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There are three teams in the Kremlin. None of them are opposed to democracy, but each understands democracy in its own way.
For liberal economists like Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref, who belongs to the Gaidar-Chubais camp, democracy is essential to the functioning of a normal market economy. But that presupposes the existence of a normal market. In a society just emerging from communism, and where the market is still taking shape, wise rulers sometimes have to violate democratic principles from time to time in the name of progress. The idea of a Russian Pinochet was always popular among liberals with an economic bent, and this helps to explain their support for the coup staged by Boris Yeltsin, his shelling of parliament in 1993 and the information war waged against Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov during the 1996 presidential campaign. This notion of "correcting" the mistakes of democracy occasioned by the "improper understanding" of progressive reforms held by the majority of voters is basically what is meant by the term "managed democracy." Managed democracy will gradually become normal democracy as the economy grows, the standard of living improves and the private sector develops. For this team, then, promoting democracy comes down to pushing ahead with liberal economic reforms.
The second team, the St. Petersburg chekists, hold themselves responsible for the country's sovereignty and its preservation. For them, democracy is part of the modern world, just as the rivalry and struggle between nations is. Their relationship to democracy is entirely pragmatic: They're all for democracy as long as it serves their vision of restoring Russia to great-power status; however, when it hinders them, democracy must be curtailed. In principle, one has to strive for democracy, but today's objectives are described in other more technical terms. And as far as freedom is concerned we have quite enough, indeed in the Yeltsin epoch the country experienced a surfeit of freedom. The chekists understand democracy as the deployment of power in the interest of the majority. Thus, to them, the unabashed oligarchic anarchy of the Yeltsin era is not democracy, but the direct opposite. The thing is, those who ruled the roost completely ignored the interests of the majority. In their view, democratic development is not about the careful observation of all democratic procedures, particularly those that can be exploited by the oligarchs and others capable of hiring expensive lawyers to engage in legal chicanery. Democratic development is about the authorities serving the interests of the majority and on occasion that may mean trampling on the interests of a self-serving minority -- for example, in order to neutralize the ambitions of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, whom the chekists view as a threat to the welfare of the state.
The third team is made up of St. Petersburg lawyers and political spin doctors for whom the future of Russia holds a European-style state based on the rule of law, a competitive market and a robust civil society with strong political parties. Until these factors are in place, however, the country will have to be run "by hand" on occasion. This team shares with the liberal economists a belief in the link between economic growth and the rise of democracy. Like the chekists they insist on political stability and independence. For them building democracy entails pursuing economic reforms that expand the private sector and a state that makes it possible for its citizens to abide by the law. They have therefore concentrated their efforts on administrative and legal reform.
On the whole, the Kremlin holds that the groundwork must be laid before democracy can flourish. This means raising the standard of living, promoting the private sector, creating political stability based on rules of the game that are accepted by the majority, and ensuring the independence of state institutions.
President Putin regards democracy as necessary to the development of the country. Thus to portray him as an advocate of dictatorship is to paint a false caricature. His attitude to democracy, however, is not ideological but instrumental -- i.e. where it works, we will use it and where it does not, we will try something else. For him, democracy is a principle necessary for the country's development, but the country is more important. While the rights of minorities are important to Putin, the powers of the majority are more important. His regime is therefore best described as a plebiscitary democracy based on the will of the majority and pursuing policies in the interests of that majority. If Putin feels that he has the majority of the population behind him, he can act in a very tough manner. And finally, Putin is very much a legalist: He believes that everything should be done according to the law. One's enemies have to be crushed, of course, but the letter of the law must be adhered to.
Managed democracy is not an ideal. It is a natural stage in the development of Russia from Soviet dictatorship through the anarchy of the Yeltsin years to normal democracy. Where democracy and the rule of law are not already in place, the state must be guided by a firm but gentle hand in the name of development and, finally, of democracy.
Not too much attention should be paid to the critics of Putin's policies. They can be broken down into four types. The first are ideological supporters of democracy, for whom freedom is the supreme value even if the country goes to hell in a handbasket. They tore down the Soviet Union, and given the chance they would do the same to the Russian Federation. Listening to them, you come away with the impression that it would be better to hand over power in the North Caucasus to terrorists than to use the army against them and to violate human rights. However, their delusion is sincere, they are human rights activists.
Next come the adherents of the oligarchical model, for whom the citizens of this country simply don't matter. All they want is money and power, and they will go to great lengths to hold on to them. They are mercenary critics.
The third group is made up of Russia's enemies who understand that when properly applied, managed democracy helps the country to develop and lays the foundation for normal democracy. That's the problem -- They fear a strong Russia.
Last but not least are the friends of Russia, Western businessmen, who simply fear that managed democracy could lead the country down the wrong path. They must be drawn into dialogue, calmed and their concerns listened to.
The Kremlin's approach to democracy can be illustrated in terms of freedom of the press. In principle, the regime supports a free press, though it understands that the media are always dependent on something: the state, private owners, financial reality. And profitable media outlets in Russia, such as commercial radio stations and entertainment magazines, are already free. The regime shouldn't meddle in their affairs. All media outlets should strive for such financial independence, but most are hampered by meager advertising revenue -- the result of Russia's low standard of living and its influence on the advertising market. This forces the media to seek out political money. The regime accepts that quality outlets, such as the newspapers Kommersant and Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy radio, are controlled by its political opponents, and even helps them indirectly by keeping the price of paper and equipment artificially low. But in our current situation, with political parties weaker then ever, television is not just another sector of the media. It is a weapon for spreading propaganda. Therefore Putin issued an ultimatum to private interest groups: Disarm, and only the state will wield the weapon of television.
The transition to a free press requires that we build the economic foundation for the advertising market. The bigger the ad market (assuming an independent judiciary), the freer the media, just as developing democracy in Russia today means creating the economic, administrative and legal foundations of democracy. When we have achieved economic growth, a competitive market, an improved standard of living and we have rid the bureaucracy of corruption, the transition to democracy will occur automatically.
This theory has been very influential in the Kremlin, but the events of recent months indicate that it's not entirely accurate. Left to its own devices, managed democracy doesn't automatically lead to full democracy because it entails a simultaneous increase in fervid loyalty to the regime. This is how all large bureaucratic systems are built. But the rise of hyper-loyalty can outpace the building of democracy, as demonstrated during the parliamentary election campaign last fall. The public has grown increasingly annoyed with the propaganda broadcast on state television, and this annoyance, created by the bureaucrats, is opening a gap between Putin and the voters. People like Putin and his policies, but they're turned off by the way television showers him with praise. Low voter turnout in March would reduce the legitimacy of Putin's second term, and that would be a blow for the country.
One thing became clear after the State Duma elections: You can't rely on the political superstructure to automatically follow the movement of the economic base. That's primitive Marxism. Rather, the Kremlin must create democratic development mechanisms, which will promote the development of the political system from managed democracy to consolidated democracy. Here, the top priorities are strengthening civil society, assisting in the development of an opposition and raising the level of pluralism, including vis-a-vis the range of opinions expressed on national television.
It's time to introduce a system of advisory committees for the state channels like those that help shape policy at the BBC.
At the end of Putin's second term, stability should be based not on the president himself, but on stable institutions: a competitive market and democracy. This is Putin's mission in the next four years.
Sergei Markov is director of the Institute of Political Studies and chairman of the Civic Committee on Foreign Affairs. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.