It's no exaggeration to say that the main hero of last week's scandals was, and may be for some time, First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. Not Uneximbank and ORT, not Potanin, Berezovsky or Gusinsky, but Nemtsov.
At first, this seemed illogical. Competitors were fighting over a 25 percent stake in Svyazinvest, with which Nemtsov had no direct connection, but the media criticized his words, his actions -- even the color of his pants. At the end of the week, Nemtsov was accused of taking bribes. And Monday, he was hit with a major new problem.
Novaya Gazeta newspaper published a transcript of a conversation in which, the paper says, Nemtsov and Sergei Lisovsky discussed Nemtsov's honorarium for his book "The Provincial." Because of this honorarium, Nemtsov ostensibly delayed for three days a presidential decree on bureaucrats' declaring income and personal wealth.
Nemtsov's purported motives for holding back the presidential decree (if the conversation did take place) seem strange. The decree did not require that bureaucrats immediately declare their income; they had until July 20.
It's hard to explain Nemtsov's apparent nervous hurry. But this lack of logic is not the point. The point is this: The tone and nature of a telephone conversation between one of the most highly placed government leaders with a major entrepreneur (if, I repeat, there actually was such a conversation) undoubtedly discredits Nemtsov.
Perhaps what's happening to Nemtsov is being used to send a "message" to another first deputy prime minister, Anatoly Chubais.
The Svyazinvest auction started a war among major financial and industrial groups. Obviously, there are other figures behind the visible sides in this war (Uneximbank on one hand; MOST, Berezovsky, Alfa on the other). We're not talking just about the political forces apparently involved (Chubais, Nemtsov, Kokh on the winning side; Chernomyrdin ostensibly on the losing side). Other invisible participants are representatives of major Russian businesses. Most of them didn't take part in the Svyazinvest bid. But in private discussions, the bankers ask the same question: How long does Chubais's team intend to support the particularly privileged position of a certain commercial structure -- which most assume to be Uneximbank?
They say Potanin, as a first deputy prime minister, used his position and the position of former first deputy finance minister Andrei Vavilov for his group's private gain. Uneximbank's privileged position servicing huge government accounts, such as that of the State Customs Committee, has given it a competitive advantage.
The business world is interested in one question: Is Chubais's team planning to continue to support the special position of Uneximbank, or will this favoritism stop?
The results of the Svyazinvest competition, plus the government's intention to conduct a tender for Norilsk Nickel shares under conditions favorable for Uneximbank, were seen as confirmation of the Chubais team's preference for Potanin's group.
It looks strange. It seems Chubais is the guilty party here, but everything's fallen on Nemtsov's head. But the "strangeness" means this: The attackers hope Chubais will change his position. What happened to Nemtsov is just a warning about what could happen to Chubais himself.
At first, this seemed illogical. Competitors were fighting over a 25 percent stake in Svyazinvest, with which Nemtsov had no direct connection, but the media criticized his words, his actions -- even the color of his pants. At the end of the week, Nemtsov was accused of taking bribes. And Monday, he was hit with a major new problem.
Novaya Gazeta newspaper published a transcript of a conversation in which, the paper says, Nemtsov and Sergei Lisovsky discussed Nemtsov's honorarium for his book "The Provincial." Because of this honorarium, Nemtsov ostensibly delayed for three days a presidential decree on bureaucrats' declaring income and personal wealth.
Nemtsov's purported motives for holding back the presidential decree (if the conversation did take place) seem strange. The decree did not require that bureaucrats immediately declare their income; they had until July 20.
It's hard to explain Nemtsov's apparent nervous hurry. But this lack of logic is not the point. The point is this: The tone and nature of a telephone conversation between one of the most highly placed government leaders with a major entrepreneur (if, I repeat, there actually was such a conversation) undoubtedly discredits Nemtsov.
Perhaps what's happening to Nemtsov is being used to send a "message" to another first deputy prime minister, Anatoly Chubais.
The Svyazinvest auction started a war among major financial and industrial groups. Obviously, there are other figures behind the visible sides in this war (Uneximbank on one hand; MOST, Berezovsky, Alfa on the other). We're not talking just about the political forces apparently involved (Chubais, Nemtsov, Kokh on the winning side; Chernomyrdin ostensibly on the losing side). Other invisible participants are representatives of major Russian businesses. Most of them didn't take part in the Svyazinvest bid. But in private discussions, the bankers ask the same question: How long does Chubais's team intend to support the particularly privileged position of a certain commercial structure -- which most assume to be Uneximbank?
They say Potanin, as a first deputy prime minister, used his position and the position of former first deputy finance minister Andrei Vavilov for his group's private gain. Uneximbank's privileged position servicing huge government accounts, such as that of the State Customs Committee, has given it a competitive advantage.
The business world is interested in one question: Is Chubais's team planning to continue to support the special position of Uneximbank, or will this favoritism stop?
The results of the Svyazinvest competition, plus the government's intention to conduct a tender for Norilsk Nickel shares under conditions favorable for Uneximbank, were seen as confirmation of the Chubais team's preference for Potanin's group.
It looks strange. It seems Chubais is the guilty party here, but everything's fallen on Nemtsov's head. But the "strangeness" means this: The attackers hope Chubais will change his position. What happened to Nemtsov is just a warning about what could happen to Chubais himself.