The one thing that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has going for him is loyalty. He showed it in October last year when, after some hesitation, he stood behind President Boris Yeltsin during the clashes with the parliamentary opposition, and he has been unstinting in his support ever since.


From the point of view of the president of a country in chaotic transition, such loyalty is a valuable quality in a Defense Minister. But it is no longer enough, and as it becomes clear that Grachev has no other patronage than Yeltsin, his loyalty is becoming less valuable. Grachev is unpopular both inside the armed forces and out, he has no outstanding qualities as a politician and, as the recent outcry over reports of corruption in the Western Group of Forces showed, he keeps some dubious company.


Grachev's days should have been numbered ever since the death of Dmitry Kholodov, the investigative reporter looking into the activities of the Western Group who was blown up by a boobytrap bomb last month. No links have been established between Grachev and that killing, but it brought to center stage the massive corruption in the armed forces of which Grachev must have been aware but has yet to acknowledge or tackle.


Given the foul odor that the Kholodov case has left hanging over the Defense Ministry, this is the time to bring about some long overdue changes. The most important would be to demilitarize the ministry, to allow it to become a genuine part of government, rather than a Soviet-style administrative branch of the armed forces.


The right candidate for Grachev's job is already waiting in the wings. Andrei Kokoshin has been trying to reform the ministry and the armed forces as a whole since being appointed Grachev's first deputy more than two years ago. He is widely respected inside the military as well as in the civilian sector.


It is often said that the military simply would not wear a civilian defense minister. Certainly many in the armed forces would look askance at such an appointment. But there is no reason why a civilian should be any less effective a lobbyist for his own ministry than a professional soldier -- on the contrary.


Firing Grachev must be among the most difficult decisions Yeltsin has had to make as president. Should he stick with what he knows or risk cleaning house in the military, where morale is already at a low ebb? The desire not to rock the boat must be strong. But if Yeltsin does not act soon of his own volition, he could later be forced to accept a defense minister whose ambitions run a great deal higher than driving Mercedes cars.