country mired in an economic crisis. The political system is paralyzed and the leaders are disorientated. He has an opportunity to come to Russia and address Russians as an embodiment of change. But for change to happen, he needs a strategic vision and an understanding that Russia is not just another board piece in a U.S. geopolitical chess game. Russia is a challenge.
Lilia Shevtsova is a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center and chair of the Davos Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Future of Russia.