Politics and the Military

At some point my foreign colleagues stopped asking me, "Who does the Russian Army support?" Events convinced them, and Russian political analysts as well, that the army as an institution -- I'm not speaking about individual generals -- does not have any political ambitions of its own. Military people, like the majority of Russian citizens, are just not interested in taking up any particular political banner.


As a result, the talk of a possible military coup seems to have burned itself out and people no longer fear the army. This would be a very good thing if not for one factor that is typical of the Russian mentality. As so often with us, ceasing to fear also means ceasing to respect. Now people have started asking me, "Who is supporting the army?" And I don't have an answer for that one.


It seems to me that our politicians, having realized that the army cannot serve as a reliable source of support in the political battle, have begun to treat the military as nothing but an obstacle in that struggle. The intense campaign of criticism currently being directed against the leadership of the defense ministry is indicative of more than just society's justifiable anger over charges of corruption and the still unproven claim that the army was involved in the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov.


Even those who let loose this storm have begun to admit this. Yury Boldyrev, whose name is connected with a two-year investigation of financial irregularities in the Western Army Group, cannot hide his amazement today. Financial corruption in the army is no worse than in many other government bodies. Moreover, he claims, many of those who are pushing angry resolutions against the army are themselves involved in corruption on the same scale. Even journalists from Moskovsky Komsomolets acknowledge that their desire to revenge their fallen colleague has been co-opted by forces in some dirty political games.


Of course a number of our leaders are once again, as in 1991, trying to build their careers on an anti-military campaign. However, I see something more profound in this turn of events. Society is exasperated because the army has found itself in an intellectual dead end as it tries to confront some very real and serious issues. After all, the army's problems are, to a large extent, simply the problems of society seen through a magnifying glass: a ruined economy, a huge bureaucratic apparatus, and a conflict between its old missions and its current possibilities.


The problem is how to modernize this aging machine and with what resources. After all, our industrial sector at least has some branches capable of financing their own reconstruction. The army, however, or at least that part of the army that wants to remain within the framework of a democratic society, is completely dependent on the federal budget. Any attempt to raise funds on its own immediately leads to accusations of corruption. And the army is, after all, a heavy burden for Russia's economy.


The current situation is paradoxical. Only by significantly increasing military expenditures today can Russia make significant cuts in the future. For example, funds must be found to pay severance and pensions to the thousands of senior officers who could well be released from service immediately without any harm to the army. Funds must also be found to expand the current program to create a volunteer army, although the Economics Ministry has been calling for the program to be cut back.


Finally, without further funding it will be impossible to continue the process of restructuring the armed forces, which is finally beginning to tackle the problem of concentrating the army's forces on the country's main strategic problems and considerably increasing its effectiveness.


However, the government is not in a position to offer short-term budget increases. The current draft budget allots 45 trillion rubles ($1,447 billion), or about 22 percent of the budget, to the military. For one thing, this is not enough to continue the military reforms. For another, the allotment was made without indicating what concrete programs are to be financed. When the budget is discussed in parliament, it is likely that deputies will again shirk from this responsibility and the available funds will simply be spread in an even, but very thin, layer over all the currently existing military programs.


The Defense Ministry is not to blame for this. Naturally, the military seeks to maintain readiness in every branch. Deciding what is essential and what is secondary is a political matter. Our political leadership must choose the priorities on which our essentially new military will be built.


But this is an enormous responsibility. Not only is our national security at stake, but choosing priorities naturally entails alienating a large portion of the current military-industrial complex and many people who are currently serving in military units or bases that will have to be denied funding in the future.


Politicians, though, always think in terms of the next election and, as a result, are unwilling to take on such dangerous responsibilities. It has become considerably less dangerous to criticize the military leadership, as if it were responsible for slowing down the reform process. That is why I would not hazard a guess as to which political force in Russia is truly committed to supporting the army.


But there is one party that has unwaveringly demonstrated its support for the military. That is Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party, which only recently was promising to find a mission for the army in its infamous "thrust to the south." Those who so far have been unwilling to plunge into the business of reforming Russia's armed forces would do well to keep this in mind.


Alexander Golz is a political commentator for Krasnaya Zvezda. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.