Russia and Europe

Recent developments ?€” including plans for enlarging the European Union, uncertainties surrounding the U.S. presidential election and President Vladimir Putin?€™s ongoing efforts to forge a new Russian foreign policy ?€” indicate an opportunity to enter a new phase in Russia?€™s relations with Europe. The Brussels-based European Press Agency has just completed a study of this subject, examining this dynamic from Mikhail Gorbachev?€™s proposal for "a common European home" to talk of a "strategic partnership" during November?€™s EU-Russian summit.

Our study found plenty wrong with the EU?€™s programs in the 1990s. The lesson that European models may not always be the right ones for Russia was learned at the cost of misspent billions. But today there are new minds at work in Brussels, people concerned not just with economic and commercial relations that were the basis of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but with broader political and security questions.

The key step was last year?€™s decision to establish a common foreign and security policy and the appointment of former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to develop it. The new EU foreign affairs commissioner, Chris Patten, has also shown lively interest in Russia.

Experience in the Balkans has shown that there can be no stability for Europe without the active cooperation of Russia. And without such cooperation, plans for the EU?€™s expansion will be seriously undermined. At the same time Europe is deeply interested in the stability of Russia itself.

Russia has no objection to the enlargement of the European Union, in contrast to its fierce opposition to the further enlargement of NATO. Apart from the attraction of long-term trading arrangements is the fact that applicants for membership include difficult neighbors on whom EU rules may have a restraining influence. But what can be done to take full advantage of these favorable circumstances?

First it is necessary to know what should not be done or even attempted. This particularly concerns steps being taken to create an EU military capability. On the face of it, the creation of a European peacekeeping force should be welcome to Russia, which has long called for European solutions to European situations. But much depends on how that force is designed. The Russians can be supportive if the force is for peacekeeping within Europe, if Russia is kept fully informed about its development and possible missions, and if Russia, like other non-EU countries, is on the list of force providers. In order to do this, Brussels must create a mechanism similar to the Russia-NATO permanent joint council.

What certainly will not attract Russian support is anything that looks like a proxy arm of NATO. And since Russian policy-makers are realistic enough to see the limitations imposed on Europe by its military dependence on NATO logistic and other resources, they are unlikely to go further than trying to persuade the EU to maintain whatever autonomy it can.

However, this leaves scope for action on important advances in the economic and political aspects of the EU-Russian relationship. More than ever before, Europe has come to acknowledge the dependence of its economic and industrial expansion on Russian oil, gas and electricity supplies.

For geographical reasons, Russian gas and oil supplies will always be cheaper for Europe than those of any other foreign source. They may also be more reliable. Other Russian imports will also have a place. However, Russia must recognize that the present market for its manufactures is closer to home ?€” in the CIS and southward.

In the political field, too, there are limits to a "strategic relationship." Russia must by now understand the futility of earlier attempts to split Europe from its relationship with North America. Ties of history, trade and sentiment are simply too strong to be exchanged for an alternative ?€” to say nothing of Europe?€™s continued reliance, despite changes since the Cold War?€™s end, on the U.S. security guarantee.

On the other hand, there is no shortage of Europeans sharing Russia?€™s apprehensions about the effects of a "uni-polar" world, in which Europe would be dominated by the interests of the other side of the Atlantic. A strengthened European relationship with Russia would serve two purposes in addition to the obvious one of cementing stability.

First, it would enhance Europe?€™s sense of collective autonomy. Second, it would provide Russia with a valuable interlocutor inside the wider Russia-Europe-U.S. relationship. Particularly, it could show, in some cases of dispute, that Russia?€™s is not a lone voice. For instance, no one would count on Europe?€™s swaying the United States against deploying a national missile defense, but if Europe and Russia are able to adopt a common position, then the discussion?€™s dynamics would be altered. Finally, for Europe?€™s relations with Russia to have a firm basis in popular support, it is necessary to refresh each side?€™s cultural attitudes. Russians need to understand that when Europeans speak against horrendous excesses on both sides in Chechnya, it is not necessarily an echo of the Cold War.

Similarly, Europeans need to be reminded of the long history that makes Russia part of the European heritage. Certainly Russia?€™s claim in this regard is considerably greater than Turkey?€™s. Europe could benefit from looking at some of the better aspects of Russian society and seeing if it cannot extract lessons useful for itself.

Andrew Wilson and Nina Bachkatov are co-editors of the European Press Agency?€™s monthly intelligence report "Inside Russia and the FSU." They contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.