At the Interior Ministry the other day, they were handing out posters. Against a clear blue sky, resplendent in hunky fatigues, a soldier stands, his feet planted firmly on the turret of a tank, waving a white, blue and red Russian flag. The message reads: "Interior Troops -- the guarantee of stability in society."
When they took that picture, the soldier in question was probably not planning on getting down inside the turret and closing the hatch. But that is what thousands like him are now doing in Vladikavkaz and other centers close to the rebellious north Caucasus region of Chechnya.
This time, Boris Yeltsin will have done his homework. Whatever he actually decides to do about Chechnya, he will have made sure in advance that if he tells his troops to go in, they will not turn round and say no.
Because that, as doubtless Yeltsin will remember only too well, is exactly what happened last time, three years ago. The Interior Ministry refused to order its forces into action, parliament demanded the revoking of a state of emergency in what was then still officially Checheno-Ingushetia and Yeltsin backed down. Dzhokhar Dudayev faced up to the might of Russia and has been thumbing his nose at Yeltsin ever since.
Actually, it wasn't as humiliating as all that. Yeltsin, who emerged as a popular hero after the failed August coup, was still on a roll. His climbdown could be portrayed as a new sense of reconciliation triumphing over Soviet-style confrontation.
That was certainly the message that Yeltsin's then close confidant, Ruslan Khasbulatov, whose Chechen nationality gave it additional voracity, was keen to push at the time. And with memories all too fresh of Mikhail Gorbachev's bloody punitive expeditions into Georgia, Azerbaijan and Lithuania, it did Yeltsin no harm to show that Moscow had indeed turned a new leaf.
It was also prudent. Dudayev had yet to acquire his reputation as a gangster and was regarded in Chechnya at least as the leader of a struggle for national liberation. He had the whole Chechen nation united behind him, with the citizens of Grozny pouring out onto the streets to build barricades against the Russian tanks that never came. There was no question that any attempt by Russia to crush the Chechen rebellion by force, would have met determined resistance and led to a long and extremely bloody war that would probably have spread right across the volatile, multi-ethnic north Caucasus region.
But that does not mean that Yeltsin ever intended to forgive and forget. Indeed, while stopping short of overt direct involvement, Russia has been waging a war-by-proxy in Chechnya ever since, providing the anti-Dudayev opposition with arms, financial support and a safe haven whenever necessary. And it made no secret of the fact that it was doing so, for this was part of a campaign to undermine the authority of Dudayev at every opportunity.
The fact that many of the opposition leaders receiving Russian support were no more pro-Moscow than Dudayev -- and certainly no less bloodthirsty or contemptuous of the law -- was immaterial; any enemy of Dudayev was for the time being to be considered a friend.
And so matters might have been left to continue more or less indefinitely, had it not been for the capture of some 70 Russian soldiers fighting alongside Chechen opposition forces last weekend. This in itself was something of an embarrassment for Russia, which has consistently denied that any of its own forces have been involved in the actual fighting. But when Dudayev threatened to execute them, he forced Yeltsin's hand.
This time, it would appear that Dudayev has miscalculated. The Chechens who were united behind him in November 1991 have become disillusioned after three years of lawlessness, violence and severe economic deprivation, interspersed with skirmishes between government and opposition forces. This time the citizens of Grozny are choosing to leave town, rather than stay and build the barricades.
Yeltsin would seem to be holding all the cards. The opposition forces have said they will abide by his cease-fire demand, but should he want a pretext to invade, they would doubtless oblige by starting to fight again. In the meantime, Dudayev has to sit and watch his airports being bombed without a chance to hit back.
For all his defiant statements, he may just end up in an unfamiliar seat around the negotiating table. Unless he opts for Armageddon and shoots his prisoners.
When they took that picture, the soldier in question was probably not planning on getting down inside the turret and closing the hatch. But that is what thousands like him are now doing in Vladikavkaz and other centers close to the rebellious north Caucasus region of Chechnya.
This time, Boris Yeltsin will have done his homework. Whatever he actually decides to do about Chechnya, he will have made sure in advance that if he tells his troops to go in, they will not turn round and say no.
Because that, as doubtless Yeltsin will remember only too well, is exactly what happened last time, three years ago. The Interior Ministry refused to order its forces into action, parliament demanded the revoking of a state of emergency in what was then still officially Checheno-Ingushetia and Yeltsin backed down. Dzhokhar Dudayev faced up to the might of Russia and has been thumbing his nose at Yeltsin ever since.
Actually, it wasn't as humiliating as all that. Yeltsin, who emerged as a popular hero after the failed August coup, was still on a roll. His climbdown could be portrayed as a new sense of reconciliation triumphing over Soviet-style confrontation.
That was certainly the message that Yeltsin's then close confidant, Ruslan Khasbulatov, whose Chechen nationality gave it additional voracity, was keen to push at the time. And with memories all too fresh of Mikhail Gorbachev's bloody punitive expeditions into Georgia, Azerbaijan and Lithuania, it did Yeltsin no harm to show that Moscow had indeed turned a new leaf.
It was also prudent. Dudayev had yet to acquire his reputation as a gangster and was regarded in Chechnya at least as the leader of a struggle for national liberation. He had the whole Chechen nation united behind him, with the citizens of Grozny pouring out onto the streets to build barricades against the Russian tanks that never came. There was no question that any attempt by Russia to crush the Chechen rebellion by force, would have met determined resistance and led to a long and extremely bloody war that would probably have spread right across the volatile, multi-ethnic north Caucasus region.
But that does not mean that Yeltsin ever intended to forgive and forget. Indeed, while stopping short of overt direct involvement, Russia has been waging a war-by-proxy in Chechnya ever since, providing the anti-Dudayev opposition with arms, financial support and a safe haven whenever necessary. And it made no secret of the fact that it was doing so, for this was part of a campaign to undermine the authority of Dudayev at every opportunity.
The fact that many of the opposition leaders receiving Russian support were no more pro-Moscow than Dudayev -- and certainly no less bloodthirsty or contemptuous of the law -- was immaterial; any enemy of Dudayev was for the time being to be considered a friend.
And so matters might have been left to continue more or less indefinitely, had it not been for the capture of some 70 Russian soldiers fighting alongside Chechen opposition forces last weekend. This in itself was something of an embarrassment for Russia, which has consistently denied that any of its own forces have been involved in the actual fighting. But when Dudayev threatened to execute them, he forced Yeltsin's hand.
This time, it would appear that Dudayev has miscalculated. The Chechens who were united behind him in November 1991 have become disillusioned after three years of lawlessness, violence and severe economic deprivation, interspersed with skirmishes between government and opposition forces. This time the citizens of Grozny are choosing to leave town, rather than stay and build the barricades.
Yeltsin would seem to be holding all the cards. The opposition forces have said they will abide by his cease-fire demand, but should he want a pretext to invade, they would doubtless oblige by starting to fight again. In the meantime, Dudayev has to sit and watch his airports being bombed without a chance to hit back.
For all his defiant statements, he may just end up in an unfamiliar seat around the negotiating table. Unless he opts for Armageddon and shoots his prisoners.
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